Edward Hallett Carr was born in 1892 and educated at the Merchant Taylors' School, London, and Trinity College, Cambridge. He joined the Foreign Office in 1916, and, after numerous jobs in and connected with the F.O. at home and abroad, he resigned in 1936, and became Wilson Professor of International Politics at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth. He was Assistant Editor of The Times from 1941 to 1946, Tutor in Politics at Balliol College, Oxford, from 1953 to 1955, and became a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1955. Among his many publications are: The Romantic Exiles, The Twenty Year’s Crisis 1919-1939, Conditions of Peace, The Soviet Impact on the Western World, The New Society (1951). The first six volumes of his large-scale History of Soviet Russia has been published in Pelicans, including the Bolshevik Revolution, The Interregnum, and two volumes of Socialism in One Country. Professor Carr's most recent book, a collection of essays, is 1917: Before and After (1968).

I. The Historian and His Facts

I often think it odd that it should be so dull, for a great deal of it must be invention.

- Catherine Morland on History

WHAT is history? Lest anyone think the question meaningless or superfluous, I will take as my text two passages relating respectively to the first and second incarnations of the Cambridge Modern History. Here is Acton in his report of October 1896 to the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press on the work which he had undertaken to edit:

It is a unique opportunity of recording, in the way most useful to the greatest number, the fullness of the knowledge which the nineteenth century is about to bequeath.... By the judicious division of labour we should be able to do it, and to bring home to every man the last document, and the ripest conclusions of international research.

Ultimate history we cannot have in this generation; but we can dispose of conventional
history, and show the point we have reached on the road from one to the other, now that all information is within reach, and every problem has become capable of solution.' And almost exactly sixty years later Professor Sir George Clark, in his general introduction to the second *Cambridge Modern History*, commented on this belief of Acton and his collaborators that it would one day be possible to produce 'ultimate history', and went on:

Historians of a later generation do not look forward to any such prospect. They expect their work to be superseded again and again. They consider that knowledge of the past has come down through one or more human minds, has been 'processed' by them, and therefore cannot consist of elemental and impersonal atoms which nothing can alter....The exploration seems to be endless, and some impatient scholars take refuge in scepticism, or at least in the doctrine that, since all historical judgements involve persons and points of view, one is as good as another and there is no 'objective' historical truth.

Where the pundits contradict each other so flagrantly, the held is open to inquiry. I hope that I am sufficiently up-to-date to recognize that anything written in the 1890s must be nonsense. But I am not yet advanced enough to be committed to the view that anything written in the 1950s necessarily makes sense. Indeed, it may already have occurred to you that this inquiry is liable to stray into something even broader than the nature of history. The clash between Acton and Sir George Clark is a reflection of the change in our total outlook on society over the interval between these two pronouncements. Acton speaks out of the positive belief, the clear-eyed self-confidence, of the later Victorian age; Sir George Clark echoes the bewilderment sad distracted scepticism of the beat generation. When we attempt to answer the question 'What is history?' our answer, consciously or unconsciously, reflects our own position in time, and forms part of our answer to the broader question what view we take of the society in which we live. I have no fear that my subject may, on closer inspection, seem trivial. I am afraid only that I may seem presumptuous to have broached a question so vast and so important.

The nineteenth century was a great age for facts.' What I want', said Mr. Gradgrind in *Ward Times*, 'is Facts.... Facts alone are wanted in life.' Nineteenth-century historians on the whole agreed with him. When Ranke in the 1830s, in legitimate protest against moralizing history, remarked that the task of the historian was 'simply to show how it really was (wei es eigentlich gewesen)', this not very profound aphorism had an astonishing success. Three generations of German, British, and even French historians marched into battle intoning the magic words *Wieu eigendich gewesen* like an incantation - designed, like most incantations, to save them from the tiresome obligation to think for
themselves. The Positivists, anxious to stake out their claim for history as a science, contributed the weight of their influence to this cult of facts. First ascertain the facts, said the Positivists, then draw your conclusions from them. In Great Britain, this view of history fitted in perfectly with the empiricist addition which was the dominant strain in British philosophy from Locke to Bertrand Russell. The empirical theory of knowledge presupposes a complete separation between subject and object. Facts, like sense-impressions, impinge on the observer from outside and are independent of his consciousness. The process of reception is passive: having received the data, he then acts on them. The Oxford Shorter English Dictionary, a useful but tendentious work of the empirical school, clearly marks the separateness of the two processes by defining a fact as 'a datum of experience as distinct from conclusions'. This is what may be called the common-sense view of history. History consists of a corpus of ascertained facts. The facts are available to the historian in documents, inscriptions and so on, like fish on the fishmonger's slab. The historian collects them, takes them home, and cooks and serves them in whatever style appeals to him. Acton, whose culinary tastes were austere, wanted them served plain. In his letter of instructions to contributors to the first Cambridge Modern History he announced the requirement 'that our Waterloo must be one that satisfies French and English, German and Dutch alike; that nobody can tell, without examining the list of authors, where the Bishop of Oxford laid down the pen and whether Fairbairn or Gasquet, Liebermann or Harrison it up'. 'Even Sir George Clark critical as he was of Acton’s attitude, himself contrasted the 'hard core of facts in history with the 'surrounding pulp of disputable interpretation' - forgetting perhaps that the pulpy part of the fruit is more rewarding than the hard core. First get your facts straight, then plunge at your peril into the shifting sands of interpretation - that is the ultimate wisdom of the empirical, common-sense school of history. It recalls the favourite dictum of the great liberal journalist C. P. Scott: 'Facts are sacred, opinion is free.'

Now this clearly will not do. I shall not embark on a philosophical discussion of the nature of our knowledge of the past. Let us assume for present purposes that the fact that Caesar crossed the Rubicon and the fact there is a table in the middle of the room are of the same or of a comparable order, that both these facts enter our consciousness in the same or in a comparable manner, and that both have the same objective character in relation to the person who knows them. But, even on this bold and not very plausible assumption, our argument at mice runs into the difficulty that not all facts about the past are historical facts, or are treated as such by the historian. What is the criterion which distinguishes the facts of history from other facts about the past?
What is a historical fact? This is a crucial question into which we must look a little more closely. According to the commonsense view, there are certain basic facts which are the same for all historians and which form, so to speak, the backbone of history - the fact, for example, that the Battle of Hastings was fought in 1066. But this view calls for two observations. In the first place, it is not with facts like these that the historian is primarily concerned. It is no doubt important to know that the great battle was fought in 1066 and not in 1065 or 1067, and that it was fought at Hastings and not at Eastbourne or Brighton. The historian must not get these things wrong. But when points of this kind are raised, I am reminded of Housman's remark that 'accuracy is a duty, not a virtue'. To praise a historian for his accuracy is like praising an architect for using well-seasoned timber or properly mixed concrete in his building. It is a necessary condition of his work, but not his essential function. It is precisely for matters of this kind that the historian is entitled to rely on what have been called the 'auxiliary sciences' of history archaeology, epigraphy, numismatics, chronology, and so forth. The historian is not required to have the special skills which enable the expert to determine the origin and period of a fragment of pottery or marble, to decipher an obscure inscription, or to make the elaborate astronomical calculations necessary to establish a precise date. These so-called basic facts, which are the same for all historians, commonly belong to the category of the raw materials of the historian rather than of history itself. The second observation is that the necessity to establish these basic facts rests not on any quality in the facts themselves, but on an a priori decision of the historian. In spite of C. P. Scott's motto, every journalist knows today that the most effective way to influence opinion is by the selection and arrangement of the appropriate facts. It used to be said that facts speak for themselves. This is, of course, untrue. The facts, speak only when the historian calls on them: it is he who decides to which facts to give the door, and in what order or context. It was, I think, one of Pirandello's characters who said that a fact is like a sack - it won't stand up till you've put something in it. The only reason why we are interested to know that the battle was fought at Hastings in 1066 is that historians regard it as a major historical event. It is the historian who has decided for his own reasons that Caesar's crossing of that petty stream, the Rubicon, is a fact of history, whereas the crossing of the Rubicon by millions of other people before or since interests nobody at all. The fact that you arrived in this building half an hour ago on foot, or on a bicycle, or in a car, is just as much a fact about the past as the fact that Caesar crossed the Rubicon. But it will probably be ignored by historians. Professor Talcott Parsons once called science 'a selective system of cognitive orientations to reality'. It might perhaps have been put more simply. But history is, among other things, that. The historian is necessarily selective. The belief in a hard core of historical facts existing objectively and independently of the interpretation of the historian is a
preposterous fallacy, but one which it is very hard to eradicate.

Let us take a look at the process by which a mere fact about the past is transformed into a fact of history. At Stalybridge Wakes in 1850, a vendor of gingerbread, as the result of some petty dispute, was deliberately kicked to death by an angry mob. Is this a fact of history? A year ago I should unhesitatingly have said 'no'. It was recorded by an eyewitness in some little-known memoirs"; but I had never seen it judged worthy of mention by any historian. A year ago Dr Kitson Clark cited it in his Ford lectures in Oxford. Does this make it into a historical fact? Not, I think, yet. Its present status, I suggest, is that it has been proposed for membership of the select club of historical facts. It now awaits a seconder and sponsors. It may be that in the course of the next few years we shall see this fact appearing first in footnotes, then in the text, of articles and books about nineteenth-century England, and that in twenty or thirty years' time it may be a well-established historical fact. Alternatively, nobody may take it up, in which case it will relapse into the limbo of unhistorical facts about the past from which Dr Kitson Clark has gallantly attempted to rescue it. What will decide which of these two things will happen? It will depend, I think, on whether the thesis or interpretation in support of which Dr Kitson Clark cited this incident is accepted by other historians as valid and significant. Its status as a historical fact will turn on a question of interpretation. This element of interpretation enters into every fact of history.

May I be allowed a personal reminiscence. When I studied ancient history in this university many years ago, I had as a special subject 'Greece in the period of the Persian Wars'. I collected fifteen or twenty volumes on my shelves and took it far granted that there, recorded in these volumes, I had all the facts relating to my subject. Let us assume - it was very nearly true - that those volumes contained all the facts about it that were then known, or could be known. It never occurred to me to inquire by what accident or process of attrition that minute selection of facts, out of all the myriad facts that must once have been known to somebody, had survived to become tire facts of history. I suspect that even today one of the fascinations of ancient and medieval history is that it gives us the illusion of having all the facts at our disposal within a manageable compass: the nagging distinction between the facts of history and other facts about the past vanishes, because the few known facts are all facts of history. As Bury, who had worked in both periods, said, 'the records of ancient and medieval history are starred with lacunae. ' History has been called an enormous jig-saw with a lot of missing parts. But the main trouble does not consist in the lacunae. Our picture of Greece in the fifth century B.C. is defective not primarily because so many of the bits have been accidentally lost, but because it is, by and
large, the picture formed by a tiny group of people in the city of Athens. We know a lot about what fifth-century Greece looked like to an Athenian citizen; but hardly anything about what it looked like to a Spartan, a Corinthian, or a Theban - not to mention a Persian, or a slave or other non-citizen resident in Athens. Our picture has been preselected and predetermined for us, not so much by accident as by people who were consciously or unconsciously imbued with a particular view and thought the facts which supported that view worth preserving. In the same way, when I read in a modern history of the Middle Ages that the people of the Middle Ages were deeply concerned with religion, I wonder how we know this, and whether it is true. What we know as the facts of medieval history have almost all been selected for us by generations of chroniclers who were professionally occupied in the theory and practice of religion, and who therefore thought it supremely important, and recorded everything relating to it, and not much else. The picture of the Russian peasant as devoutly religious was destroyed by the revolution of 1917. The picture of medieval man as devoutly religious, whether true or not, is indestructible, because nearly all the known facts about him were preselected for us by people who believed it, and wanted others to believe it, and a mass of other facts, in which we might possibly have found evidence to the contrary, has been lost beyond recall. The dead hand of vanished generations of historians, scribes, and chroniclers has determined beyond the possibility of appeal the pattern of the past.’ The history we read;’ writes Professor Barraclough, himself trained as a medievalist, 'though based on facts, is, strictly speaking, not factual at all, but a series of accepted judgements."

But let us turn to the different, but equally grave, plight of the modern historian. The ancient or medieval historian may be grateful for the vast winnowing process which, over the years, has put at his disposal a manageable corpus of historical facts. As Lytton Strachey said, in his mischievous way, 'ignorance is the first requisite of the historian, ignorance which simplifies and clarifies, which selects and omits.'" When I am tempted, as I sometimes am, to envy the extreme competence of colleagues engaged in writing ancient or medieval history, I find consolation in the reflection that they are so competent mainly because they are so ignorant of their subject. The modern historian enjoys none of the advantages of this built-in ignorance. He must cultivate this necessary ignorance for himself - the more so the nearer he comes to his own times. He has the dual task of discovering the few significant facts and turning them into facts of history, and of discarding the many insignificant facts as unhistorical. But this is the very converse of the nineteenth- century heresy that history consists of the compilation of a maximum number of irrefutable and objective facts. Anyone who succumbs to this heresy will either have to give up history as a bad job, and take to stamp-collecting or some other form of
antiquarianism, or end in a madhouse. It is this heresy which during the past hundred years
has had such devastating effects on the modern historian, producing in Germany, in Great
Britain, and in the United States, a vast and growing mass of dry-as-dust factual histories,
of minutely specialized mono-graphs of would-be historians knowing more and more
about less and less, sunk without trace in an ocean of facts. It was, I suspect, this heresy -
rather than the alleged conflict between liberal and Catholic loyalties - which frustrated
Acton as a historian. In an early essay he said of his teacher Dollinger: 'He would not write
with imperfect materials, and to him the materials were always imperfect.' Acton was
surely here pronouncing an anticipatory verdict on himself, on that strange phenomenon of
a historian whom many would regard as the most distinguished occupant the Regius Chair
of Modern History in this university has ever had - but who wrote no history. And Acton
wrote his own epitaph, in the introductory note to the first volume of the *Cambridge
Modern History* published just after his death, when he lamented that the requirements
pressing on the historian 'threaten to turn him from a man of letters into the compiler of an
encyclopaedia'. Something had gone wrong. What had gone wrong was the belief in this
untiring and unending accumulation of hard facts as the foundation of history, the belief
that facts speak for themselves and that we cannot have too many facts, a belief at that
time so unquestioning that few historians then thought it necessary - and some still think it
unnecessary today - to ask themselves the question.

The nineteenth-century fetishism of facts was completed and justified by a fetishism of
documents. The documents were the Art of the Covenant in the temple of facts. The
reverent historian approached them with bowed head and spoke of than in awed tones. If
you find it in the documents, it is so. But what, when we get down to it, do these
documents - the decrees, the treaties, the rent-rolls, the blue books, the official
 correspondence, the private letters and diaries - tell us. No document am tell us more than
what the author of the document thought - what he thought had happened, what he thought
ought to hap- pen or would happen, or perhaps only what he wanted others no think he
thought, or even only what he himself thought he thought. None of this means anything
until she historian has got to work on it and deciphered it. The facts, whether found in
documents or not, have still to be processed by the historian before he can make any use of
them: the we he makes of them is, if I may put it that way, the processing process.

Let me illustrate what I am trying to say by an example which I happen to know well.
When Gustav Stresemann, the Foreign Minister of the Weimar Republic, died in 1929, he
left behind him an enormous mass - 300 boxes full - of papers, official, semi-official, and
private, nearly all relating to the six years of his tenure of office as Foreign Minister. His
friends and relatives naturally thought that a monument should be raised to the memory of so great a man. His faithful secretary Bernhard got to work; and within three years there appeared three massive volumes, of some 600 pages each, of selected documents from the 300 boxes, with the impressive title Stresemanns Vermachtnis. In the ordinary way the documents themselves would have mouldered away in some cellar or attic and disappeared for ever; or perhaps in a hundred years or so some curious scholar would have come upon them and set out to compare them with Bernhard's text. What happened was far more dramatic. In 1945 the documents fell into the hands of the British and American Governments, who photographed the lot and put the photostats at the disposal of scholars in the Public Record office in London and in the National Archives in Washington, so that, if we have sufficient patience and curiosity, we can discover exactly what Bernhard did. What he did was neither very unusual nor very shocking. When Stresemann died, his western policy seemed to have been crowned with a series of brilliant successes - Locarno, the admission of Germany to the League of Nations, the Dawes and Young plans and the American loans, the withdrawal of allied occupation armies from the Rhineland. This seemed the important and rewarding: part of Stresemann's foreign policy; and it was not unnatural that it should have been over-represented in Bernhard's selection of documents. Stresemann's eastern policy, on the other hand, his relations with the Soviet Union, seemed to have led nowhere in particular; and, since masses of documents about negotiations which yielded only trivial results were not very interesting and added nothing to Stresemann's reputation, the process of selection could be more rigorous. Stresemann in fact devoted a far more constant and anxious attention to relations with the Soviet Union, and they played a far larger part in his foreign policy as a whole, than the reader of the Bernhard selection would surmise. But the Bernhard volumes compare favourably, I suspect, with many published collections of documents on which the ordinary historian implicitly relies.

This is not the end of my story. Shortly after the publication of Bernhard's volumes, Hitler came into power. Stresemann's name was consigned to oblivion in Germany, and the volumes disappeared from circulation: many, perhaps most, of the copies must have been destroyed. Today Stresemanns Vermachtnis is a rather rare book. But in the west Stresemann's reputation stood high. In 1935 an English publisher brought out an abbreviated translation of Bernhard's work - a selection from Bernhard's selection; perhaps one-third of the original was omitted. Sutton, a well-known translator from the German, did his job competently and well. The English version, he explained in the preface, was 'slightly condensed, but only by the omission of a certain amount of what, it was felt, was more ephemeral matter ... of little interest to English readers or students'. This again is
natural enough. But the result is that Stresemann's eastern policy, already underrepresented in Bernhard, recedes still further from view, and the Soviet Union appears in Sutton's volumes merely as an occasional and rather unwelcome intruder in Stresemann's predominantly western foreign policy. Yet it is safe to say that, for all except a few specialists, Sutton and not Bernhard - and still less the documents themselves - represents for the western world the authentic voice of Stresemann. Had the documents perished in 1945 in the bombing, and had the remaining Bernhard volumes disappeared, the authenticity and authority of Sutton would never have been questioned. Many printed collections of documents, gratefully accepted by historians in default of the originals, rest on no secure basis than this.

But I want to carry the story one step further. Let us forget about Bernhard and Sutton, and be thankful that we can, if we choose, consult the authentic papers of a leading participant in some important events of recent European history. What do the papers tell us? Among other things they contain records of some hundreds of Stresemann's conversations with the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin and of a score or so with Chicherin. These records have one feature in common. They depict Stresemann as having the lion's share of the conversations and reveal his arguments as invariably well put and cogent, while those of his partner are for the most part scanty, confused, and unconvincing. This is a familiar characteristic of all records of diplomatic conversations. The documents do not tell us what happened, but only what Stresemann thought had happened, or what he wanted others to think, or perhaps what he wanted himself to think, had happened. It was not Sutton or Bernhard, but Stresemann himself, who started the process of selection. And if we had, say, Chicherin's records of these same conversations, we should still learn from them only what Chicherin thought, and what really happened would still have to be reconstructed in the mind of the historian. Of course, facts and documents are essential to the historian. But do not make a fetish of them. They do not by themselves constitute history; they provide in themselves no ready-made answer to this tiresome question 'What is history?'

At this point I should like to say a few words on the question why nineteenth-century historians were generally indifferent to the philosophy of history. The term was invented by Voltaire, and has since been used in different senses; but I shall take it to mean, if I use it at all, our answer to the question, 'What is history~' The nineteenth century was, for the intellectuals of western Europe, a comfortable period exuding confidence and optimism. The facts were on the whole satisfactory; and the inclination to ask and answer awkward questions about them was correspondingly weak. Ranke piously believed that divine providence would take care of the meaning of history, if he took care of the facts; and
Burckhardt, with a more modern touch of cynicism, observed that 'we are not initiated into the purposes of the eternal wisdom'. Professor Butterfield as late as 1931 noted with apparent satisfaction that 'historians have reflected little upon the nature of things, and even the nature of their own subject'. But my predecessor in these lectures, Dr A. L. Rowse, more justly critical, wrote of Sir Winston Churchill's World Crisis - his book about the First World War - that, while it matched Trotsky's History of the Russian Revolution in personality, vividness, and vitality, it was inferior in one respect: it had 'no philosophy of history behind it'. British historians refused to be drawn, not because they believed that history had no meaning, but because they believed that its meaning was implicit and self-evident. The liberal nineteenth-century view of history had a close affinity with the economic doctrine of laissez-faire - also the product of a serene and self-confident outlook on the world. Let everyone get on with his particular job, and the hidden hand would take care of the universal harmony. The facts of history were themselves a demonstration of the supreme fact of a beneficent and apparently infinite progress towards higher things. This was the age of innocence, and historians walked in the Garden of Eden, without a scrap of philosophy to cover them, naked and unashamed before the god of history. Since then, we have known Sin and experienced a Fall; and those historians who today pretend to dispense with a philosophy of history merely trying, vainly and self-consciously, like members of a nudist colony, to recreate the Garden of Eden in their garden suburb. Today the awkward question can no longer be evaded.

During the past fifty years a good deal of serious work has been done on the question 'What is history?' It was from Germany, the country which was to do so much to upset the comfortable reign of nineteenth-century liberalism, that the first challenge came in the 1880s and 1890s to the doctrine of the primacy and autonomy of facts in history. The philosophers who made the challenge are now little more than names: Dilthey is the only one of them who has recently received some belated recognition in Great Britain. Before the turn of the century, prosperity and confidence were still too great in this country for any attention to be paid to heretics who attacked the cult of facts. But early in the new century, the torch passed to Italy, where Croce began to propound a philosophy of history which obviously owed much to German masters. All history is 'contemporary history', declared Croce,' meaning that history consists essentially in seeing the past through the eyes of the present and in the light of its problems, and that the main work of the historian is not to record, but to evaluate; for, if he does not evaluate, how can he know what is worth recording? In 1910 the American historian, Carl Becker, argued in deliberately provocative language that 'the facts of history do not exist for any historian till he creates them'. These challenges were for the moment little noticed. It was only after 1920 that
Croce began to have a considerable vogue in France and Great Britain. This was not perhaps because Croce was a subtler thinker or a better stylist than his German predecessors, but because, after the First World War, the facts seemed to smile on us less propitiously than in the years before 1914, and we were therefore more accessible to a philosophy which sought to diminish their prestige. Croce was an important influence on the Oxford philosopher and historian Collingwood, the only British thinker in the present century who has made a serious contribution to the philosophy of history. He did not live to write the systematic treatise he had planned; but his published and unpublished papers on the subject were collected after his death in a volume entitled *The Idea of History*, which appeared in 1945.

The views of Collingwood can be summarized as follows. The philosophy of history is concerned neither with 'the past by itself' nor with 'the historian's thought about it by itself', but with 'the two things in their mutual relations'. (This dictum reflects the two current meanings of the word 'history' - the inquiry conducted by the historian and the series of past events into which he inquires.) 'The past which a historian studies is not a dead past, but a past which in some sense is still living in the present.' But a past act is dead, i.e. meaningless to the historian, unless he can understand the thought that lay behind it. Hence 'all history is the history of thought', and 'history is the re-enactment in the historian's mind of the thought whose history he is studying'. The reconstitution of the past in the historian's mind is dependent on empirical evidence. But it is not in itself an empirical process, and cannot consist in a mere recital of facts. On the contrary, the process of reconstitution governs the selection and interpretation of the facts: this, indeed, is what makes them historical facts. 'History', says Professor Oakeshott, who on this point stands near to Collingwood, 'is the historian's experience. It is "made" by nobody save the historian: to write history is the only way of making'.

This searching critique, though it may call for some serious reservations, brings to light certain neglected truths. In the first place, the faces of history never come to us 'pure', since they do not and cannot exist in a pure form: they are always refracted through the mind of the recorder. It follows that when we take up a work of history, our first concern should be not with the facts which it contains but with the historian who wrote it. Let me take as an example the great historian in whose honour and in whose name these lectures were founded. G. M. Trevelyan, as he tells us in his autobiography, was 'brought up at home on a somewhat exuberantly Whig tradition and he would not, I hope, disclaim the title if I described him as the last and not the least of the great English liberal historians of the Whig tradition. It is not for nothing that he traces back his family tree, through the
great Whig historian George Otto Trevelyan, to Macaulay, incomparably the greatest of
the Whig historians. Trevelyan's finest and maturest work, *England under Queen Anne*,
was written against that background, and will yield its full meaning and significance to the
reader only when read against that background. The author, indeed, leaves the reader with
no excuse for failing to do so. For, if following the technique of connoisseurs of detective
novels, you read the end first, you will find on the last few pages of the third volume the
best summary known to me of what is nowadays called the Whig interpretation of history;
and you will see that what Trevelyan is trying to do is to investigate the origin and
development of the Whig tradition, and to root it fairly and squarely in the years after the
death of its founder, William III. Though this is not, perhaps, the only conceivable
interpretation of the events of Queen Anne's reign, it is a valid and, in Trevelyan's hands, a
fruitful interpretation. But, in order to appreciate it at its' full value, you have to
understand what the historian is doing. For if, as Collingwood says, the historian must re-
enact in thought what has gone on in the mind of his dramatis personae, so the reader in
his turn must re-enact what goes on in the mind of the historian. Study the historian before
you begin to study the facts. This is, after all, not very abstruse. It is what is already done
by the intelligent undergraduate who, when recommended to read a work by that great
scholar Jones of St Jude's, goes round to a friend at St Jude's to ask what sort of chap
Jones is, and what bees he has in his bonnet. When you read a work of history, always
listen out for the buzzing. If you can detect none, either you are tone deaf or your historian
is a dull dog. The facts are really not at all like fish on the fishmonger's slab. They are like
fish swimming about in a vast and sometimes inaccessible ocean; and what the historian
catches will depend, partly on chance, but mainly on what part of the ocean he chooses to
fish in and what tackle he chooses to use - these two factors being, of course, determined
by the kind of fish he wants to catch. By and lame, the historian will get the kind of facts
he wants. History means interpretation. Indeed, if, standing Sir George Clark on his head,
I were to call history 'a hard core of interpretation surrounded by a pulp of disputable facts
', my statement would, no doubt, be one-sided and misleading, but no more so, I venture to
think, than the original dictum.

The second point is the more familiar one of the historian's need of imaginative
understanding for the minds of the people with whom he is dealing, for the thought behind
their acts: I say imaginative understanding', not 'sympathy', lest sympathy should be
supposed to imply agreement. The nineteenth century was weak in medieval history,
because it was too much repelled by the superstitious beliefs of the Middle Ages, and by
the barbarities which they inspired, to have any imaginative understanding of medieval
people. Or take Burckhardt's censorious remark about the Thirty Years War: It is
scandalous for a creed, no matter whether it is Catholic or Protestant, to place its salvation above the integrity of the nation." It was extremely difficult for a nineteenth-century liberal historian, brought up to believe that it is right and praiseworthy to kill in defence of one's country, but wicked and wrong-headed to kill in defence of one's religion, to enter into the state of mind of those who fought the Thirty Years War. This difficulty is particularly acute in the held in which I am now working. Much of what has been written in English speaking countries in the last ten years about the Soviet Union, and in the Soviet Union about the English-speaking countries, has been vitiated by this inability to achieve even the most elementary measure of imaginative understanding of what goes on in the mind of the other party, so that the words and actions of the other are always made to appear malign, senseless, or hypocritical. History cannot be written unless the historian can achieve some kind of contact with the mind of those about whom he is writing.

The third point is that we can view the past, and achieve our understanding of the past, only through the eyes of the present. The historian is of his own age, and is bound to it by the conditions of human existence. The very words which he uses - words like democracy, empire, war, revolution - have current connotations from which he cannot divorce them. Ancient historians have taken to using words like polls and plebs in the original, just in order to show that they have not fallen into this trap. This does not help them. They, too, live in the present, and cannot cheat themselves into the past by using unfamiliar or obsolete words, any more than they would become better Greek or Roman historians if they delivered their lectures in a *chilamys et a toga*. The names by which successive French historians have described the Parisian crowds which played so prominent a role in the French revolution - *les sans-vulottes, le peuple, la canaille, les bras-nus* - are all, for those who know the rules of the game, manifestos of a political affiliation and of a particular interpretation. Yet the historian is obliged to choose: the use of language forbids him to be neutral. Nor is it a matter of words alone. Over the past hundred years the changed balance of power in Europe has reversed the attitude of British historians to Frederick the Great. The changed balance of power within the Christian churches between Catholicism and Protestantism has profoundly altered their attitude to such figures as Loyola, Luther, ad Cromwell. It requires only a superficial knowledge of the work of French historians of the last forty years on the French revolution to recognize how deeply it has been affected by the Russian revolution of 1917. The historian belongs not to the past but to the present. Professor Trevor-Roper tells us that the historian 'ought to love the past.' This is a dubious injunction. To love the past may easily be an expression of the nostalgic romanticism of old men and old societies, a symptom of loss of faith and interest in the present or future. Cliché for cliché, I should prefer the one about freeing oneself
from 'the dead hand of the past'. The function of the historian is neither to love the past nor to emancipate himself from the past, but to master and understand it as the key to the understanding of the present.

If, however, these are some of the insights of what I may call the Collingwood view of history, it is time to consider some of the dangers. The emphasis on the role of the historian in the making of history tends, if pressed to its logical conclusion, to rule out any objective history at all: history is what the historian makes. Collingwood seems indeed, at one moment, in an unpublished note quoted by his editor, to have reached this conclusion:

St Augustine looked at history from the point of view of the early Christian; Tillamont, from that of a seventeenth-century Frenchman; Gibbon, from that of an eighteenth-century Englishman; Mommsen from that of a nineteenth-century German. There is no point in asking which was the right point of view. Each was the only one possible for the man who adopted

This amounts to total scepticism, like Froude's remark that history is 'a child's box of letters with which we can spell any word we please'. Collingwood, in his reaction against 'scissors- and-paste history', against the view of history as a mere compilation of facts, comes perilously near to treating history as something spun out of the human brain, and leads back to the conclusion referred to by Sir George Clark in the passage which I quoted earlier, that there is no "objective" historical truth'. In place of the theory that history has no meaning, we are offered here the theory of an infinity of meanings, none any more right than any other - which comes to much the same thing. The second theory is surely as untenable as the first. It does not follow that, because a mountain appears to take on different because interpretation plays a necessary part in establishing the facts of history, and because no existing interpretation is wholly objective, one interpretation is as good as another, and the facts of history are in principle not amenable to objective interpretation. I shall have to consider at a later stage what exactly is meant by objectivity in history.

But a still greater danger lurks in the Collingwood hypothesis. If the historian necessarily looks at his period of history through the eyes of his own time, and studies the problems of the past as a key to those of the present, will he not fall into a purely pragmatic view of the facts, and maintain that the criterion of a right interpretation is its suitability to some present purpose? On this hypothesis, the facts of history are nothing, interpretation is everything. Nietzsche had already enunciated the principle: 'The falseness of an opinion is not for us any objection to it. ... The question is how far it is life-furthering, life-
preserving, species-preserving, perhaps species-creating. The American pragmatists moved, less explicitly and less wholeheartedly, along the same line. Knowledge is knowledge for some purpose. The validity of the knowledge depends on the validity of the purpose. But even where no such theory has been professed, practice has often been no less disquieting. In my own field of study I have seen too many examples of extravagant interpretation riding roughshod over facts not to be impressed with the reality of this danger. It is not surprising that perusal of some of the more extreme products of Soviet and anti-Soviet schools of historiography should sometimes breed a certain nostalgia for that illusory nineteenth-century haven of purely factual history.

How then, in the middle of the twentieth century, are we to define the obligation of the historian to his facts? I trust that I have spent a sufficient number of hours in recent years chasing and perusing documents, and stuffing my historical narrative with properly footnoted facts, to escape the imputation of treating facts and documents too cavalierly. The duty of the historian to respect his facts is not exhausted by the obligation to see that his facts are accurate. He must seek to bring into the picture all known or knowable facts relevant, in one sense or another, to the theme on which he is engaged and to the interpretation proposed. If he seeks to depict the Victorian Englishman as a moral and rational being, he must not forget what happened at Starybridge Wakes in 1850. But this, in turn, does not mean that he can eliminate interpretation, which is the life-blood of history. Laymen - that is to say, non-academic friends or friends from other academic disciplines - sometimes ask me how the historian goes to work when he writes history. The commonest assumption appears to be that the historian divides his work into two sharply distinguishable phases or periods. First, he spends a long preliminary period reading his sources and filling his notebooks with facts: then, when this is over, he puts away his sources, fake out his notebooks and writes his book from beginning to end. This is to me an unconvincing and implausible picture. For myself, as soon as I have got going on a few of what I take to be the capital sources, the itch becomes too strong and I begin to write - not necessarily at the beginning, but somewhere, anywhere. Thereafter, reading and writing go on simultaneously. The writing is added to, subtracted from, reshaped, cancelled, as I go on reading. The reading is guided and directed and made fruitful by the writing: the more I write, the more I know what I am looking for, the better I understand the significance and relevance of what I find. Some historians probably do all this preliminary writing in their head without using pen, paper, or typewriter, just as some people play chess in their heads without recourse to board and chessmen: this is a talent which I envy, but cannot emulate. But I am convinced that, for any historian worth the name, the two processes of what economists call 'input' and 'output' go on simultaneously.
and are, in practice, parts of a single process. If you try to separate them, or to give one priority over the other, you fall into one of two heresies. Either you write scissors-and-paste history without meaning or significance; or you write propaganda or historical fiction, and merely use facts of the past to embroider a kind of writing which has nothing to do with history.

Our examination of the relation of the historian to the facts of history finds us, therefore, in an apparently precarious situation, navigating delicately between the Scylla of an untenable theory of history as an objective compilation of facts, of the unqualified primacy of fact over interpretation, and the Charybdis of an equally untenable theory of history as the subjective product of the mind of the historian who establishes the facts of history and masters them through the process of interpretation, between a view of history having the centre of gravity in the past and a view having the centre of gravity in the present. But our situation is less precarious than it seems. We shall encounter the same dichotomy of fact and interpretation again in these lectures in other guises - the particular and the general, the empirical and the theoretical, the objective and the subjective. The predicament of the historian is a reflexion of the nature of man. Man, except perhaps in earliest infancy and in extreme old age, is not totally involved in his environment and unconditionally subject to it. On the other hand, he is never totally independent of it and its unconditionally master. The relation of man to his environment is the relation of the historian to his theme. The historian is neither the humble slave nor the tyrannical master of Ids facts. The relation between the historian and his facts is one of equality, of give-and-take. As any working historian knows, if he stops to reflect what he is doing as he thinks and writes, the historian is engaged on a continuous process of moulding his facts to his interpretation and his interpretation to his facts. It is impossible to assign primacy to one over the other.

The historian starts with a provisional selection of facts, and a provisional interpretation in the light of which that selection has been made - by others as well as by himself. As he works, both the interpretation and the selection and ordering of facts undergo subtle and perhaps partly unconscious changes, through the reciprocal action of one or the other. And this reciprocal action also involves reciprocity between present and past, since the historian is part of the present and the facts belong to the past. The historian and the facts of history are necessary to one another. The historian without his facts is rootless and futile; the facts without their historian are dead and meaningless. My first answer therefore to the question 'What is history?' is that it is a continuous process of interaction between the historian and his facts, an unending dialogue between the present and the past.
2. Society and the individual

The question which comes first - society or the individual - is like the question about the hen and the egg. Whether you treat it as a logical or as a historical question, you can make no statement about it, one way or the other, which does not have to be corrected by an opposite, and equally one-sided, statement. Society and the individual are inseparable; they are necessary and complementary to each other, not opposites. 'No man is an island, entire of itself;' in Dore's famous words: 'every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main.' That is an aspect of the truth. On the other hand, take the dictum of J. S. Mill, the classical individualist: 'Men are not, when brought together, converted into another kind of substance. 'Of course not. But the fallacy is to suppose that they existed, or had any kind of substance, before being 'brought together'. As soon as we are born, the world gets to work on us and transforms us from merely biological into social units. Every human being at every stage of history or pre-history is born into a society and from his earliest years is moulded by that society. The language which he speaks is not an individual inheritance, but a social acquisition from the group in which he grows up. Both language and environment help to determine the character of his thought; his earliest ideas come to him from others. As has been well said, the individual apart from society would be both speechless and mindless. The lasting fascination of the Robinson Crusoe myth is due to its attempt to imagine an individual independent of society. The attempt breaks down. Robinson is not an abstract individual, but an Englishman from York; he carries his Bible with him and prays to his tribal God. The myth quickly bestows on him his Man Friday; and the building of a new society begins. The other relevant myth is that of Kirilov in Dostoyevsky's *Devils* who kills himself in order to demonstrate his perfect freedom. Suicide is the only perfectly free act open to individual man; every other act involves in one way or another his membership of society.

It is commonly said by anthropologists that primitive man is less individual and more completely moulded by his society than civilized man. This contains an element of truth. Simpler societies are more uniform, in the sense that they call for, and provide opportunities for, a far smaller diversity of individual skills and occupations than the more complex and advanced societies. Increasing individualization in this sense is a necessary product of modern advanced society, and runs through all its activities from top to bottom. But it would be a serious error to set up an antithesis between this process of individualization and the growing strength and cohesion of society. The development of society and the development of the individual go hand in hand and condition each other. Indeed what we mean by a complex or advanced society is a society in which the
interdependence of individuals on one another has assumed advanced and complex forms. It would be dangerous to assume that the power of a modern national community to mould the character and thought of its individual members, and to produce a certain degree of conformity and uniformity among them, is any less than that of a primitive tribal community. The old conception of national character based on biological differences has long been exploded; but differences of national character arising out of different national backgrounds of society and education are difficult to deny. That elusive entity 'human nature' has varied so much from country to country and from century to century that it is difficult not to regard it as a historical phenomenon shaped by prevailing social conditions and conventions. There are many differences between, say, Americans, Russians, and Indians. But some, and perhaps the most important, of these differences take the form of different attitudes to social relations between individuals, or, in other words, to the way in which society should be constituted, so that the study of differences between American, Russian, and Indian society as a whole may well turn out to be the best way of studying differences between individual Americans, Russians, and Indians. Civilized man, like primitive man, is moulded by society just as effectively as society is moulded by him. You can no more have the egg without the hen than you can have the hen without the egg.

It would have been unnecessary to dwell on these very obvious truths but for the fact that they have been obscured for us by the remarkable and exceptional period of history from which the western world is only just emerging. The cult of individualism is one of the most pervasive of modern historical myths. According to the familiar account in Burckhardt's *Civilisation of the Renaissance in Italy*, the second part of which is subtitled 'The Development of the Individual', the cult of the individual began with the Renaissance, when man, who had hitherto been 'conscious of himself only as a member of a race, people, party, family, or corporation', at length 'became a spiritual individual and recognized himself as such'. Later the cult was connected with the rise of capitalism and of Protestantism, with the beginnings of the industrial revolution, and with the doctrines of laissez-faire. The rights of man and the citizen proclaimed by the French revolution were the rights of the individual. Individualism was the basis of the great nineteenth-century philosophy of utilitarianism, Morley's essay *On Compromise*, a characteristic document of Victorian liberalism, called individualism and utilitarianism 'the religion of human happiness and well-being'. 'Rugged individualism' was the keynote of human progress. This may be a perfectly sound and valid analysis of the ideology of a particular historical epoch. But what I want to make clear is that the increased individualization which accompanied the rise of the modern world was a normal process of advancing civilization. A social revolution brought new social groups to positions of power. It
operated, as always, through individuals and by offering fresh opportunities of individual
development; and, since in the early stages of capitalism the units of production and
distribution were largely in the hands of single individuals, the ideology of the new social
order strongly emphasized the role of individual initiative in the social order. But the
whole process was a social process representing a specific stage in historical development,
and cannot be explained in terms of a revolt of individuals against society or of an
emancipation of individuals from social restraints.

Many signs suggest that, even in the western world, which was the focus of this
development and of this ideology, this period of history has reached its end: I need not
insist here on the rise of what is called mass democracy, or on the gradual replacement of
predominantly individual by predominantly collective forms of economic production and
organization. But the ideology generated by this long and fruitful period is still a dominant
force in western Europe and throughout the English- speaking countries. When we speak
in abstract terms of the tension between liberty and equality, or between individual liberty
and social justice, we are apt to forget that fights do not occur between abstract ideas.
These are not struggles between individuals as such and society as such, but between
groups of individuals in society, each group striving to promote social policies favourable
to it and to frustrate social policies inimical to it. Individualism, in the sense no longer of a
great social movement but of false opposition between individual and society, has become
today the slogan of an interested group and, because of its controversial character, a
barrier to our understanding of what goes on in the world. I have nothing to say against the
cult of the individual as a protest against the perversion which treats the individual as a
means and society or the state as the end. But we shall arrive at no real understanding
either of the past or of the present if we attempt to operate with the concept of an abstract
individual standing outside society.

And this brings me at last to the point of my long digression. The common-sense view of
history treats it as something written by individuals about individuals. This view was
certainly taken and encouraged by nineteenth-century liberal historians, and is not in
substance incorrect. But it now seems over-simplified and inadequate, and we need to
probe deeper. The knowledge of the historian is not his exclusive individual possession:
men, probably, of many generations and of many different countries have participated in
accumulating it. The men whose actions the historian studies were not isolated individuals
acting in a vacuum: they acted in the context, and under the impulse, of a past society. In
my last lecture I described history as a process of interaction, a dialogue between the
historian in the present and the facts of the past. I now want to inquire into the relative
weight of the individual and social elements on both sides' of the equation. How far are historians single individuals, and how far products of their society and their period? How far are the facts of history facts about single individuals and how far social facts?

The historian, then, is an individual human being. Like other individuals, he is also a social phenomenon, both the product and the conscious or unconscious spokesman of the society to which he belongs; it is in this capacity that he approaches the facts of the historical past. We sometimes speak of the course of history as a 'moving procession'. The metaphor is fair enough, provided it does not tempt the historian to think of himself as an eagle surveying the scene from a lonely crag or as a V.I.P. at the saluting base. Nothing of the kind! The historian is just another dim figure trudging along in another part of the procession. And as the procession winds along, swerving now to the right and now to the left, and sometimes doubling back on itself, the relative positions of different parts of the procession are constantly changing, so that it may make perfectly good sense to say, for example, that we are nearer today to the Middle Ages than were our great-grandfathers a century ago, or that the age of Caesar is nearer to us than the age of Dante. New vistas, new angles of vision, constantly appear as the procession - and the historian with it - moves along. The historian is part of history. The point in the procession at which he finds himself determines his angle of vision over the past.

This truism is not less true when the period treated by the historian is remote from his own time. When I studied ancient history, the classics on the subject were - and probably still are - Grote's *History of Greece* and Mommsen's *History of Rome*. Grote, an enlightened radical- banker writing in the 1840s, embodied the aspirations of the rising and politically progressive British middle class in an idealized picture of Athenian democracy, in which Pericles figured as a Benthanite reformer and Athens acquired an empire in a fit of absence of mind. It may not be fanciful to suggest that Grote's neglect of the problem of slavery in Athens reflected the failure of the group to which he belonged to face the problem of the new English factory working class. Mommsen was a German liberal, disillusioned by the muddles and humiliations of the German revolution of 1848-9. Writing in the 1850s - the decade which saw the birth of the name and concept of *Realpolitik* - Mommsen was imbued with the sense of need for a strong man to clear up the mess left by the failure of the German people to realize its political aspirations; and we shall never appreciate his history at its true value unless we realize that his well-known idealization of Caesar is the product of this yearning for the strong man to save Germany from ruin, and that the lawyer-politician Cicero that ineffective chatterbox and slippery procrastinator, has walked straight out of the debates of the Paulikirche in Frankfurt in
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1948. Indeed, I should not think it an outrageous paradox if someone were to say that Grote's History of Greece has quite as much to tell us today about the thought of the English philosophical radicals in the 1840s as about Athenian democracy in the fifth century B.C., or that anyone wishing to understand what 1848 did to the German liberals should take Mommsen's History of Rome as one of his text-books. Nor does this diminish their stature as great historical works. I have no patience with the fashion, set by Bury in his inaugural lecture, of pretending that Mommsen's greatness rests not on his History of Rome but on his corpus of inscriptions and his work on Roman constitutional law: this is to reduce history to the level of compilation. Great history is written precisely when the historian's vision of the past is illuminated by insights into the problems of the present. Surprise has often been expressed that Mommsen failed to continue his history beyond the fall of the republic. He lacked neither time, nor opportunity, nor knowledge. But, when Mommsen wrote his history, the strong man had not yet arisen in Germany. During his active career, the problem of what happened once the strong man had taken over was not yet actual. Nothing inspired Mommsen to project this problem back on to the Roman scene; and the history of the empire remained unwritten.

It would be easy to multiply examples of this phenomenon among modern historians. In my last lecture I paid tribute to G. M. Trevelyan's England under Queen Anne as a monument to the Whig tradition in which he had been reared. Let us now consider the imposing and significant achievement of one whom most of us would regard as the greatest British historian to emerge on the academic scene since the First World War: Sir Lewis Namier. Namier was a true conservative - not a typical English conservative who when scratched turns out to be 75 per cent a liberal, but a conservative such as we have not seen among British historians for more than a hundred years. Between the middle of the last century and 1914 it was scarcely possible for a British historian to conceive of historical change except as change for the better. In the 1920s, we moved into a period in which change was beginning to be associated with fear for the future, and could be thought of as change for the worse - a period of the rebirth of conservative thinking. Like Acton's liberalism, Namier's conservatism derived both strength and profundity from being rooted in a continental background. Unlike Fisher or Toynbee, Namier had no roots in the nineteenth-century liberalism, and suffered from no nostalgic regrets for it. After the First World War and the abortive peace had revealed the bankruptcy of liberalism, the reaction could come only in one of two forms - socialism or conservatism. Namier appeared as the conservative historian. He worked in two chosen fields, and the choice of both was significant. In English history he went back to the last period in which the ruling class had been able to engage in the rational pursuit of position and power in an orderly
and mainly static society. Somebody has accused Namier of taking mind out of history." It is not perhaps a very fortunate phrase, but one can see the point which the critic was trying to make. Politics at the accession of George III were still immune from the fanaticism of ideas, and of that passionate belief in progress, which was to break on the world with the French revolution and usher in the century of triumphant liberalism. No ideas, no revolution, no liberalism: Namier chose to give us a brilliant portrait of an age still safe - though not to d remain safe for long - from all these dangers.

But Namier's choice of a second subject was equally significant. Namier by-passed the great modern revolutions, English, French, and Russian - he wrote nothing of substance on any of them - and elected to give us a penetrating study of the European revolution of 1848 - a revolution that failed, a set-back all over Europe for the rising hopes of liberalism, a demonstration of the hollowness of ideas in face of armed force, of democrats when confronted with soldiers. The intrusion of ideas into the serious business of politics is futile and dangerous: Namier rubbed in the moral by calling this humiliating failure 'the revolution of the intellectuals'. Nor is our conclusion a matter of inference alone; for, though Namier wrote nothing systematic on the philosophy of history, he expressed himself in an essay published a few years ago with his usual clarity and incisiveness. 'The less, therefore,' he wrote, 'man clogs the free play of his mind with political doctrine and dogma, the better for his thinking.' And, after mentioning, and not rejecting, the charge that he had taken the mind out of history, he went on:

Some political philosophers complain of a 'tired lull' and the absence at present of argument on general politics in this country; practical solutions are sought for concrete problems, while programmes and ideals are forgotten by both parties. But to me this attitude seems to betoken a greater national maturity, and I can only wish that it may long continue undisturbed by the workings of political philosophy.

I do not want at the moment to join issue with this view: I will reserve that for a later lecture. My purpose here is merely to understand or appreciate the work of the historian unless you have first grasped the standpoint from which he himself approached it; secondly, that that standpoint is itself rooted in a social and historical background. Do not forget that, as Marx once said, the educator himself has to be educated; in modern jargon, the brain of the brain-washer has itself been washed. The historian, before he begins to write history, is the product of history.

The historians of whom I have just spoken - Grote and Mommsen, Trevelyan and Namier
- were each of them cast, so to speak, in a single social and political mould; no marked change of outlook occurs between their earlier and later work. But some historians in periods of rapid change have reflected in their writings not one society and one social order, but a succession of different orders. The best example known to me of this is the great German historian Meinecke, whose span of life and work was unusually long, and covered a series of revolutionary and catastrophic changes in the fortunes of his country. Here we have in effect three different Meineckes, each the spokesman; of a different historical epoch, and each speaking through one of his three major works. The Meinecke of *Weltburgetthum* and *Nationalstaat*, published in 1907, confidently sees the realization of German national ideals in the Bismarckian Reich and - like many nineteenth-century thinkers, from Mazzini onwards - identities nationalism with the highest form of universalism: this is the product of the baroque Wilhelmine sequel to the age of Bismarck. The Meinecke of *Die idee der Staatssraison*, published in 1925 speaks with the divided and bewildered mind of the Weimar Republic: the world of politics has become an arena of unresolved conflict between raison d'etat and a morality which is external to politics, but which cannot in the last resort override the life and security of the state. Finally the Meinecke of *Die Entstehung des Historismus*, published in 1936 when he had been swept from his academic honours by the Nazi flood, utters a cry of despair, rejecting a historicism which appears to recognize that 'Whatever is, is right' and tossing uneasily between the historical relative and a super-rational absolute. Last of all, when Meinecke in his old age had seen his country succumb to a military defeat more crushing than that of 1918, he relapsed helplessly in *Die Deutsche Katastrophe* of 1946 into the belief in a history at the mercy of blind, inexorable chance.' The psychologist or the biographer would be interested here in Meinecke's development as an individual: what interests the historian is the way in which Meinecke reflects back three - or even four - successive, and sharply contrasted, periods of present time into the historical past.

Or let us take a distinguished example nearer home. In the iconoclastic 1930s, when the Liberal Party had just been snuffed out as an effective force in British politics, Professor Butterfield wrote a book called *The Whig Interpretation of History*, which enjoyed a great and deserved success. It was a remarkable book in many ways - not least because, though it denounced the Whig Interpretation over some 130 pages, it did not (so far as I can discover without the help of an index) name a single Whig except Fox, who was no historian, or a single historian save Acton, who was no Whig But anything that the book lacked in detail and precision it made up for in sparkling invective. The reader was left in no doubt that the Whig interpretation was a bad thing; and one of the charges brought against it was that it 'studies the past with reference to the present'. On this point Professor
Butterfield was categorical and severe:

The study of the past with one eye, so to speak, upon the present is the source of all sins and sophistries in history. is the essence of what we mean by the word 'unhistorical'.

Twelve years elapsed. The fashion for iconoclasm went out. Professor Butterfield's country was engaged in a war often said to be fought in defence of the constitutional liberties embodied in the Whig tradition, under a great leader who constantly invoked the past 'with one eye, so to speak, upon the present'. In a small book called *The Englishman and His History* published in 1944, Professor Butterfield not only decided that the Whig interpretation of history was the 'English' interpretation, but spoke enthusiastically of 'the Englishman's alliance with his history' and of the 'marriage between the present and the past'. To draw attention to these reversals of outlook is not an unfriendly criticism. It is not my purpose to refute the proto-Butterfield with the deutero-Butterfield, or to confront Professor Butterfield drunk with Professor Butterfield sober. I am fully aware that, if anyone took the trouble to peruse some of the things I wrote before, during, and after the war, he would have no difficulty at all in convincing me of contradictions and inconsistencies at least as glaring as any I have detected in others. Indeed, I am not sure that I should envy any historian who could honestly claim to have lived through the earth-shaking events of the past fifty years without some radical modifications of his outlook. My purpose is merely to show how closely the work of the historian mirrors the society in which he works. It is not merely the events that are in flux. The historian himself is in flux. When you take up a historical work, it is not enough to look for the author's name on the title-page: look also for the date of publication or writing - it is sometimes even more revealing. If the philosopher is right in telling us that we cannot step into the same river twice, it is perhaps equally true, and for the same reason, that two books cannot be written by the same historian.

And, if we move for a moment from the individual historian to what may be called broad trends in historical writing, the extent to which the historian is the product of his society becomes all the more apparent. In the nineteenth century, British historians with scarcely an exception regarded the course of history as a demonstration of the principle of progress: they expressed the ideology of a society in a condition of remarkably rapid progress. History was full of meaning for British historians, so long as it seemed to be going our way; now that it has taken a wrong turning, belief in the meaning of history has become a heresy. After the First World War, Toynbee made a desperate attempt to replace a linear view of history by a cyclical theory - the characteristic ideology of a society in decline.
Since Toynbee's failure, British historians have for the most part been content to throw in their hands and declare that there is no general pattern in history at all. A banal remark by Fisher to that effect has achieved almost as wide a popularity as Ranke's aphorism in the last century. If anyone tells me that the British historians of the last thirty years experienced this change of heart as the result of profound individual reflexion and of the burning of midnight oil in their separate garrets, I shall not think it necessary to contest the fact. But I shall continue to regard all this individual thinking and oil-burning as a social phenomenon, the product and expression of a fundamental change in the character and outlook of our society since 1914. There is no more significant pointer to the character of a society than the kind of history it writes or fails to write. Geyl, the Dutch historian, in his fascinating monograph translated into English under the title Napoleon For and Against, shows how the successive judgements of French nineteenth-century historians on Napoleon reflected the changing and conflicting patterns of French political life and thought throughout the century. The thought of historians, as of other human beings, is moulded by the environment of the time and place. Acton, who fully recognized this truth, sought for an escape from it in history itself:

History [he wrote] must be our deliverer not only from the undue influence of other times, but from the undue influence of our own, from the tyranny of environment and the pressure of the air we breathe.

This may sound too optimistic an assessment of the role of history. But I shall venture to believe that the historian who is most conscious of his own situation is also more capable of transcending it, and more capable of appreciating the essential nature of the differences between his own society and outlook and those of other periods and other countries, than the historian who loudly protests that he is an individual and not a social phenomenon. Man's capacity to rise above his social and historical situation seems to be conditioned by the sensitivity with which he recognizes the extent of his involvement in it.

In my first lecture I said: Before you study the history study the historian. Now I would add: Before you study the historian, study his historical and social environment. The historian, being an individual, is also a product of history and of society; and it is in this twofold light that the student of history must learn to regard him.

Let us now leave the historian and consider the other side of my equation - the facts of history - in the light of the same problem. Is the object of the historian's inquiry the behaviour of individuals or the action of social forces? Here I am moving on to well-
trodden ground. When Sir Isaiah Berlin published a few years ago a sparkling and popular essay entitled Historical Inevitability - to the main thesis of which I shall return later in these lectures - he headed it with a motto, culled from the works of Mr T. S. Eliot, 'Vast impersonal forces'; and throughout the essay he pokes fun at people who believe in 'vast impersonal forces' rather than individuals as the decisive factor in history. What I will call the Bad King John theory of history - the view that what matters in history is the character and behaviour of individuals - has a long pedigree. The desire to postulate individual genius as the creative force in history is characteristic of the primitive stages of historical consciousness. The ancient Greeks liked to label the achievements of the past with the names of eponymous heroes supposedly responsible for them, to attribute their epics to a bard called Homer, and their laws and institutions to a Lycurgus or a Solon. The same inclination reappears at the Renaissance, when Plutarch, the biographer- moralist, was much more popular and influential a figure in the classical revival than the historians of antiquity. In this country, in particular, we all learned this theory, so to speak, at our mother's knee; and today we should probably recognize that there is something childish, or at any rate childlike, about it. It had some plausibility in days when society was simpler, and public affairs appeared to be run by a handful of known individuals. It clearly does not fit the more complex society of our times; and the birth in the nineteenth century of the new science of sociology was a response to this growing complexity. Yet the old tradition dies hard. At the beginning of this century, 'history is the biography of great men' was still a reputable dictum. Only ten years ago a distinguished American historian accused his colleagues, perhaps not too seriously, of the 'mass murder of historical characters) by treating them as 'puppets of social and economic forces'. Addicts of this theory tend nowadays to be shy about it; but, after some searching, I found an excellent contemporary statement of it in the introduction to one of Miss Wedgwood's books.

The behaviour of men as individuals [she writes] is more interesting to me than their behaviour as groups or classes. History can be written with this bias as well as another; it is neither more, nor less, misleading.... This book... is an attempt to understand how these men felt and why, in their own estimation, they acted as they did.'

This statement is precise; and, since Miss Wedgwood is a popular writer, many people, I am sure, think as she does. Dr Rowse tells us, for instance, that the Elizabethan system broke down because James I was incapable of understanding it, and that the English revolution of the seventeenth century was an 'accidental' event due to the stupidity of the two first Stuart kings. Even Sir James Neale, a more austere historian than Dr Rowse, sometimes seems more eager to express his admiration for Queen Elizabeth than to
explain what the Tudor monarchy stood for; and Sir Isaiah Berlin, in the essay which I have just quoted, is terribly worried by the prospect that historians may fail to denounce Genghis Khan and Hitler as bad men. The Bad King John and Good Queen Bess theory is especially rife when we come to more recent times. It is easier to call communism 'the brain-child of Karl Marx' (I pluck this flower from a recent stockbrokers' circular) than to analyse its origin and character, to attribute the Bolshevik Revolution to the stupidity of Nicholas II or to German gold than to study its profound social causes, and to see in the two world wars of this century the result of the individual wickedness of Wilhelm II and Hitler rather than of some deep-seated breakdown in the system of international relations.

Miss Wedgwood's statement, then, combines two propositions. The first is that the behaviour of men as individuals is distinct from their behaviour as members of groups or classes, and that the historian may legitimately choose to dwell on the one rather than on the other. The second is that the study of the behaviour of men as individuals consists of the study of the conscious motives of their actions.

After what I have already said, I need not labour the first point. It is not that the view of man as an individual is more or less misleading than the view of him as a member of the group; it is the attempt to draw a distinction between the two which is misleading. The individual is by definition a member of a society, or probably of more than one society - call it group, class, tribe, nation, or what you will. Early biologists were content to classify species of birds, beasts, and fishes in cages, aquariums, and showcases, and did not seek to study the living creature in relation to its environment. Perhaps the social sciences today have not yet fully emerged from that primitive stage. Some people distinguish between psychology as the science of the individual and sociology as the science of society; and the name 'psychologism' has been given to the view that all social problems are ultimately reducible to the analysis of individual human behaviour. But the psychologist who failed to study the social environment of the individual would not get very far. It is tempting to make a distinction between biography, which treats man as an individual, and history, which treats man as part of a whole, and to suggest that good biography makes bad history.’ Nothing causes more error and unfairness in man's view of history’, Acton once wrote, 'than the interest which is inspired by individual characters.’ But this distinction, too, is unreal. Nor do I want to take shelter behind the Victorian proverb placed by G. 1M. Young on the title-page of his book Victorian England:’ Servants talk about people, gentlefolk discuss things.' Some biographies are serious contributions to history: in my own field, Isaac Deutscher's biographies of Stalin and Trotsky are outstanding examples. Others belong to literature, like the historical novel. ‘To Lytton Strachey', writes Professor
Trevor-Roper, 'historical problems were always, and only, problems of individual behaviour and individual eccentricity. ... Historical problems, the problems of politics and society, he never sought to answer, or even to ask.' Nobody is obliged to write or read history; and excellent books can be written about the past which are not history. But I think we are entitled by convention - as I propose to do in these lectures - to reserve the word 'history' for the process of inquiry into the past of man in society.

The second point, i.e. that history is concerned to inquire why individuals 'in their own estimation, acted as they did', seems at first sight extremely odd; and I suspect that Miss Wedgwood like other sensible people, does not practise what she preaches. If she does, she must write some very queer history. Everyone knows today that human beings do not always, or perhaps even habitually, act from motives of which they are fully conscious or which they are willing to avow; and to exclude insight into unconscious or unavowed motives is surely a way of going about one's work with one eye wilfully shut. This ~s, however, what, according to some people, historians ought to do. The point is this. So long as you are content to say that the badness of King John consisted in his greed or stupidity or ambition to play the tyrant, you are speaking in terms of individual qualities which are comprehensible even at the level of nursery history. But, once you begin to say that King John was the unconscious tool of vested interests opposed to the rise to power of the feudal barons, you not only introduce a more complicated and sophisticated view of King John's badness, but you appear to suggest that historical events are determined not by the conscious actions of individuals, but by some extraneous and all-powerful forces guiding their unconscious will. This is, of course, nonsense. So far as I am concerned, I have no belief in Divine Providence, World Spirit, Manifest Destiny, History with a capital H, or any other of the abstractions which have sometimes been sup- posed to guide the course of events; and I should endorse without qualification the comment of Marx:

History does nothing, it possesses no immense wealth, fights no battles. It is rather man, real living man who does everything, who possesses and fights.

The two remarks which I have to make on this question have nothing to do with any abstract view of history, and are based on purely empirical observation.

The first is that history is to a considerable extent a matter of numbers. Carlyle was responsible for the unfortunate assertion that 'history is the biography of great men'. But listen to him at his most eloquent and in his greatest historical work:
Hunger and nakedness and nightmare oppression lying heavy on twenty-five million hearts: this, not the wounded vanities or contradicted philosophies of philosophical advocates, rich shopkeepers, rural noblesse, was the prime mover in the French revolution; as the like will be in all such revolutions, in all countries."

Or, as Lenin said: ‘Politics begin where the masses are; not where there are thousands, but where there are millions, that is where serious politics begin." Carlyle's and Lenin's millions were millions of individuals: there was nothing impersonal about them. Discussions of this question sometimes confuse anonymity with impersonality. People do not cease to be people, or individuals - individuals, because we do not know their names. Mr Eliot's 'vast, impersonal forces' were the individuals whom Clarendon, a bolder and franker conservative, calls 'dirty people of no name'. These nameless millions were individuals acting more or less unconsciously, together, and constituting a social force. The historian will not in ordinary circumstances need to take cognizance of a single discontented peasant or discontented village. But millions of discontented peasants in thousands of villages are a factor which no historian will ignore. The reasons which deter Jones from getting married do not interest the historian unless the same reasons also deter thousands of other individuals of Jones's generation, and bring about a substantial fall in a marriage-rate: in that event, they may well be historically significant. Nor need we be perturbed by the platitudinous that movements are started by minorities. All effective movements have few leaders and a multitude of followers; but this does not mean that the multitude is not essential to their success. Numbers count in history.

My second observation is even better attested. Writers of many different schools of thought have concurred in remarking that the actions of individual human beings often have results which were not intended or desired by the actors or indeed by any other individual. The Christian believes that the individual, acting consciously for his own often selfish ends, is the unconscious agent of God's purpose. Mandeville's 'private vices - public benefits' was an early and deliberately paradoxical expression of this discovery. Adam Smith's hidden hand and Hegel's 'cunning of reason', which sets individuals to work for it and to serve its purposes, though the individuals believe themselves to be fulfilling their own personal desires, are too familiar to require quotation. 'In the social production of their means of production,' wrote Marx in the preface to his *Critique of Political Economy*, ‘human beings enter into definite and necessary relations which are independent of their will.' 'Man lives consciously for himself,' wrote Tolstoy in *War and Peace*, echoing Adam Smith, ‘but is an unconscious instrument in the attainment of the historic universal aims of humanity.' And here, to round off this anthology, which is already long...
enough, is Professor Butterfield: 'There is something in the nature of historical events which twists the course of history in a direction that no man ever intended.' Since 1914, after a hundred years of only minor local wars, we have had two major world wars. It would not be a plausible explanation of this phenomenon to maintain that more individuals wanted war, or fewer wanted peace, in the first half of the twentieth century than in the last three quarters of the nineteenth. It is difficult to believe that any individual willed or desired the great economic depression of the 1930s. Yet it was indubitably brought about by the actions of individuals, each consciously pursuing some totally different aim. Nor does the diagnosis of a discrepancy between the intentions of the individual and the results of his action always have to wait for the retrospective historian. 'He does not mean to go to war,' wrote Lodge of Woodrow Wilson in March 1917, 'but I think he will be carried away by events.' It defies all the evidence, to suggest that history can be written on the basis of 'explanations in terms of human intentions" or of accounts of their motives given by the actors themselves, of why 'in their own estimation, they acted as they did'. The facts of history are indeed facts about individuals, but not about actions of individuals performed in isolation, and not about the motives, real or imaginary, from which individuals suppose themselves to have acted. They are facts about the relations of individuals to one another in society and about the social forces which produce from the actions of individuals results often at variance with, and sometimes opposite to, the results which they themselves intended.

One of the serious errors of Collingwood's view of history which I discussed in my low lecture was to assume that the thought behind the act, which the historian was called on to investigate, was the thought of the individual actor. This is a false assumption. What the historian is called on to investigate is what lies behind the act; and to this the conscious thought or motive of the individual actor may be quite irrelevant.

Here I should say something about the role of the rebel or dissident in history. To set up the popular picture of the individual in revolt against society is to reintroduce the false anti-thesis between society and the individual. No society is fully homogeneous. Every society is an arena of social conflicts, and those individuals who range themselves against existing authority are no less products and reflexions of the society than those who uphold it. Richard II and Catherine the Great represented powerful social forces in the England of the fourteenth century and in the Russia of the eighteenth century: but so also did Wat Tyler and Pugachev, the leader of the great serf rebellion. Monarchs and rebels alike were the product of the specific conditions of their age and country. To describe Wat Tyler and Pugachev as individuals in revolt against society is a misleading simplification. If they had
been merely that, the historian would never have heard of them. They owe their role in history to the mass of their followers, and are significant as social phenomena, or not at all. Or let us take an outstanding rebel and individualist at a more sophisticated level. Few people have reacted more violently and more radically against the society of their day and country than Nietzsche. Yet Nietzsche was a direct product of European, and more specifically of German, society - a phenomenon which could not have occurred in China or Peru. A generation after Nietzsche's death it became clearer than it had been to his contemporaries how strong were the European, and specifically German, social forces of which this individual had been the expression; and Nietzsche became a more significant figure for posterity than for his own generation.

The role of the rebel in history has some analogies with that of the great man. The great-man theory of history - a particular example of the Good Queen Bess school - has gone out of fashion in recent years, though it still occasionally rears its ungainly head. The editor of a series of popular history text-books, started after the Second World War, invited his authors 'to open up a significant historical theme by way of a biography of a great: man'; and Mr A. J. P. Taylor told us in one of his minor essays that 'the history of modern Europe can be written in terms of three titans: Napoleon, Bismarck, and Lenin', though in his more serious writings he has undertaken no such rash project. What is the role of the great man in history? The great man is an individual, and, being an outstanding individual, is also a social phenomenon of outstanding importance. 'It is an obvious truth', observed Gibbon, 'that the times must be suited to extraordinary characters, and that the genius of Cromwell or Retz might now expire in obscurity.' Marx, in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, diagnosed the converse phenomenon: 'The class war in France created circumstances and relations which enabled a gross mediocrity to strut about in a hero's garb.' Had Bismarck been born in the eighteenth century - an absurd hypothesis, since he would not then have been Bismarck - he would not have united Germany and might not have been a great man at all. But one need not, I think, as Tolstoy does, deny great men as no more than 'labels giving names to events'. Sometimes of course the cult of the great man may have sinister implications. Nietzsche's superman is a repellent figure. It is not necessary for me to recall the case of Hitler, or the grim consequences of the 'cult of personality' in the Soviet Union. But it is not my purpose to deflate the greatness of great men: nor do I want to subscribe to the thesis that 'great men are almost always bad men'. The view which I would hope to discourage is the view which places great men outside history and sees them as imposing themselves on history in virtue of their greatness, as 'lack-in-the-boxes who emerge miraculously from the unknown to interrupt the real continuity of history.' Even today I do not know that we can better Hegel's classic
The great man of the age is the one who can put into words the will of his age, tell his age what its will is, and accomplish it. What he does is the heart and essence of his age; he actualizes his age.

Dr Leavis means something like this when he says that great writers are 'significant in terms of the human awareness they promote'. The great man is always representative either of existing forces or of forces which he helps to create by way of challenge to existing authority. But the higher degree of creativity may perhaps be assigned to those great men who, like Cromwell or Lenin, helped to mould the forces which carried them to greatness, rather than to those who, like Napoleon or Bismarck, rode to greatness on the back of already existing forces. Nor should we forget those great men who stood so far in advance of their own time that their greatness was recognized only by succeeding generations. What seems to me essential is to recognize in the great man an outstanding individual who is at once a product and an agent of the historical process, at once the representative and the creator of social forces which change the shape of the world and the thoughts of men.

History, then, in both senses of the word - meaning both the inquiry conducted by the historian and the facts of the past into which he inquires - is a social process, in which individuals are engaged as social beings; and the imaginary antithesis between society and the individual is no more than a red herring drawn across our path to confuse our thinking. The reciprocal process of interaction between-the historian and his facts, what I have called the dialogue between present and past, is a dialogue not between abstract and isolated individuals, but between the society of today and the society of yesterday. History, in Burckhardt's words, is 'the record of what one age finds worthy of note in another'. The past is intelligible to us only in the light of the present; and we can fully understand the present only in the light of the past. To enable man to understand the society of the past, and to increase his mastery over the society of the present, is the dual function of history.

3. History, Science, and Morality

WHEN I was very young, I was suitably impressed to learn that, appearances notwithstanding, the whale is not a fish. Nowadays these questions of classification move me less; and it does not worry me unduly when I am assured that history is not a science.
This terminological question is an eccentricity of the English language. In every other European language, the equivalent word to 'science' includes history without hesitation. But in the English-speaking world this question has a long past behind it, and the issues raised by it are a convenient introduction to the problems of method in history.

At the end of the eighteenth century, when science had contributed so triumphantly both to man's knowledge of the world and to man's knowledge of his own physical attributes, it began to be asked whether science could not also further man's knowledge of society. The conception of the social sciences, and of history among them, gradually developed throughout the nineteenth century; and the method by which science studied the world of nature was applied to the study of human affairs. In the first part of this period the Newtonian tradition prevailed. Society, like the world of nature, was thought of as a mechanism; the title of a work by Herbert Spencer, *Social Statics*, published in 1951, is still remembered. Bertrand Russell, reared in this tradition, later recalled the period when he hoped that in time there would be 'a mathematics of human behaviour as precise as the mathematics of machines'. Then Darwin made another scientific revolution; and social scientists, taking their cue from biology, began to think of society as an organism. But the real importance of the Darwinian revolution was that Darwin, completing what Lyell had already begun in geology, brought history into science. Science was concerned no longer with some-thing static and timeless, but with a process of change and development. Evolution in science confirmed and complemented progress in history. Nothing, however, occurred to alter the inductive view of historical method which I described in my first lecture: First collect your facts, then interpret them. It was assumed without question that this was also the method of science. This was the view which Bury evidently had in mind when, in the closing words of his inaugural lecture of January 1903, he described history as 'a science, no more and no less'. The fifty years after Bury's inaugural lecture witnessed a strong reaction against this view of history. Collingwood, when he wrote in the 1930s, was particularly anxious to draw a sharp line between the world of nature, which was the object of scientific inquiry, and the world of history; and during this period Bury's dictum was rarely quoted except in terms of derision. But what historians failed to notice at the time was that science itself had undergone a profound revolution, which makes it seem that Bury may have been more nearly right than we had supposed, though for the wrong reason. What Lyell did for geology and Darwin for biology has now been done for astronomy, which has become a science of how the universe came to be what it is; and modern physicists constantly tell us that what they investigate are not facts, but events. The historian has some excuse for feeling him- self more at home in the world of science today than he could have done a hundred years ago.
Let us look first at the concept of laws. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, scientists assumed that laws of nature - Newton's laws of motion, the law of gravitation, Boyle's law, the law of evolution, and so forth - had been discovered and definitely established, and that the business of the scientist was to discover and establish more such laws by process of induction from observed facts. The word 'law' came down trailing clouds of glory from Galileo and Newton. Students of society, consciously or unconsciously desiring to assert the scientific status of their studies, adopted the same language and believed themselves to be following the same procedure. The political economists seem to have been first in the field with Gresham's law, and Adam Smith's laws of the market. Burke appealed to 'the laws of commerce, which are the laws of nature, and consequently the Laws of God'. Malthus propounded a law of population; Lassalle an iron law of wages; and Marx in the preface to Capital claimed to have discovered 'the economic law of motion of modern society'. Buckle in the concluding words of his *History of Civilization* expressed the conviction that the course of human affairs was 'permeated by one glorious principle of universal and undeviating regularity'. Today this terminology sounds as old-fashioned as it is presumptuous; but it sounds almost as old-fashioned to the physical scientist as it does to the social scientist. In the year before Bury delivered his inaugural lecture, the French mathematician Henri Poincare published a small volume called *La Science et l'hypothese* which started a revolution in scientific thinking. Poincare's main thesis was that the general propositions enunciated by scientists, where they were not mere definitions or disguised conventions about the use of language, were hypotheses designed to crystallize and organize further thinking, and were subject to verification, modification, or refutation. All this has now become something of a commonplace. Newton's boast 'Hypotheses non fingo' rings hollow today; and though scientists, and even social scientists, still sometimes speak of laws, so to speak, for old time's sake, they no longer believe in their existence in the sense in which scientists of the eighteenth and nineteenth century universally believed in them. It is recognized that scientists make discoveries and acquire fresh knowledge, not by establishing precise and comprehensive laws, but by enunciating hypotheses which open the way to fresh inquiry. A standard text-book on scientific method by two American philosophers describes the method of science as 'essentially circular':

We obtain evidence for principles by appealing to empirical material, to what is alleged to be 'fact'; and we select, analyse, and interpret empirical material on the basis of principles. The word 'reciprocal' would perhaps have been preferable to 'circular'; for the result is not to return to the same place, but to move forward to fresh discoveries through this process of interaction between principles and facts, between theory and practice. Ah thinking
requires acceptance of certain presuppositions based on observation, which make
scientific thinking possible but are subject to revision in the light of that thinking. These
hypotheses may well be valid in some contexts or for some purposes, though they turn out
to be invalid in others. The test in all cases is the empirical one whether they are in fact
effective in promoting fresh insights and adding to our knowledge. The methods of
Rutherford were recently described by one of his most distinguished pupils and fellow-
workers:

He had a driving urge to know how nuclear phenomena worked, in the sense in which one
could speak of knowing what went on in the kitchen. I do not believe that he searched for
an explanation in the classical manner of a theory using certain basic laws; as long as he
knew what was happening he was content."

This description equally fits the historian, who has abandoned the search for basic laws,
and is content to inquire how things work.

The status of the hypotheses used by the historian in the process of his inquiry seems
remarkably similar to that of the hypotheses used by the scientist. Take, for example, Mm
Weber's famous diagnosis of a relation between Protestantism and capitalism. Nobody
today would call this a law, though it might have been hailed as such in an earlier period.
It is a hypothesis which, though modified to some extent in the course of the inquiries
which it inspired, has beyond doubt enlarged our understanding of both these movements.
Or take a statement like that of Marx: "The hand-mill gives us a society with a feudal lord;
the steam-mill gives us a society with an industrial capitalist." This is not in modern
terminology a law, though Marx would probably have claimed it as such, but a fruitful
hypothesis pointing the way to further inquiry and fresh understanding. Such hypotheses
are indispensable tools of thought. The well-known German economist of the early 1900s,
Werner ; Sombart, confessed to a 'troubled feeling' which overtook those who had
abandoned Marxism.

When [he wrote] we lose the comfortable formulas that have hitherto been our guides
amid the complexities of existence ... we feel like drowning in the ocean of facts until we
find a new foothold or learn to swim."

The controversy about periodization in history falls into this category. The division of
history into periods is not a fact, but 8 necessary hypothesis or tool of thought, valid in so
far as it is illuminating, and dependent for its validity on interpretation. Historians who
differ on the question when the Middle Ages ended differ in their interpretation of certain events. The question is not a question of fact; but it is also not meaningless. The division of history into geographical sectors is equally not a fact, but a hypothesis: to speak of European history may be a valid and fruitful hypothesis in some contexts, misleading and mischievous in others. Most historians assume that Russia is part of Europe; some passionately deny it. The bias of the historian can be judged by the hypothesis which he adopts. I must quote one general pronouncement on the methods of social science, since it comes from a great social scientist who was trained as a physical scientist. Georges Sorel, who practised as an engineer before he began in his forties to write about the problems of society, emphasized the need to isolate particular elements in a situation even at the risk of over-simplifying:

One should proceed [he wrote] by feeling one's way; one should try out probable and partial hypotheses, and be satisfied with provisional approximations so as always to leave the door open to progressive correction.'

This is a far cry from the nineteenth century, when scientists, and historians like Acton, looked forward to one day establishing, through the accumulation of well-attested facts, a comprehensive body of knowledge which would settle all disputed issues once for all. Nowadays both scientists and historians entertain the more modest hope of advancing progressively from one fragmentary hypothesis to another, isolating their facts through the medium of their interpretations, and testing their interpretations by the facts; and ways in which they go about it do not seem to me essentially different. In my first lecture I quoted a remark of Professor Barraclough that history was 'not factual at all, but a series of accepted judgements'. While I was preparing these lectures, a physicist from this university, in a B.B.C. broadcast, defined a scientific truth as 'a statement which has been publicly accepted by the experts'. Neither of these formulas is entirely satisfactory - for reasons which will appear when I come to discuss the question of objectivity. But it was striking to find a historian and a physicist independently formulating the same problem in almost exactly the same words.

Analogies are, however, a notorious trap for the unwary: and I want to consider respectfully the arguments for believing that, great as are the differences between the mathematical and the natural sciences, or between different sciences within these categories, a fundamental distinction can be drawn between these sciences and history, and that this distinction makes it misleading to call history - and perhaps also the other so-called social sciences - by the name of science. These objections - some of them more
convincing than others - are in brief: (r) that history deals exclusively with the unique, science with the general; (2) that history teaches no lessons; (3) that history is unable to predict; (4) that history is necessarily subjective, since man is observing himself; and (5) that history, unlike science, involves issues of religion and morality. I will try to examine each of these points in turn.

First, it is alleged that history deals with the unique and particular, and science with the general and universal. This view may be said to start with Aristotle, who declared that poetry was 'more philosophical' and 'more serious' than history, since poetry was concerned with general truth and history with particular.' A host of later writers, down to Collingwood inclusive, made a similar distinction between science and history. This seems to rest on a misunderstanding. Hobbes's famous dictum still stands: 'Nothing in the world is universal but names, for the things named are every one of them individual and singular.' This is certainly true of the physical sciences: no two geological formations, no two animals of the same species, and no two atoms, are identical. Similarly, no two historical events are identical. But insistence on the uniqueness of historical events has the same paralysing effect as the platitude taken over by Moore from Bishop Butler and at one time especially beloved by linguistic philosophers: 'Everything is what it is and not another thing.' Embarked on this course, you soon attain a sort of philosophical nirvana, in which nothing that matters can be said about anything.

The very use of language commits the historian, like the scientist, to generalization. The Peloponnesian War and the Second World War were very different, and both were unique. But the historian calls them both wars, and only the pedant will protest. When Gibbon wrote of both the establishment of Christianity by Constantine and the rise of Islam as revolutions, he was generalizing two unique events. Modern historians do the same when they write of the English, French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions. The historian is not really interested in the unique, but in what is general in the unique. In the 1930s discussions by historians of the causes of the war of 1914 usually proceeded on the assumption that it was due either to the mismanagement of diplomats, working in secret and uncontrolled by public opinion, or to the unfortunate division of the world into territorial sovereign states. In the 1930s discussions proceeded on the assumption that it was due to rivalries between imperialist powers driven by the stresses of capitalism in decline to partition the world between them. These discussions all involved generalization about the causes of war, or at any rate of war in nineteenth-century conditions. The historian constantly uses generalization to test his evidence. If the evidence is not clear whether Richard murdered the princes in the Tower, the historian will ask himself - perhaps
unconsciously rather than consciously - whether it was a habit of rulers of the period to liquidate potential rivals to their throne; and his judgement will, quite rightly, be influenced by this generalization.

The reader, as well as the writer, of history, is a chronic generalizer, applying the observation of the historian to other historical contexts with which he is familiar - or perhaps to his own time. When I read Carlyle's French Revolution, I find myself again and again generalizing his comments by applying them to my own special interest in the Russian revolution. Take this on the terror:

Horrible, in lands that had known equal justice - not so unnatural in lands that had never known it. Or, more significantly, this:

It is unfortunate, though very natural, that the history of this period has so generally been written in hystericis. Exaggeration abounds, execration, wailing; and on the whole, darkness.' Or another, this time from Burckhardt on the growth of the modern state in the sixteenth century:

The more recently power has originated, the less it can remain stationary - first because those who created it have become accustomed to rapid further movement and because they are and will remain innovators per se; secondly, because the forces aroused or subdued by them can be employed only through further acts of violence."

It is nonsense to say that generalization is foreign to history; history thrives on generalizations. As Mr Elton neatly puts it in a volume of the new Cambridge Modern History, 'what distinguishes the historian from the collector of historical facts is generalization';" he might have added that the same thing distinguishes the natural scientist from the naturalist or collector of specimens. But do not suppose that generalization permits us to construct some vast scheme of history into which specific events must be fitted. And, since Marx is one of those who is often accused of constructing, or believing in, such a scheme, I will quote by way of summing-up a passage from one of his letters which puts the matter in its right perspective:

Events strikingly similar, but occurring in a different historical milieu, lead to completely dissimilar results. By studying each of these evolutions separately and then comparing them, it is easy to find the key to the understanding of this phenomenon; but it is never possible to arrive at this understanding by using the passe-partout of some historical-
philosophical theory whose great virtue is to stand above history. History is concerned with the relation between the unique and the general. As a historian, you can no more separate them, or give precedence to one over the other, than you can separate fact and interpretation.

This is perhaps the place for a brief remark on the relations between history and sociology. Sociology at present faces two apposite dangers - the danger of becoming ultra-theoretical and the danger of becoming ultra-empirical. The first is the danger of losing itself in abstract and meaningless generalizations about society in general. Society with a big S is as misleading a fallacy as History with a big H. This danger is brought nearer by those who assign to sociology the exclusive task of generalizing from the unique events recorded by history: it has even been suggested that sociology is distinguished from history by having 'laws'. The other danger is that foreseen by Karl Mannheim almost a generation ago, and very much present today, of a sociology 'split into a series of discrete technical problems of social readjustment'. Sociology is concerned with historical societies, every one of which is unique and moulded by specific historical antecedents and conditions. But to attempt to avoid generalization and interpretation by confining oneself to so-called 'technical' problems of enumeration and analysis is merely to become the unconscious apologist of a static society. Sociology, if it is to become a fruitful field of study, must, like history, concern itself with the relation between the unique and the general. But it must also become dynamic - a study not of society at rest (for no such society exists), but of social change and development. For the rest, I would only say that the more sociological history becomes, and the more historical sociology becomes, the better for both. Let the frontier between them be kept wide open for two-way traffic.

The question of generalization is closely connected with my second question: the lessons of history. The real point about generalization is that through it we attempt to learn from history, to apply the lesson drawn from one set of events to another set of events: when we generalize, we are consciously or unconsciously trying to do this. Those who reject generalization and insist that history is concerned exclusively with the unique are, logically enough, those who deny that anything can be learned from history. But the assertion that men learn nothing from history is contradicted by a multitude of observable facts. No experience is more common. In 1919 I was present at the Paris Peace Conference as a junior member of the British delegation. Everyone in the delegation believed that we could learn from the lessons of the Vienna Congress, the last great European peace congress a hundred years earlier. A certain Captain Webster, then employed in the War office, now Sir Charles Webster and an eminent historian, wrote an
essay telling us what those lessons were. Two of them have remained in my memory. One
was that it was dangerous, when re-drawing the map of Europe, to neglect the principle of
self-determination. The other was that it was dangerous to throw secret documents into
your waste-paper basket, the contents of which would certainly be bought by the secret
service of some other delegation. These lessons of history were taken for gospel and
influenced our behaviour. This example is recent and trivial. But it would be easy to trace
in comparatively remote history the influence of the lessons of a still remoter past.
Everyone knows about the impact of ancient Greece upon Rome. But I am not sure
whether any historian has attempted to make a precise analysis of the lessons which the
Romans learned, or believed themselves to have learned, from the history of Hellas. An
examination of the lessons drawn in western Europe in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and
nineteenth centuries from Old Testament history might yield rewarding results. The
English Puritan revolution cannot be fully understood without it; and the conception of the
chosen people was an important factor in the rise of modern nationalism. The stamp of a
classical education was heavily imprinted in the nineteenth century on the new ruling class
in Great Britain. Grote, as I have already noted, painted to Athena as an exemplar for the
new democracy; and I should like to see a study of the extensive and important lessons
consciously or unconsciously imparted to British empire-builders by the history of the
Roman Empire. In my own particular field, the makers of the Russian revolution were
profoundly impressed - one might almost say, obsessed –by the lessons of the French
revolution, of the revolutions of 1848, and of the Paris commune of 1871. But I shall
recall here the qualification imposed by the dual character of history. Learning from
history is never simply a one-way process. To learn about the present in the light of the
past means also to learn about the past in the light of the present. The function of history is
to promote a profounder understanding of both past and present through the interrelation
between them.

My third point is the role of prediction in history: no lessons, it is said, can be learned
from history because history, unlike science, cannot predict the future. This question is
involved in a tissue of misunderstandings. As we have seen, scientists are no longer so
eager as they used to be to talk about the laws of nature. The so-called laws of sciences
which affect our ordinary life are in fact statements of tendency, statements of what will
happen other things being equal or in laboratory conditions. They do not claim to predict
what will happen in concrete cases. The law of gravity does not prove that that particular
apple will fall to the ground: somebody may catch it in a basket. The law of optics that
light travels in a straight line does not prove that a particular ray of light may not be
refracted or scattered by some intervening object. But this does not mean that these laws
are worthless, or not in principle valid. Modern physical theories, we are told, deal only with the probabilities of events taking place. Today science is more inclined to remember that induction can logically lead only to probabilities or to reasonable belief, and is more anxious to treat its pronouncements as general rules or guides, the validity of which can be tested only in specific action. 'Science, d'ou prevoyance; prevance, d'ou action ', as Comte puts it. The clue to the question of prediction in history lies in this distinction between the general and the specific, between the universal and the unique. The historian, as we have seen, is bound to generalize; and, in so doing, he provides general guides for future action which, though not specific predictions, are both valid and useful. But he cannot predict specific events, because the specific is unique and because the element of accident enters into it. This distinction, which worries philosophers, is perfectly clear to the ordinary man. If two or three children in a school develop measles, you will conclude that the epidemic will spread; and this prediction, if you care to call it such, is based on a generalization from past experience and is a valid and useful guide to action. But you cannot make the specific prediction that Charles or Mary will catch measles. The historian proceeds in the same way. People do not expect the historian to predict that revolution will break out in Ruritania next month. The kind of conclusion which they will seek to draw, partly from specific knowledge of Ruritanian affairs and partly from a study of history, is that conditions in Ruritania are such that a revolution is likely to occur in the near future if somebody touches it off, or unless somebody on the government side does something to stop it; and this conclusion might be accompanied by estimates, based partly on the analogy of other revolutions, of the attitude which different sectors of the population may be expected to adopt. The prediction, if such it can be called, can be realized only through the occurrence of unique events, which cannot themselves be predicted. But this does not mean that inferences drawn from history about the future are worthless, or that they do not possess a conditional validity which serves both as a guide to action and a key to our understanding of how things happen. I do not wish to suggest that the inferences of the social scientist or of the historian can match those of the physical scientist in precision, or that their inferiority in this respect is due merely to the greater backwardness of the social sciences. The human being is on any view the most complex natural entity known to us, and the study of his behaviour may well involve difficulties different in kind from those confronting the physical scientist. All I wish to establish is that their aims and methods are not fundamentally dissimilar.

My fourth point introduces a far more cogent argument for drawing a line of demarcation between the social sciences, including history, and the physical sciences. This is the argument that in the social sciences subject and object belong to the same category and
interact reciprocally on each other. Human beings are not only the most complex and variable of natural entities, but they have to be studied by other human beings, not by independent observers of another species. Here man is no longer content, as in the biological sciences, to study his own physical make-up and physical reactions. The sociologist, the economist, or the historian needs to penetrate into forms of human behaviour in which the will is active, to ascertain why the human beings who are the object of his study willed to act as they did. This sets up a relation, which is peculiar to history and the social sciences, between the observer and what is observed. The point of view of the historian enters irrevocably into every observation which he makes; history is shot through and through with relativity. In Karl Mannheim's words, 'even the categories in which experiences are subsumed, collected, and ordered vary according to the social position of the observer'. But it is not merely true that the bias of the social scientist necessarily enters into all his observations. It is also true that the process of observation affects and modifies what is being observed. And this can happen in two opposite ways. The human beings whose behaviour is made the object of analysis and prediction may be warned in advance, by the prediction of consequences unwelcome to them, and be induced by it to modify their action, so that the prediction, however correctly based on the analysis, proves self-frustrating. One reason why history rarely repeats itself among historically conscious people is that the dramatis personae are aware at the second performance of the denouement of the first, and their action is affected by that knowledge.'

The Bolsheviks knew that the French revolution had ended in a Napoleon, and feared that their own revolution might end in the same way. They therefore mistrusted Trotsky, who among their leaders looked most like a Napoleon, and trusted Stalin, who looked least like a Napoleon. But this process may work in a converse direction. The economist who, by a scientific analysis of existing economic conditions, predicts an approaching boom or slump may, if his authority is great and his arguments cogent, contribute by the very fact of his prediction to the occurrence of the phenomenon predicted. The political scientist who, on the strength of historical observations, nourishes the conviction that despotism is short-lived, may contribute to the downfall of the despot. Everyone is familiar with the behaviour of candidates at elections, who predict their own victory for the conscious purpose of rendering the fulfilment of the prediction more likely; and one suspects that economists, political scientists, and historians, when they venture on prediction, are sometimes inspired by the unconscious hope of hastening the realization of the prediction. All that one can perhaps safely say about these complex relations is that interaction between the observer and what is observed, between the social scientist and his data, between the historian and his facts, is continuous, and continuously varies; and that this
appears to be a distinctive feature of history and of the social sciences.

I should perhaps note here that some physicists in recent years have spoken of their science in terms which appear to suggest more striking analogies between the physical universe and the world of the historian. In the first place, their results are said to involve a principle of uncertainty or indeterminacy. I shall speak in my next lecture of the nature and limits of so-called determinism in history. But whether the indeterminacy of modern physics resides in the nature of the universe, or is merely an index of our own hitherto imperfect understanding of it (this point is still in debate), I should have the same doubts about finding in it significant analogies with our ability to make historical predictions as one had a few years ago about the attempts of some enthusiasts to find proof in it of the operation of free will in the universe. Secondly, we are told that in modern physics distances in space and lapses of time have measures depending on the motion of the 'observer'. In modern physics all measurements are subject to inherent variations due to the impossibility of establishing a constant relation between the 'observer' and the object under observation; both the 'observer' and the thing observed - both subject and object - enter into the final result of the observation. But, while these descriptions would apply with a minimum of change to the relations between the historian and the objects of his observations, I am not satisfied that the essence of these relations is in any real sense comparable with the nature of relations between the physicist and his universe; and though I am in principle concerned to reduce rather than to inflate the differences which separate the approach of the historian from that of the scientist, it will not help to attempt to spirit these differences away by relying on imperfect analogies.

But, while it is, I think, fair to say that the involvement of the social scientist or historian in the object of his study is of a different kind from that of the physical scientist, and the issues raised by the relation between subject and object infinitely more complicated, this is not the end of the matter. Classical theories of knowledge, which prevailed throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, all assumed a sharp dichotomy between the knowing subject and the object known. However the process was conceived, the model constructed by the philosophers showed subject and object, man and the external world, divided and apart. This was the great age of the birth and development of science; and theories of knowledge were strongly influenced by the outlook of the pioneers of science. Man was set sharply against the external world. He grappled with it as with something intractable and potentially hostile - intractable because it was difficult to understand, potentially hostile because it was difficult to master. With the successes of modern science, this outlook has been radically modified. The scientist nowadays is far less likely
to think of the forces of nature as something to fight against than as something to co-operate with and to harness to his purposes. Classical theories of knowledge no longer fit the newer science, and least of all the science of physics. It is not surprising that during the past fifty years philosophers have begun to call them in question, and to recognise that the process of knowledge, far from setting subject and object sharply apart, involves a measure of interrelation and interdependence between them. This is, however, extremely significant for the social sciences. In my first lecture, I suggested that the study of history was difficult to reconcile with the traditional empiricist theory of knowledge. I should now like to argue that the social sciences as a whole, since they involve man as both subject and object, both investigator and thing investigated, are incompatible with any theory of knowledge which pronounces a rigid divorce between subject and object. Sociology, in its attempts to establish itself as a coherent body of doctrine, has quite rightly set up a branch called the sociology of knowledge. This has, however, not yet got very far mainly, I suspect, because it has been content to go round and round inside the cage of a traditional theory of knowledge. If philosophers, under the impact first of modern physical science, and now of modern social science, are beginning to break out from this cage, and construct some more up-to-date model for the processes of knowledge than the old billiard-ball model of the impact of data on a passive consciousness, this is a good omen for the social sciences and for history in particular. This is a point of some importance, to which I shall return later when I come to consider what we mean by objectivity in history.

Last but not least, I have to discuss the view that history, being intimately involved in questions of religion and morality, is thereby distinguished from science in general and perhaps even from the other social sciences. Of the relation of history to religion I shall say only the little that is necessary to make my own position clear. To be a serious astronomer is compatible with belief in a God who created and ordered the universe. But it is not compatible with belief in a God who intervenes at will to change the course of a planet, to postpone an eclipse, or to alter the rules of the cosmic game. In the same way, it is sometimes suggested, a serious historian may believe in a God who has ordered, and given meaning to, the course of history as a whole, though he cannot believe in the Old Testament kind of God who intervenes to slaughter the Amalekites, or cheats on the calendar by extending the hours of daylight for the benefit of Joshua's army. Nor can he invoke God as an explanation of particular historical events. Father D'Arcy in a recent book attempted to make this distinction:

It would not do for a student to answer every question in history by saying that it was the finger of God. Not until we have gone as far as most in tidying up mundane events and the
human drama are we permitted to bring in wider considerations.

The awkwardness of this view is that it appears to treat religion like the joker in the pack of cards, to be reserved for really important tricks that cannot be taken in any other way. Karl Barth, the Lutheran theologian, did better when he pronounced a total separation between divine and secular history, and handed over the latter to the secular arm. Professor Butterfield, if I understand him, means the same thing when he speaks of technical history. Technical history is the only kind of history you or I are ever likely to write, or he himself has ever written. But by the use of this odd epithet, he reserves the right to believe in an esoteric or providential history with which the rest of us need not concern ourselves. Writers like Berdyaev, Niebarhr, and Maritain purport to maintain the autonomous status of history, but insist that the end or goal of history lies outside history. Personally, I find it hard to reconcile the integrity of history with belief in some super-historical force on which its meaning and significance depend - whether that force be the God of a Chosen People, a Christian God, the Hidden Hand of the deist, or Hegel's World Spirit. For the purposes of these lectures, I shall assume that the historian must solve his problems without recourse to any such deus ex machina, that history is a game played, so to speak, without a joker in the pack.

The relation of history to morality is more complicated, and discussions of it in the past have suffered from several ambiguities. It is scarcely necessary today to argue that the historian is not required to pass moral judgements on the private life of the characters in his story. The standpoints of the historian and of the moralist are not identical. Henry VIII may have been a husband and a good king. But the historian is interested in him in the former capacity only in so far as it affected historical repents. If his moral delinquencies had had as little apparent effect on public affairs as those of Henry II, the historian would not need to bother about them. This goes for virtues as well as vices. Pasteur and Einstein were, one is told, men of exemplary, even saintly, private lives. But, suppose they had been unfaithful husbands, cruel fathers, and unscrupulous colleagues, would their historical achievements have been any the less? And it is these which preoccupy the historian. Stalin is said to have behaved cruelly and callously to his second wife; but, as a historian of Soviet affairs, I do not feel myself much concerned. This does not mean that private morality is not important, or that the history of morals is not a legitimate part of history. But the historian does not need to pronounce moral judgements on the private lives of individuals who appear in his pages. He has other things to do.

The more serious ambiguity arises over the question of moral judgements on public
actions. Belief in the duty of the historian to pronounce moral judgements on his dramatis
personae has a long pedigree. But it was never more powerful than in nineteenth-century
Britain, when it was reinforced both by the moralizing tendencies of the age and by the
uninhibited cult of individualism. Rosebery remarked that what English people wanted to
know about Napoleon was whether he was 'a good man'. Acton in his correspondence with
Creighton declared that 'the inflexibility of the moral code is the secret of the authority, the
dignity, and the utility of History', and claimed to make history 'an arbiter of controversy,
a guide of the wanderer, the upholder of that moral standard which the powers of earth and
of religion itself tend constantly to depress'" - a view based on Acton's almost mystical
belief in the objectivity and supremacy of historical facts, which apparently requires and
entitles the historian, in the name of History as a sort of super-historical power, to pass
moral judgements on individuals participating in historical events. This attitude still
sometimes reappears in unexpected forms. Professor Toynbee described Mussolini's
invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 as a 'deliberate personal sin';" and Sir Isaiah Berlin, in the
essay already quoted, insists with great vehemence that it is the duty of the historian 'to
direct Charlemagne or Napoleon or Genghis Khan or Hitler or Stalin for their massacres.'
This view has been sufficiently castigated by Professor Knowles, who in his inaugural
lecture quoted Motley's denunciation of Philip II ('if there are vices ... from which he was
exempt, it is because it is not permitted by human nature to attain perfection even in evil')
and Stubbs's description of Ring John ('polluted with every crime that could disgrace a
man') as instances of moral judgements on individuals which it is not within the
competence of the historian to pronounce: 'The historian is not a judge, still less a hanging
judge.' But Croce also has a fine passage on this point, which I should like to quote:

The accusation forgets the great difference that our tribunals (whether juridical or moral)
are present-day tribunals designed for living, active and dangerous men, while those other
men have already appeared before the tribunal of their day, and cannot be condemned or
absolved twice. They cannot be held responsible before any tribunal whatsoever, just
because they are men of the past who belong to the peace of the past and as such can only
be subjects of history, and can suffer no other judgement than that which penetrates and
understands the spirit of their work. ... Those who, on the plea of narrating history, bustle
about as judges, condemning here and giving absolution there, because they think that this
is the office of history ... are generally recognised as devoid of historical sense.

And if anyone cavils at the statement that it is not our business to pass moral judgement on
Hitler or Stalin - or, if you like, on Senator McCarthy - this is because they were the
contemporaries of many of us, because hundreds of thousands of those who suffered
directly or indirectly from their actions are still alive, and because, precisely for these reasons, it is difficult for us to approach them as historians and to divest ourselves of other capacities which might justify us in passing judgement on their deeds: this is one of the embarrassments - I should say, the principal embarrassment - of the contemporary historian. But what profit does anyone find today in denouncing the sins of Charlemagne or of Napoleon!

Let us therefore reject the notion of the historian as a hanging judge, and turn to the more difficult but more profitable question of the passing of moral judgements not on individuals, but on events, institutions, or policies of the past. These are the important judgements of the historian; and those who insist so fervently on the moral condemnation of the individual sometimes unconsciously provide an alibi for whole groups and societies. The French historian Lefebvre, seeking to exonerate the French revolution from responsibility for the disasters and bloodshed of the Napoleonic wars, attributed them to 'the dictatorship of a general ... whose temperament ... could not easily acquiesce in peace and moderation'. Germans today welcome the denunciation of Hitler's individual wickedness as a satisfactory alternative to the moral judgement of the historian on the society which produced him. Russians, Englishmen, and Americans readily join in personal attacks on Stalin, Neville Chamberlain, or McCarthy as scapegoats for their collective misdeeds. Moreover, laudatory moral judgements on individuals can be just as misleading and mischievous as the moral denunciation of individuals. Recognition that some individual slave-owners were high-minded was constantly used as an excuse for not condemning slavery as immoral. Ruler Weber refers to 'the masterless slavery in which capitalism emmeshes the worker or the debtor', and rightly argues that the historian should pass moral judgement on the institution, but not on the individuals who created it. The historian does not sit in judgement on an individual oriental despot. But he is not required to remain indifferent and impartial between, say, oriental despotism and the institutions of Periclean Athens. He will not pass judgement on the individual slave-owner. But this does not prevent him from condemning a slave-owning society. Historical facts, as we saw, presuppose some measure of interpretation; and historical interpretations always involve moral judgements - or, if you prefer a more neutral-sounding term, value judgements.

This is, however, only the beginning of our difficulties. History is a process of struggle, in which results, whether we judge them good or bad, are achieved by some groups directly or indirectly - and more often directly than indirectly - at the expense of others. The losers pay. Suffering is indigenous in history. Every great period of history has its casualties as well as its victories. This is an exceedingly complicated question, because we have no
measure which enables us to balance the greater good of some against the sacrifices of others: yet some such balance must be struck. It is not exclusively a problem of history. In ordinary life we are more often involved than we sometimes care to admit in the necessity of preferring the lesser evil, or of doing evil that good may come. In history the question is sometimes discussed under the rubric 'the cost of progress' or 'the price of revolution'. This is misleading. As Bacon says in the essay *On Innovations*, 'the forward retention of custom is as turbulent a thing as an innovation'. The cost of conservation falls just as heavily on the underprivileged as the cost of innovation on those who are deprived of their privileges. The thesis that the good of some justifies the sufferings of others is implicit in all government, and is just as much a conservative as a radical doctrine. Dr Johnson robustly invoked the argument of the lesser evil to justify the maintenance of existing inequalities.

It is better that some should be unhappy than that none should be happy, which would be the case in a general state of equality.'

But it is in periods of radical change that the issue appears in its most dramatic form; and it is here that we find it easiest to study the attitude of the historian towards it.

Let us take the story of the industrialisation of Great Britain between, say, about 1780 and 1870. Virtually every historian will treat the industrial revolution, probably without discussion, as a great and progressive achievement. He will also describe the driving of the peasantry off the land, the herding of workers in unhealthy factories and unsanitary dwellings, the exploitation of child labour. He will probably say that abuses occurred in the working of the system, and that some employers were more ruthless than others, and will dwell with some unction on the gradual growth of a humanitarian conscience once the system has become established. But he will assume, again probably without saying it, that measures of coercion and exploitation, at any rate in the first stages, were an unavoidable part of the cast of industrialisation. Nor have I ever heard of a historian who said that, in view of the cost, it would have been better to stay the hand of progress and not industrialise; if any such exists, he doubtless belongs to the school of Chesterton and Belloc, and will - quite properly - not be taken seriously by serious historians. This example is of particular interest to me, because I hope soon in my history of Soviet Russia to approach the problem of the collectivisation of the peasant as a part of the cost of industrialisation; and I know well that if, following the example of historians of the British industrial revolution, I deplore the brutalities and abuses of collectivisation, but treat the process as an unavoidable part of the cost of a desirable and necessary policy of
industrialisation, I shall incur charges of cynicism and of condoning evil things. Historians condone the nineteenth-century colonisation of Asia and Africa by the western nations on the ground not only of its immediate effects on the world economy, but of its long-term consequences for the backward peoples of these continents. After all, it is said, modern India is the child of British rule; and modern China is the product of nineteenth-century western imperialism, crossed with the influence of the Russian revolution. Unfortunately it was not the Chinese workers who laboured in the western-owned factories in the treaty ports, or in the South African mines, or on the western front in the First World War, who have survived to enjoy whatever glory or profit may have accrued from the Chinese revolution. Those who pay the cost are rarely those who reap the benefits. The well-known purple passage from Engels is uncomfortably apt:

History is about the most cruel of all goddesses, and she leads her triumphal car over heaps of corpses, not only in war, but also in 'peaceful' economic development. And we men and women are unfortunately so stupid that we never pluck up courage for real progress unless urged to it by sufferings that seem almost out of proportion.'

Ivan Karamazov's famous gesture of defiance is a heroic fallacy. We are born into society, we are born into history. No moment: occurs when we are offered a ticket of admission with the option to accept or reject it. The historian has no more conclusive answer than the theologian to the problem of suffering. He, too, falls back on the thesis of the lesser evil and the greater good.

But does not the fact that the historian, unlike the scientist, becomes involved by the nature of his material in these issues of moral judgement imply the submission of history to a super- historical standard of value. I do not think that it does. Let us assume that abstract conceptions like 'good' and 'bad', and more sophisticated developments of them, lie beyond the confines of history. But, even so, these abstractions play in the study of historical morality much the same role as mathematical and logical formulas in physical science. They are indispensable categories of thought; but they are devoid of meaning or application till specific content is put into them. If you prefer a different metaphor, the moral precepts which we apply in history or in everyday life are like cheques on a bank: they have a printed and a written part. The printed part consists of abstract words like liberty and equality, justice and democracy. These are essential categories. But the cheque is valueless until we fill in the other part, which states how much liberty we propose to allocate to whom, whom we recognise as our equals, and up to what amount. The way in which we fill in the cheque from time to time is a matter of history. The process by which
specific historical content is given to abstract moral conceptions is a historical process; indeed, our moral judgements are made within a conceptual framework which is itself the creation of history. The favourite form of contemporary international controversy on moral issues is a debate on rival claims to freedom and democracy. The conceptions are abstract and universal. But the content put into them has varied throughout history, from time to time and from place to place; any practical issue of their application can be understood and debated only in historical terms. To take a slightly less popular example, the attempt has been made to use the conception of 'economic rationality' as an objective and non-controversial criterion by which the desirability of economic policies can be tested and judged. The attempt at once breaks down. Theorists brought up on the laws of classical economics condemn planning in principle as an irrational intrusion into rational economic processes; for example, planners refuse in their price policy to be bound by the law of supply and demand, and prices under planning can have no rational basis. It may, of course, be true that planners often behave irrationally, and therefore foolishly. But the criterion by which they must be judged is not the old 'economic rationality' of classical economy. Personally, I have more sympathy with the converse argument that it was the uncontrolled unorganised laissez-faire economy which was essentially irrational, and that planning is an attempt to introduce 'economic rationality' into the process. But the only point which I wish to make at the moment is the impossibility of erecting an abstract and super-historical standard by which historical actions can be judged. Both sides inevitably read into such a standard the specific content appropriate to their own historical conditions and aspirations.

This is the real indictment of those who seek to erect a super-historical standard or criterion in the light of which judgement is passed on historical events or situations - whether that standard derives from some divine authority postulated by the theologians, or from a static Reason or Nature postulated by the philosophers of the Enlightenment. It is not that short-coming occur in the application of the standard, or defects in the standard itself. It is that the attempt to erect such a standard is unhistorical and contradicts the very essence of history. It provides a dogmatic answer to questions which the historian is bound by his vocation incessantly to ask: the historian who accepts answers in advance to these questions goes to work with his eyes blindfolded and renounces his vocation. History is movement; and movement implies comparison. That is why historians tend to express their moral judgements in words of a comparative nature like 'progressive' and 'reactionary' rather than in uncompromising absolutes like 'good' and 'bad'; these are attempts to define different societies or historical phenomena not in relation to some absolute standard, but in their relation to one another. Moreover, when we examine these
supposedly absolute and extra-historical values, we find that they too are in fact rooted to history. The emergence of a particular value or ideal at a given time or place is explained by historical conditions of place and time. The practical content of hypothetical absolutes like equality, liberty, justice, or natural law varies from period to period, or from continent to continent. Every group has its own values, which are rooted in history. Every group protects itself against the intrusion of alien and inconvenient values, which it brands by opprobrious epithets as bourgeois and capitalist, or undemocratic and totalitarian, or, more crudely still, as un-English and un-American. The abstract standard or value, divorced from society and divorced from history, is as much an illusion as the abstract individual. The serious historian is the one who recognises the historically-conditioned character of all values, not the one who claims for his own values an objectivity beyond history. The beliefs which we hold and the standards of judgement which we set up are part of history, and are as much subject to historical investigation as any other aspect of human behaviour. Few sciences today - least of all the social sciences - would lay claim to total independence. But history has no fundamental dependence on something outside itself which would differentiate it from any other science.

Let me sum up what I have tried to say about the claim of history to be included among the sciences. The word science already covers so many different branches of knowledge, employing so many different methods and techniques, that the onus seems to rest on those who seek to exclude history rather than on those who seek to include it. It is significant that the arguments for exclusion come not from scientists anxious to exclude historians from their select company, but from historians and philosophers anxious to vindicate the status of history as a branch of humane letters. The dispute reflects the prejudice of the old division between the humanities and science, in which the humanities were supposed to represent the broad culture of the ruling class, and science the skills of the technicians who served it. The words 'humanities' and 'humane' are themselves in this context a survival of this time-honoured prejudice; and the fact that the antithesis between science and history will not make sense in any language but English suggests the peculiarly insular character of the prejudice. My principal objection to the refusal to call history a science is that it justifies and perpetuates the rift between the so-called 'two cultures'. The rift itself is a product of this ancient prejudice, based on a class structure of English society which itself belongs to the past; and I am myself not convinced that the chasm which separates the historian from the geologist is any deeper or more unbridgeable than the chasm which separates the geologist from the physicist. But the way to mend the rift is not, in my view, to teach elementary science to historians or elementary history to scientists. This is a blind alley into which we have been led by muddled thinking. After all, scientists themselves do
not behave in this way. I have never heard of engineers being advised to attend elementary classes in botany.

One remedy I would suggest is to improve the standard of our history, to make it - if I may dare to say so - more scientific, to make our demands on those who pursue it more rigorous. History as an academic discipline in this university is sometimes thought of as a catch-all for those who find classics too difficult and science too serious. One impression which I hope to convey in these lectures is that history is a far more difficult subject than classics, and quite as serious as any science. But this remedy would imply a stronger faith among historians themselves in what they are doing. Sir Charles Snow, in a recent lecture on this theme, had a point when he contrasted the 'brash' optimism of the scientist with the 'subdued voice' and 'anti-social feeling' of what he called the 'literary intellectual'. Some historians - and more of those who write about history without being historians - belong to this category of 'literary intellectuals'. They are so busy telling us that history is not a science, and explaining what it cannot and should not be or do, that they have no time for its achievements and its potentialities.

The other way to heal the rift is to promote a profounder understanding of the identity of aim between scientists and historians; and this is the main value of the new and growing interest in the history and philosophy of science. Scientists, social scientists, and historians are all engaged in different branches of the same study: the study of man and his environment, of the effects of man on his environment and of his environment on man. The object of the study is the same: to increase man's understanding of, and mastery over, his environment. The presuppositions and the methods of the physicist, the geologist, the psychologist, and the historian differ widely in detail; nor do I wish to commit myself to the proposition that, in order to be more scientific, the historian must follow more closely the methods of physical science. But historian and physical scientist are united in the fundamental purpose of seeking to explain, and in the fundamental procedure of question and answer. The historian, like any other scientist, is an animal who incessantly asks the question 'Why?'. In my next lecture I shall examine the ways in which he puts the question and in which he attempts to answer it.

4 Causation in History

If milk is set to boil in a saucepan, it boils over. I do not know, and have never wanted to know, why this happens; if pressed, I should probably attribute it to a propensity in milk to boil over, which is true enough but explains nothing. But then I am not a natural scientist.
In the same way, one can read, or even write, about the events of the past without wanting to know why they happened, or be content to say that the Second World War occurred because Hitler wanted war, which is true enough but explains nothing. But one should not then commit the solecism of calling oneself a student of history or a historian. The study of history is a study of causes. The historian, as I said at the end of my last lecture, continuously asks the question 'Why?'; and so long as he hopes for an answer, he cannot rest. The great historian - or perhaps I should say more broadly, the great thinker - is the man who asks the question 'Why?' about new things or in new contexts.

Herodotus, the father of history, defined his purpose in the opening of his work: to preserve a memory of the deeds of the Greeks and the barbarians, ‘and in particular, beyond everything else, to give the cause of their fighting one another'. He found few disciples in the ancient world: even Thucydides has been accused of having no clear conception of causation. But when in the eighteenth century the foundations of modern historiography began to be laid, Montesquieu, in his Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and a their Rise and Decline, took as his starting-point the principles that 'there are general causes, moral or physical, which operate in every monarchy, raise it, maintain it, or overthrow it', and that 'all that occurs is subject to these causes'. A few years later in the Esprit des lois he developed and generalised this idea. It was absurd to suppose that 'blind fate has produced all the effects which we see in the world'. Men were 'not governed uniquely by their fantasies'; their behaviour followed certain laws or principles derived from 'the nature of things'. For nearly three years after that, historians and philosophers of history were busily engaged in an attempt to organise the past experience of mankind by discovering the causes of historical events and the laws which governed them. Sometimes the causes and the laws were thought of in mechanical, sometimes in biological, terms, sometimes as metaphysical, sometimes as economic, sometimes as psychological. But it was accepted doctrine that history consisted in marshalling the events of the past in an orderly sequence of cause and effect. 'If you have nothing to tell us', wrote Voltaire in his article on history for the Encyclopaedia, 'except that one barbarian succeeded another on the banks of the Oxus and Jaxartes, what is that to us?' In the last years the picture has been somewhat modified. Nowadays, for reasons discussed in my last lecture, we no longer speak of historical 'laws'; and even the word 'cause' has gone out of fashion, partly owing to certain philosophical ambiguities into which I need not enter, and partly owing to its supposed association with determinism, to which I will come presently. Some people therefore speak not of ‘cause' in history, but of 'explanation' or 'interpretation', or of ‘the logic of the situation', or of ‘the inner logic of events' (this comes from Dicey), or reject the causal approach (why it happened) in favour
of the functional approach (how it happened), though this seems inevitably to involve the question how it came to happen, and so leads us back to the question 'Why?' Other people distinguish between different kinds of cause - mechanical, biological, psychological, and so forth - and regard historical cause as a category of its own. Though some of these distinctions are in some degree valid, it may be more profitable for present purposes to stress what is common to all kinds of cause rather than what separates them. For myself, I shall be content to use the word 'cause' in the popular sense and neglect these particular refinements.

Let us begin by asking what the historian in practice does when he is confronted by the necessity of assigning causes to events. The first characteristic of the historian's approach to the problem of cause is that he will commonly assign several to the same event. Marshall the economist once wrote that 'people must be warned off by every possible means from considering the action of any one cause ... without taking account of the others whose effects are commingled with it'. The examination candidate who, in answering the question 'Why did revolution break out in Russia in 1917?', offered only one cause, would be lucky to get a third class. The historian deals in a multiplicity of causes. If he were required to consider the causes of the Bolshevik revolution, he might name Russia's successive military defeats, the collapse of the Russian economy under pressure of war, the effective propaganda of the Bolsheviks, the failure of the Tsarist government to solve the agrarian problem, the concentration of an impoverished and exploited proletariat in the factories of Petrograd, the fact that Lenin knew his own mind and nobody on the other side did - in short, a random jumble of economic, political, ideological, and personal causes, of long-term and short-term causes.

But this brings us at once to the second characteristic of the historian's approach. The candidate who, in reply to our question, was content to set out one after the other a dozen causes of - the Russian revolution and leave it at that, might get a second class, but scarcely a first; 'well-informed, but unimaginative' would probably be the verdict of the examiners. The true historian, confronted with this list of causes of his own compiling, would feel a professional compulsion to reduce it; to order, to establish some hierarchy of causes which would fix their relation to one another, perhaps to decide which cause, or which category of causes, should be regarded 'in the last resort' or 'hi the final analysis' (favourite phrases of historians) as the ultimate cause, the cause of all causes. This is his interpretation of his theme; the historian is known by the causes which he invokes. Gibbon attributed the decline and fall of the Roman empire to the triumph of barbarism and religion. The English Whig historians of the nineteenth century attributed...
the rise of British power and prosperity to the development of political institutions embodying the principles of constitutional liberty. Gibbon and the English nineteenth-century historians have an old-fashioned look today, because they ignore the economic causes which modern historians have moved into the forefront. Every historical argument revolves round the question of the priority of causes.

Henri Poincare, in the work which I quoted in my last lecture, noted that science was advancing simultaneously 'towards variety complexity' and 'towards unity and simplicity', and that this dual and apparently contradictory process was a necessary condition of knowledge. This is no less true of history. The historian, by expanding and deepening his research, constantly accumulates more and more answers to the question, 'Why?' The proliferation in recent years of economic, social, cultural, and legal history - not to mention fresh insights into the complexities of political history, and the new techniques of psychology and statistics - have enormously increased the number and range of our answers. When Bertrand Russell observed that 'every advance in a science takes us further away from the crude uniformities which are first observed into a greater differentiation of antecedent and consequent, and into a continually wider circle of antecedents recognised as relevant', he accurately described the situation in history. But the historian, in virtue of his urge to understand the past, is simultaneously compelled, like the scientist, to simplify the multiplicity of his answers, to subordinate one answer to another, and to introduce some order and unity into the chaos of happenings and the chaos of specific causes. 'One God, one Law, one Element, and one far-off Divine Event'; or Henry Adams's quest for 'some great generalisation which would finish one's clamour to be educated' - these read nowadays like old-fashioned jokes. But the fact remains that the historian must work through the simplification, as well as through the multiplication, of causes. History, like science, advances through this dual and apparently contradictory process.

At this point I must reluctantly turn aside to deal with two savoury red herrings which have been drawn across our path - one labelled 'Determinism in History; or the Wickedness of Hegel', the other 'Chance in History; or Cleopatra's Nose'. First I must say a word or two about how they come to be here. Professor Karl Popper, who in the 1930s in Vienna wrote a weighty work on the new look in science (recently translated into English under the title *The Logic of Scientific Enquiry*), published in English during the war two books of a more popular character: *The Open Society and Its Enemies and The Poverty of Historicism*. They were written under the strong emotional influence of the reaction against Hegel, who was, treated, together with Plato, as the spiritual ancestor of Nazism, and against the rather shallow Marxism which was the intellectual climate of the British
Left in the 1930s. The principal targets were the allegedly determinist philosophies of history of Hegel and Marx grouped together under the opprobrious name of 'Historicism'. In 1954 Sir Isaiah Berlin published his essay on *Historical Inevitability*. He dropped the attack on Plate, perhaps out of some lingering respect for that ancient pillar of the Oxford Establishment; and he added to the indictment the argument, not found in Popper, that the 'historicism' of Hegel and Marx is objectionable because, by explaining human actions in causal terms, it implies a denial of human free will, and encourages historians to evade their supposed obligation (of which I spoke in my last lecture) to pronounce moral condemnation on the Charlemagnes, Napoleons, and Stalins of history. Otherwise not much has changed. But Sir Isaiah Berlin is a deservedly popular and widely-read writer. During the past five or six years, almost everyone in this country or in the United States who has written an article about history, or even a serious review of a historical work, has cocked a knowing snook at Hegel and Marx and determinism, and pointed out the absurdity of failing to recognise the role of accident in history. It is perhaps unfair to hold Sir Isaiah responsible for his disciples. Even when he talks nonsense, he earns our indulgence by talking it in an engaging and attractive way. The disciples repeat the nonsense, and fail to make it attractive. In any case, there is nothing new in all this. Charles Kingsley, not the most distinguished of our Regius Professors of Modern History, who had probably never read Hegel or heard of Marx, spoke in his inaugural lecture in 1860 of man's 'mysterious power of breaking the laws of his own being' as proof that no 'inevitable sequence' could exist in history. But fortunately we have forgotten Kingsley. It is Professor Popper and Sir Isaiah Berlin who between them have dogged this very dead horse back into a semblance of life; and some patience will be required to clear up the muddle.

First then let me take determinism, which I will define - I hope, uncontroversial - as the belief that everything that happened has a cause or causes, and could not have happened differently unless something in the cause or causes had also been different. Determinism is a problem not of history, but of all human behaviour. The human being whose actions have no cause and are therefore undetermined is as much an abstraction as the individual outside society whom we discussed in a previous lecture. Professor Popper's assertion that 'everything- is possible in human affairs is either meaningless or false. Nobody in ordinary life believes or can believe this. The axiom that everything has a cause is a condition of our capacity to understand what is going on around us. The nightmare quality of Kafka's novels lies in the fact that nothing that happens has any apparent cause, or any cause that can be ascertained: this leads to the total disintegration of the human personality, which is based on the assumption that events have causes, and that enough of these causes are
ascertainable to build up in the human mind a pattern of past and present sufficiently coherent to serve as a guide to action. Everyday life would be impossible unless one assumed that human behaviour was determined by causes which are in principle ascertainable. Once upon a time some people thought it blasphemous to inquire into the causes of natural phenomena, since these were obviously governed by the divine will. Sir Isaiah Berlin's objection to our explaining why human beings acted as they did, on the ground that these actions are governed by the human will, belongs to the same order of ideas, and perhaps indicates that the social sciences are in the same stage of development today as were the natural sciences when this kind of argument was directed against them.

Let us see how we handle this problem in everyday life. As you go about your daily affairs, you are in the habit of meeting Smith. You greet him with an amiable, but pointless, remark about the weather, or about the state of college or university business; he replies with an equally amiable and pointless remark about the weather or the state of business. But supposing that one morning Smith, instead of answering your remark in his usual way, were to break into a violent diatribe against your personal appearance or character. Would you shrug your shoulders, and treat this as a convincing demonstration of the freedom of Smith's will and of the fact that everything is possible in human affairs? I suspect that you would not. On the contrary, you would probably say something like: 'Poor Smith! You know, of course, his father died in a mental hospital,' or 'Poor Smith! He must have been having more trouble with his wife.' In other words, you would attempt to diagnose the cause of Smith's apparently causeless behaviour, in the conviction that some cause there must be. By so doing you would, I fear, incur the wrath of Sir Isaiah Berlin, who would bitterly complain that, by providing a causal explanation of Smith's behaviour, you had swallowed Hegel's and Marx's deterministic assumption, and shirked your obligation to denounce Smith as a cad. But nobody in ordinary life takes this view, or supposes that either determinism or moral responsibility is at stake. The logical dilemma about free will and determinism does not arise in real life. It is not that some human actions are free and others determined. The fact is that all human actions are both free and determined, according to the point of view from which one considers them. The practical question is different again. Smith's action had a cause, or a number of causes; but in so far as it was caused not by some external compulsion but by the compulsion of his own personality, he was morally responsible, since it is a condition of social life that normal adult human beings are morally responsible for their own personality. Whether to hold him responsible in this particular case is a matter for your practical judgement. But, if you do, this does not mean that you regard his action as having no cause: cause and moral responsibility are different categories. An Institute and Chair of Criminology have recently
been established in this university. It would not, I feel sure, occur to any of those engaged in investigating the causes of crime to suppose that this committed them to a denial of the moral responsibility of the criminal. Now let us look at the historian. Like the ordinary man, he believes that human actions have causes which are in principle ascertainable. History, like everyday life, would be impossible if this assumption were not made. It is the special function of the historian to investigate these causes. This may be thought to give him a special interest in the determined aspect of human behaviour: but he does not reject free will - except on the untenable hypothesis that voluntary actions have no cause. Nor is he troubled by the question of inevitability. Historians, like other people, sometimes fall into rhetorical language and speak of an occurrence as 'inevitable' when they mean merely that the conjunction of factors leading one to expect it was overwhelmingly strong. Recently I searched my own history for the offending word, and cannot give myself an entirely clean bill of health: in one passage I wrote that, after the revolution of 1917, a dash between the Bolsheviks and the Orthodox Church was 'inevitable'. No doubt it would have been wiser to say 'extremely probable'. But may I be excused for finding the correction a shade pedantic? In practice, historians do not assume that events are inevitable before they have taken place. They frequently discuss alternative courses available to the actors in the story, on the assumption that the option was open, though they go on quite correctly to explain why one course was eventually chosen rather than the other. Nothing in history is inevitable, except in the formal sense that, for it to have happened otherwise, the antecedent causes would have had to be different. As a historian, I am perfectly prepared to do without 'inevitable', 'unavoidable', 'inescapable', and even 'ineluctable'. Life will be drabber. But let us leave them to poets and metaphysicians.

So barren and pointless does this charge of inevitability appear, and so great the vehemence with which it has been pursued in recent years, that I think we must look for the hidden motives behind it. Its principal source is, I suspect, what I may call the 'might-have-been' school of thought - or rather of emotion. It attaches itself almost exclusively to contemporary history. Last term here in Cambridge I saw a talk to some society advertised under the title 'Was the Russian Revolution Inevitable?' I am sure it was intended as a perfectly serious talk. But if you had seen a talk advertised on 'Were the Wars of the Roses Inevitable?' you would at once have suspected some joke. The historian writes of the Norman Conquest or the American War of Independence as if what happened was in fact bound to happen, and as if it was his business simply to explain what happened and why; and nobody accuses him of being a determinist and of failing to discuss the alternative possibility that William the Conqueror or the American insurgents might have been defeated. When, however, I write about the Russian revolution of 1917 in precisely this
way - the only proper way to the historian I find myself under attack from my critics for having by implication depicted what happened as something that was bound to happen, and failed to examine all the other things that might have happened. Suppose, it is said, that Stolypin had had time to complete his agrarian reform, or that Russia had not gone to war, perhaps the revolution would not have occurred; or suppose that the Kerensky government had made good, and that the leadership of the revolution had been assumed by the Mensheviks or the Social Revolutionaries instead of by the Bolsheviks. These suppositions are theoretically conceivable; and one can always play a parlour game with the might-have-beens of history. But they have nothing to do with determinism; for the determinist will only reply that, for these things to have happened, the causes would also have had to be different. Nor have they anything to do with history. The point is that today nobody seriously wishes to reverse the results of the Norman Conquest or of American independence, or to express a passionate protest against these events; and nobody objects when the historian treats them as a closed chapter. But plenty of people, who have suffered directly or vicariously from the results of the Bolshevik victory, or still fear its remoter consequences, desire to register their protest against it; and this takes the form, when they read history, of letting their imagination run riot on all the more agreeable things that might have happened, and of being indignant with the historian who goes on quietly with his job of explaining what did happen and why their agreeable wish-dreams remain unfulfilled. The trouble about contemporary history is that people remember the time when all the options were still open, and find it difficult to adopt the attitude of the historian for whom they have been closed by the fait accompli. This is a purely emotional and unhistorical reaction. But it has furnished most of the fuel for the recent campaign against the supposed doctrine of 'historical inevitability'. Let us get rid of this red herring once and for all.

The other source of the attack is the famous crux of Cleopatra's nose. This is the theory that history is, by and large, a chapter of accidents, a series of events determined by chance coincidences, and attributable only to the most casual causes. The result of the Battle of Actium was due not to the sort of causes commonly postulated by historians, but to Antony's infatuation with Cleopatra. When Bajazet was deterred by an attack of gout from marching into central Europe, Gibbon observed that 'an acrimonious humour falling on a single fibre of one man may prevent or suspend the misery of nations' When King Alexander of Greece died in the autumn of 1920 from the bite of a pet monkey, this accident touched off a train of events which led Sir Winston Churchill to remark that 'a quarter of a million persons died of this monkey's bite'. Or take again Trotsky's comment on the fever contracted while shooting ducks which put him out of action at a critical point
of his quarrel with Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Stalin in the autumn of 1923: "One can foresee a revolution or a war, but it is impossible to foresee the consequences of an autumn shooting-trip for wild ducks." The first thing to be made clear is that this question has nothing to do with the issue of determinism. Antony's infatuation with Cleopatra, or Bajazet's attack of gout, or Trotsky's feverish chill, were just as much causally determined as anything else that happens. It is unnecessarily discourteous to Cleopatra's beauty to suggest that Antony's infatuation had no cause. The connexion between female beauty and male infatuation is one of the most regular sequences of cause and effect observable in everyday life. These so-called accidents in history represent a sequence of cause and effect interrupting - and, so to speak, clashing with - the sequence which the historian is primarily concerned to investigate. Bury, quite rightly, speaks of a 'collision of two independent causal chains'. Sir Isaiah Berlin, who opens his essay on Historical Inevitability by citing with praise an article of Bernard Berenson on 'The Accidental View of History, is one of those who confuse accident in this sense with an absence of causal determination. But, this confusion apart, we have a real problem on our hands. How can one discover in history a coherent sequence of cause and effect, how can we find any meaning in history, when our sequence is liable to be broken or deflected at any moment by some other, and from our point of view irrelevant, sequence?

We may pause here for a moment to notice the origin of this recent widespread insistence on the role of chance in history. Polybius appears to have been the first historian to occupy himself with it in any systematic way; and Gibbon was quick to unmask the reason. 'The Greeks', observed Gibbon, 'after their country had been reduced to a province, imputed the triumphs of Rome not to the merit, but to the fortune, of the republic.' Tacitus, also a historian of the decay of his country, was another ancient historian to indulge in extensive reflexions on chance. The renewed insistence by British writers on the importance of accident in history dates from the growth of a mood of uncertainty and apprehension which set in with the present century and became marked after 1914. The first British historian to sound this note after a long interval appears to have been Bury, who, in an article of 1909 on 'Darwinism in History', drew attention to 'the element of chance coincidence' which in large measure 'helps to determine events in social evolution'; and a separate article was devoted to this theme in 1916 under the title 'Cleopatra's Nose'. H. A. L. Fisher, in the passage already quoted, which reflects his disillusionment over the failure of liberal dreams after the First World War, begs his readers to recognise 'the play of the contingent and the unforeseen' in history." The popularity in this country of a theory of history as a chapter of accidents has coincided with the rise in Prance of a school of philosophers who preach that existence - I quote Sartre's famous L'Ene et le neant - has
'neither cause nor reason nor necessity'. In Germany, the veteran historian Meinecheke, as we have already noted, became impressed towards the end of his life with the role of chance in history. He reproached Ranke with not having paid sufficient attention to it; and after the Second World War he attributed the national disasters of the past forty years to a series of accidents, the vanity of the Raiser, the election of Hindenburg to the presidency of the Weimar Republic, Hitler's obsessional character, and so forth - the bankruptcy of a great historian's mind under the stress of the misfortunes of his country.' In a group or a nation which is riding in the trough, not on the crest, of historical events, theories that stress the role of chance or accident in history will be found to prevail. The view that examination results are all a lottery will always be popular among those who have been placed in the third class.

But to uncover the sources of a belief is not to dispose of it; and we have still to discover exactly what Cleopatra's nose is doing in the pages of history. Montesquieu was apparently the first who attempted to defend the laws of history against this intrusion. 'If a particular cause, like the accidental result of a battle, has ruined a state,' he wrote in his work on the greatness and decline of the Romans, 'there was a general cause which made the downfall of this state ensue from a single battle.' The Marxists also had some difficulty over this question. Marx wrote of it only once, and that only in a letter:

World history would have a very mystical character if there no room in it for chance. This chance itself naturally becomes part of the general trend of development and is compensated by other forms of chance. But acceleration and retardation depends on such 'accidentals', which include the 'chance' character of the individuals who are at the head of a movement at the outset.

Marx thus offered an apology for chance in history under three heads. First, it was not very important; it could 'accelerate' or 'retard' but not, by implication, radically alter, the course of events. Second, one chance was compensated by another, so that in the end chance cancelled itself out. Third, chance was illustrated in the character of individuals. Trotsky reinforced the theory of compensating and self-cancelling accidents by an ingenious analogy:

The entire historical process is a refraction of historical law through the accidental. In the language of biology, we might say that the historical law is realised through the natural selection of accidents.'
I confess that I find this theory unsatisfying and unconvincing. The role of accident in history is nowadays seriously exaggerated by those who are interested to stress its importance. But it exists, and to say that it merely accelerates or retards, but does not alter, is to juggle with words. Nor do I see any reason to believe that an accidental occurrence - say, the premature death of Lenin at the age of fifty-four - is automatically compensated by some other accident in such a way as to restore the balance of the historical process.

Equally inadequate is the view that accident in history is merely the measure of our ignorance - simply a name for something which we fail to understand. This no doubt sometimes happens. The planets got their name, which means of course 'wanderers', when they were supposed to wander at random through the sky, and the regularity of their movements was not understood. To describe something as a mischance is a favourite way of exempting oneself from the tiresome obligation to investigate its cause; and, when somebody tells me that history is a chapter of accidents, I tend to suspect him of intellectual laziness or low intellectual vitality. It is common practice with serious historians to point out that something hitherto treated as accidental was not an accident at all, but can be rationally explained and significantly fitted into the broader pattern of events. But this also does not fully answer our question. Accident is not simply something which we fail to understand. The solution of the problem of accident in history must, I believe, be sought in a quite different order of ideas.

At an earlier stage we saw that history begins with the selection and marshalling of facts by the historian to become historical facts. Not all facts are historical facts. But the distinction between historical and unhistorical facts is not rigid or constant; and any fact may, so to speak, be promoted to the status of a historical fact once its relevance and significance are discerned. We now see that a somewhat similar process is at work in the historian's approach to causes. The relation of the historian to his causes has the same dual and reciprocal character as the relation of the historian to his facts. The causes determine his interpretation of the historical process, and his interpretation determines his selection and marshalling of the causes. The hierarchy of causes, the relative significance of one cause or set of causes or of another, is the essence of his interpretation. And this furnishes the clue to the problem of the accidental in history. The shape of Cleopatra's nose, Bajazet's attack of gout, the monkey-bite that killed King Alexander, the death of Lenin - these were accidents which modified the course of history. It is futile to attempt to spirit them away, or to pretend that in some way or other they had no effect. On the other hand, in so far as they were accidental, they do not enter into any rational interpretation of history, or into the historian's hierarchy of significant causes. Professor Popper and...
Professor Berlin - I cite them once more as the most distinguished and widely read representatives of the school - assume that the historian's attempt to find significance in the historical process and to draw conclusions from it is tantamount to an attempt to reduce 'the whole of experience' to a symmetrical order, and that the presence of accident in history dooms any such attempt to failure. But no sane historian pre-tends to do anything so fantastic as to embrace 'the whole of experience'; he cannot embrace more than a minute fraction of the facts even of his chosen sector or aspect of history. The world of the historian, like the world of the scientist, is not a photographic copy of the real world, but rather a working model which enables him more or less effectively to understand it and to master it. The historian distils from the experience of the past, or from so much of the experience of the past as is accessible to him, that part which he recognises as amenable to rational explanation and interpretation, and from it draws conclusions which may serve as a guide to action. A recent popular writer, speaking of the achievements of science, refers graphically to the processes of the human mind, which, 'rummaging in the ragbag of observed "facts", selects, pieces, and patterns the relevant observed facts together, rejecting the irrelevant, until it has sewn together a logical and rational quilt of knowledge.' With some qualification as to the dangers of undue subjectivism, I should accept that as a picture of the way in which the mind of the historian works.

This procedure may puzzle and shock philosophers, and even some historians. But it is perfectly familiar to ordinary people going about the practical business of life. Let me illustrate. Jones, returning from a party at which he has consumed more than his usual ration of alcohol, ins car whose brakes turn out to have been defective, at a blind corner where visibility is notoriously poor, knocks down and kills Robinson, who was crossing the road to buy cigarettes at the shop on the corner. After the mess has been cleared up, we meet - say at local police headquarters - to inquire into the causes of the occurrence. Was it due to the driver's semi-intoxicated condition - in which case there might be criminal prosecution? Or was it due to the defective brakes - in which case something might be said to the garage which overhauled the an only the week before? Or was it due to the blind corner - in which case the road authorities might be invited to give the matter their attention? While we are discussing these practical questions, two distinguished gentlemen - I shall not attempt to identify them - burst into the room and begin to tell us, with great fluency and cogency, that, if Robinson had not happened to run out of cigarettes that evening, he would not have been crossing the road and would not have been killed; that Robinson's desire for cigarettes was therefore the cause of his death; and that any inquiry which neglects this cause will be waste of time, and any conclusions drawn from it...
meaningless and futile. Well, what do we do? As soon as we can break into the flow of eloquence, we edge our two visitors gently but firmly towards the door, we instruct the janitor on no account to admit them again, and we get on with our inquiry. But what answer have we to the interrupters? Of course, Robinson was killed because he was a cigarette-smoker. Everything that the devotees of chance and contingency in history say is perfectly true and perfectly logical. It has the kind of remorseless logic which we find in Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass. But, while I yield to none in my admiration for these ripe examples of Oxford scholarship, I prefer to keep my different modes of logic in separate compartments. The Dodgsonian mode is not the mode of history.

History therefore is a process of selection in terms of historical significance. To borrow Talcott Parson's phrase once more, history is 'a selective system' not only of cognitive, but of causal, orientations to reality. Just as from the infinite ocean of facts the historian selects those which are significant for his purpose, so from the multiplicity of sequences of cause and effect he extracts those, and only those, which are historically significant; and the standard of historical significance is his ability to get them into his pattern of rational explanation and interpretation. Other sequences of cause and effect have to be rejected as accidental, not because the relation between cause and effect is different, but because the sequence itself is irrelevant. The historian can do nothing with it; it is not amenable to rational interpretation, and has no meaning either for the past or the present. It is true that Cleopatra's nose, or Bajazet's gout, or Alexander's monkey-bite, or Lenin's death, or Robinson's cigarette-smoking, had results. But it makes no sense as a general proposition to say that generals lose battles because they are infatuated with beautiful queens, or that wars occur because kings keep pet monkeys, or that people get run over and killed on the roads because they smoke cigarettes. If on the other hand you tell the ordinary man that Robinson was killed because the driver was drunk, or because the brakes did not work, or because there was a blind corner on the road, this will seem to him a perfectly sensible and rational explanation; if he chooses to discriminate, he may even say that this, and not Robinson's desire for cigarettes, was the 'real' cause of Robinson's death. Similarly, if you tell the student of history that the struggles in the Soviet Union in the 1920s were due to discussions about the rate of industrialisation, or about the best means of inducing the peasants to grow grain to feed the towns, or even to the personal ambitions of rival leaders, he will feel that these are rational and historically significant explanations, in the sense that they could also be applied to other historical situations, and that they are 'real' causes of what happened in the sense that the accident of Lenin's premature death was not. He may even, if he is given to reflection on these things, be reminded of Hegel's much
quoted and much misunderstood dictum in the introduction to the *Philosophy of Right* that 'what is rational is real, and what is real is rational'.

Let us return for a moment to the causes of Robinson's death. We had no difficulty in recognising that some of the causes were rational and 'real' and that others were irrational and accidental. But by what criterion did we make the distinction? The faculty of reason is normally exercised for some purpose. Intellectuals may sometimes reason, or think that they reason, for fun. But, broadly speaking, human beings reason to an end. And when we recognised certain explanations as rational, and other explanations as not rational, we were, I suggest, distinguishing between explanations which served some end and explanations which did not. In the case under discussion it made sense to suppose that the curbing of alcoholic indulgence in drivers, or a stricter control over the condition of brakes, or an improvement in the siting of roads, might serve the end of reducing the number of traffic fatalities. But it made no sense at all to suppose that the number of traffic fatalities could be reduced by preventing people from smoking cigarettes. This was the criterion by which we made our distinction. And the same goes for our attitude to causes in history. There, too, we distinguish between rational and accidental causes. The former, since they are potentially applicable to other countries, other periods, and other conditions, lead to fruitful generalisations, and lessons can be learned from them; they serve the end of broadening and deepening our understanding. Accidental causes cannot be generalised; and, since they are in the fullest sense of the word unique, they teach no lessons and lead to no conclusions. But here I must make another point. It is precisely this notion of an end in view which provides the key to our treatment of causation in history; and this necessarily involves value judgements. Interpretation in history is, as we saw in the last lecture, always bound up with value judgements, and causality is bound up with interpretation. In the words of Meinecke - the great Meinecke, the Meinecke of the 1920s - 'the search for causalities in history is impossible without reference to values ... behind the search for causalities there always lies, directly or indirectly, the search for values'. And this recalls what I said earlier, about the dual and reciprocal function of history - to promote our understanding of the past in the light of the present and of the present in the light of the past. Anything which, like Antony's infatuation with Cleopatra's nose, fails to contribute to this dual purpose is from the point of view of the historian dead and barren.

At this juncture, it is time for me to confess to a rather shabby trick which I have played on you, though, since you will have had no difficulty in seeing through it, and since it has enabled me on several occasions to shorten and simplify what I had to say, you will perhaps have been indulgent enough to treat it as a convenient piece of shorthand. I have
hitherto consistently used the conventional phrase 'past and present'. But, as we all know, the present has no more than a notional existence as an imaginary dividing line between the past and the future. In speaking of the present, I have already smuggled another time dimension into the argument. It would, I think, be easy to show that, since past and future are part of the same time-span, interest in the past and interest in the future are interconnected. The line of demarcation between prehistoric and historical times is crossed when people cease to live only in the present, and become consciously interested both in their past and in their future. History begins with the handing down of tradition; and tradition means the carrying of the habits and lessons of the past into the future. Records of the past begin to be kept for the benefit of future generations. 'Historical thinking,', writes the Dutch historian Huizinga, 'is always teleological.' Sir Charles Snow recently wrote of Rutherford that 'like all scientists ... he had, almost without thinking what it meant, the future in his bones'." Good historians, I suspect, whether they think about it or not, have the future in their bones. Besides the question 'Why? is the historian also asks the question 'Whither ?'

5. History as Progress

LET me begin by quoting a passage from Professor Powicke's inaugural lecture as Regius Professor in Modern History in Oxford thirty years ago:

The craving for an interpretation of history is so deep-rooted that, unless we have a constructive outlook over the past, we are drawn either to mysticism or to cynicism. 'Mysticism' will, I think, stand for the view that the meaning of history lies somewhere outside history, in the realms of theology or eschatology - the view of such writers as Berdiaev or Niebuhr or Toynbee 'Cynicism' stands for the view, examples of which I have several times quoted, that history has no meaning, or a multiplicity of equally valid or invalid meanings, or the meaning which we arbitrarily choose to give to it. These are perhaps the two most popular views of history today. But I shall unhesitatingly reject both of them. This leaves us with that odd, but suggestive, phrase 'a constructive outlook over the past'. Having no way of knowing what was in Professor Powicke's mind when he used the phrase, I shall attempt to read my own interpretation into it.

Like the ancient civilisations of Asia, the classical civilisation of Greece and Rome was basically unhistorical. As we have already seen, Herodotus as the father of history had few children; and the writers of classical antiquity were on the whole as little concerned with
the future as with the past. Thucydides believed that nothing significant had happened in
time before the events which he described, and that nothing significant was likely to
happen thereafter. Lucretius deduced man's indifference to the future from his indifference
to the past:

Consider how that past ages of eternal time before our birth were no concern of ours. This
is a mirror which nature holds up to us of future time after our death.' Poetic visions of a
brighter future took the form of visions of a return to a golden age of the past - a cyclical
view which assimilated the processes of history to the processes of nature. History was not
going anywhere: because there was no sense of the past, there was equally no sense of the
future. Only Virgil, who in his fourth eclogue had given the classical picture of a return to
the golden age, was inspired in the Aeneid momentarily to break through the cyclical
conception: 'Imperium sine fine dedi' was a most unclassical thought, which later earned
Virgil recognition as a quasi-Christian prophet.

It was the Jews, and after them the Christians, who introduced an entirely new element by
postulating a goal towards which the historical process is moving - the teleological view of
history. History thus acquired a meaning and purpose, but at the expense of losing its
secular character. The attainment of the goal of history would automatically mean the end
of history: history itself became a theocracy. This was the medieval view of history. The
Renaissance restored the classical view of an anthropocentric world and of the primacy of
reason, but for the pessimistic classical view of the future substituted an optimistic view
derived from the Jewish-Christian tradition. Time, which had once been hostile and
corroding, now became friendly and creative: contrast Horace's 'Damnosa quid non
imminuit dies? with Bacon's 'Veritas temporis filia'. The rationalists of the Enlightenment,
who were the founders of modern historiography, retained the Jewish-Christian
teleological view, but secularized the goal; they were thus enabled to restore the rational
character of the historical process itself. History became progress towards the goal of the
perfection of man's estate on earth. Gibbon, the greatest of the Enlightenment historians,
was not deterred by the nature of his subject from recording what he called 'the pleasing
conclusion that every age of the world has increased, and still increases, the real wealth,
the happiness, the knowledge, and perhaps the virtue, of the human race'. The cult of
progress reached its climax at the moment when British prosperity, power, and self-
confidence were at their height; and British writers and British historians were among the
most ardent votaries of the cult. The phenomenon is too familiar to need illustration; and I
need only quote one or two passages to show how recently faith in progress remained a
postulate of all our thinking. Acton, in the report of 1896 on the project of the Cambridge
Modern History which I quoted in my first lecture, referred to history as 'a progressive science'; and in the introduction to the first volume of the history wrote that 'we are bound to assume, as the scientific hypothesis on which history is to be written, a progress in human affairs'. In the last volume of the history, published in 1914 Dampier, who was a tutor of my college when I was an undergraduate, felt no doubt that 'future ages will see no limit to the growth of man's power over the resources of nature and of his intelligent use of them for the welfare of his race'. In view of what I am about to say, it is fair for me to admit that this was the atmosphere in which I was educated, and that I could subscribe without reservation to the words of my senior by half a generation, Bertrand Russell: 'I grew up in the full hood of Victorian optimism, and ... something remains with me of the hopefulness that then was easy.' In 1920, when Bury wrote his book The Idea of Progress, a bleaker climate already prevailed, the blame for which he laid, in obedience to the current fashion, on 'the doctrinaires who have established the present reign of terror in Russia', though he still described progress as 'the animating and controlling idea of western civilisation'. Thereafter this note was silent. Nicholas I of Russia is said to have issued an order banning the word 'progress': nowadays the philosophers and historians of western Europe, and even the United States, have come belatedly to agree with him. The hypothesis of progress has been refuted. The decline of the west has become so familiar a phrase that quotation marks are no longer required. But what, apart from all the shouting, has really happened? By whom has this new current of opinion been formed? The other day I was shocked to come across, I think, the only remark of Bertrand Russell I have ever seen which seemed to me to betray an acute sense of class: 'There is, on the whole, much less liberty in the world now than there was a hundred years ago.' I have no measuring-rod for liberty, and do not know how to balance the lesser liberty of few against the greater liberty of many. But an any standard of measurement I can only regard the statement as fantastically untrue. I am more attracted by one of those fascinating glimpses which Mr A. J. P. Taylor sometimes gives us into Oxford academic life. All this talk about the decline of civilisation, he writes, ‘means only that university professors used to have domestic servants and now do their own washing-up.’ Of course, for former domestic servants, washing-up by professors may be a symbol of progress. The loss of white supremacy in Africa, which worries Empire Loyalists, Africaner Republicans, and investors in gold and copper shares, - may look like progress to others. I see no reason why, on this question of progress, I should ipso facto prefer the verdict of the 1950s to that of the 1890s, the verdict of the English-speaking world to that of Russia, Asia, and Africa, or the verdict of the middle-class intellectual to that of the man in the street, who, so cording to Mr. Macmillan, has never had it so good. Let us for the moment suspend judgement on the question whether we are living in a period of progress or of decline, and examine a little
mote closely what is implied in the concept of progress, what assumptions lie behind it, and how far these have become untenable.

I should like, first of all, to clear up the muddle about progress and evolution. The thinkers of the Enlightenment adopted two apparently incompatible views. They sought to vindicate man's place in the world of nature: the laws of history were equated with the laws of nature. On the other hand, they believed in progress. But what ground was there for treating nature as progressive, as constantly advancing towards a goal ~ Hegel met the difficulty by sharply distinguishing history, which was progressive, from nature, which was not. The Darwinian revolution appeared to remove all embarrassments by equating evolution and progress: nature, like history, turned out after all to be progressive. But this opened the way to a much graver misunderstanding, by confusing biological inheritance, which is the source of evolution, with social acquisition, which is the source of progress in history. The distinction is familiar and obvious. Put a European infant in a Chinese family, and the child will grow up with a white skin, but speaking Chinese. Pigmentation is a biological inheritance, language a social acquisition transmitted by the agency of the human brain. Evolution by inheritance has to be measured in millennia or in millions of years; no measurable biological change is known to have occurred in man since the beginning of written history. Progress by acquisition can be measured in generations. The essence of man as a rational being is that he develops his potential capacities by accumulating the experience of past generations. Modern man is said to have no larger a brain, and no greater innate capacity of thought, than his ancestor 5000 years ago. But the effectiveness of his thinking has been multiplied many times by learning and incorporating in his experience the experience of the intervening generations. The transmission of acquired characteristics, which is rejected by biologists, is the very foundation of social progress. History is progress through the transmission of acquired skills from one generation to another.

Secondly, we need not and should not conceive progress as having a finite beginning or end. The belief, popular less than fifty years ago, that civilisation was invented in the Nile Valley in the fourth millennium B.C. is no more credible today than the chronology which placed the creation of the world in 4004 B.C. Civilisation, the birth of which we may perhaps take as a starting-point for our hypothesis of progress, was surely not an invention, but an infinitely slow process of development, in which spectacular leaps probably occurred from time to time. We need not trouble ourselves with the question when progress - or civilisation - began. The hypothesis of a finite end of progress has led to more serious misapprehension. Hegel has been rightly condemned for seeing the end of
progress in the Prussian monarchy - apparently the result of an overstrained interpretation of his view of the impossibility of prediction. But Hegel's aberration was capped by that eminent Victorian, Arnold of Rugby, who in his inaugural lecture as Regius Professor of Modern History in Oxford in 1841 thought that modern history would be the last stage in the history of mankind: 'It appears to bear marks of the fullness of time, as if there would be no future history beyond it.' Marx's prediction that the proletarian revolution would realise the ultimate aim of a classless society was logically and morally less vulnerable; but the presumption of an end of history has an eschatological ring more appropriate to the theologian than to the historian, and reverts to the fallacy of a goal outside history. No doubt a finite end has attractions for the human mind; and Acton's vision of the march of history as an unending progress towards liberty seems chilly and vague. But if the historian is to save his hypothesis of progress, I think he must be prepared to treat it as a process into which the demands and conditions of successive periods will put their own specific content. And this is what is meant by Acton's thesis that history is not only a record of progress but a 'progressive science', or, if you like, that history in both senses of the word - as the course of events and as the record of those events - is progressive. Let us recall Acton's description of the advance of liberty in history:

It is by the combined efforts of the weak, made under compulsion, to resist the reign of force and constant wrong, that, in the rapid change but slow progress of four hundred years, liberty has been preserved, and secured, and extended, and finally understood.

History as the course of events was conceived by Acton as progress towards liberty, history as the record of those events as progress towards the understanding of liberty: the two processes advanced side by side." The philosopher Bradley, writing in an age when analogies from evolution were fashionable, remarked that 'for religious faith the end of evolution is presented as that which ...is already evolved'. For the historian the end of progress is not already evolved. It is something still infinitely remote; and pointers towards it come in sight only as we advance. This does not diminish its importance. A compass is a valuable and indeed indispensable guide. But it is not a chart of the route. The content of history can be realised only as we experience it.

My third point is that no sane person ever believed in a kind of progress which advanced in an unbroken straight line without reverses and deviations and breaks in continuity, so that even the sharpest reverse is not necessarily fatal to the belief. Clearly there are periods of regression as well as periods of progress. Moreover, it would be rash to assume that, after a retreat, the advance will be resumed from the same point or along the same line.
Hegel's or Marx's four or three civilisations, Toynbee's twenty-one civilisations, the theory of a life-cycle of civilisations passing through rise, decline, and fall - such schemes make no sense in themselves. But they are symptomatic of the observed fact that the effort which is needed to drive civilisation forward dies away in one place and is later resumed at another, so that whatever progress we can observe in history is certainly not continuous either in time or in place. Indeed, if I were addicted to formulating laws of history, one such law would be to the effect that the group - call it a class, a nation, a continent, a civilisation, what you will - which plays the leading role in the advance of civilisation in one period is unlikely to play a similar role in the next period, and this for the good reason that it will be too deeply imbued with the traditions, interests, and ideologies of the earlier period to be able to adapt itself to the demands and conditions of the next period. Thus it may very well happen that what seems for one group a period of decline may seem to another the birth of a new advance. Progress does not and cannot mean equal and simultaneous progress for all. It is significant that almost all our latter-day prophets of decline, our sceptics who see no meaning in history and assume that progress is dead, belong to that sector of the world and to that class of society which have triumphantly played a leading and predominant part in the advance of civilisation for several generations. It is no consolation to them to be told that the role which their group has played in the past will now pass to others. Clearly a history which has played so scurvy a trick on them cannot be a meaningful or rational process. But, if we are to retain the hypothesis of progress, we must, I think, accept the condition of the broken line.

Lastly, I come to the question what is the essential content of progress in terms of historical action. The people who struggle, say, to extend civil rights to all, or to reform penal practice, or to remove inequalities of race or wealth, are consciously seeking to do just those things: they are not consciously seeking to 'progress', to realise some historical 'law' or 'hypothesis' or progress. It is the historian who applies to their actions his hypothesis of progress, and interprets their actions as progress. But this does not invalidate the concept of progress. I am glad on this point to find myself in agreement with Sir Isaiah Berlin that 'progress and reaction, however much the words may have been abused, are not empty concepts'. It is a presupposition of history that man is capable of profiting (not that he necessarily profits) by the experience of his predecessors, and that progress in history, unlike evolution in nature, rests on the transmission of acquired assets. These assets include both material possessions and the capacity to master, transform, and utilise one's environment. Indeed, the two factors are closely inter-connected, and react on one another. Marx treats human labour as the foundation of the whole edifice; and this formula seems acceptable if a sufficiently broad sense is attached to 'labour'. But the mere accumulation
of resources will not avail unless it brings with it not only increased technical and social knowledge and experience, but increased mastery of man's environment in the broader sense. At the present time, few people would, I think, question the fact of progress in the accumulation both of material resources and of scientific knowledge, of mastery over the environment in the technological sense. What is questioned is whether there has been in the twentieth century any progress in our ordering of society, in our mastery of the social environment, national or international, whether indeed there has not been a marked regression. Has not the evolution of man as a social being lagged fatally behind the progress of technology!

The symptoms which inspire this question are obvious. But I suspect none the less that it is wrongly put. History has known many turning-points, where the leadership and initiative has passed from one group, from one sector of the world, to another: the period of the rise of the modern state and the shift in the centre of power from the Mediterranean to western Europe, and the period of the French revolution, have been conspicuous modern examples. Such periods are always times of violent upheavals and struggles for power. The old authorities weaken, the old landmarks disappear; out of a bitter clash of ambitions and resentments the new order emerges. What I would suggest is that we are now passing through such a period. It appears to me simply untrue to say that our understanding of the problems of social organisation or our good will to organise society in the light of that understanding have regressed: indeed, I should venture to say that they have greatly increased. It is not that our capacities have diminished, or our moral qualities declined. But the period of conflict and upheaval, due to the shifting balance of power between continents, nations, and classes, through which we are living has enormously increased the strain on these capacities and qualities, and limited and frustrated their effectiveness for positive achievement. While I do not wish to underestimate the force of the challenge of the past fifty years to the belief in progress in the western world, I am still not convinced that progress in history has come to an end. But, if you press me further on the content of progress, I think I can only reply something like this. The notion of a finite and clearly definable goal of progress in history, so often postulated by nineteenth-century thinkers, has proved inapplicable and barren. Belief in progress means belief not in any automatic or inevitable process, but in the progressive development of human potentialities. Progress is an abstract term; and the concrete ends pursued by mankind arise from time to time out of the course of history, not from some source outside it. I profess no belief in the perfectibility of man or in a future paradise on earth. To this extent I would agree with the theologians and the mystics who assert that perfection is not realisable in history. But I shall be content with the possibility of unlimited progress - or progress
subject to no limits that we can or need envisage - towards goals which can be defined only as we advance towards them, and the validity of which can be verified only in a process of attaining them. Nor do I know how, without some such conception of progress, society can survive. Every civilised society imposes sacrifices on the living generation for the sake of generations yet unborn. To justify these sacrifices in the name of a better world in the future is the secular counterpart of justifying them in the name of some divine purpose. In Bury's words, 'the principle of duty to posterity is a direct corollary of the idea of progress'. Perhaps this duty does not require justification. If it does, I know of no other way to justify it.

This brings me to the famous crux of objectivity in history. The word itself is misleading and question-begging. In an earlier lecture I have already argued that the social sciences - and history among them - cannot accommodate themselves to a theory of knowledge which puts subject and object asunder, and enforces a rigid separation between the observer and the thing observed. We need a new model which does justice to the complex process of interrelation and interaction between them.

The facts of history cannot be purely objective, since they become facts of history only in virtue of the significance attached to them by the historian. Objectivity in history - if we are still to use the conventional term - cannot be an objectivity of fact, but only of relation, of the relation between fact and interpretation, between past, present, and future. I need not revert to the reasons which led me to reject as unhistorical the attempt to judge historical events by erecting an absolute standard of value outside history and independent of it. But the concept of absolute truth is also not appropriate to the world of history - or, I suspect, to the world of science. It is only the simplest kind of historical statement that can be adjudged absolutely true or absolutely false. At a more sophisticated level, the historian who contests, say, the verdict of one of his predecessors will normally condemn it, not as absolutely false, but as inadequate or one-sided or misleading, or the product of a point of view which has been rendered obsolete or irrelevant by later evidence. To say that the Russian revolution was due to the stupidity of Nicholas II or to the genius of Lenin is altogether inadequate - so inadequate as to be altogether misleading. But it cannot be called absolutely false. The historian does not deal in absolutes of this kind.

Let us go back to the sad case of Robinson's death. The objectivity of our inquiry into that event depended not on getting our facts right - these were not in dispute - but on distinguishing between the real or significant facts, in which we were interested, and the accidental facts, which we could afford to ignore. We found it easy to draw this
distinction, because our standard or test of significance, the basis of our objectivity was clear, and consisted of relevance to the goal in view, i.e. reduction of deaths on the roads. But the historian is a less fortunate person than the investigator who has before him the simple and finite purpose of reducing traffic casualties. The historian, too, in his task; of interpretation needs his standard of significance, which is also his standard of objectivity, in order to distinguish between the significant and the accidental; and he too can find it only in relevance to the end in view. But this is necessarily an evolving end, since the evolving interpretation of the past is a necessary function of history. The traditional assumption that change has always to be explained in terms of something fixed and unchangeable is contrary to the experience of the historian. 'For the historian', says Professor Butterfield, perhaps implicitly reserving for himself a sphere into which historians need not follow him, ‘the only absolute is change." The absolute in history is not something in the past from which we start; it is not something in the present, since all present thinking is necessarily relative. It is something still incomplete and in process of becoming - something in the future towards which we move, which begins to take shape only as we move towards it, and in the light of which, as we move forward, we gradually shape our interpretation of the past. This is the secular truth behind the religious myth that the meaning of history will be revealed in the Day of Judgement. Our criterion is not an absolute in the static sense of something that is the same yesterday, today, and for ever: such an absolute is incompatible with the nature of history. But it is an absolute in respect of our interpretation of the past. It rejects the relativist view that one interpretation is as good as another, or that every interpretation is true in its own time and place, and it provides the touchstone by which our interpretation of the past will ultimately be judged. It is this sense of direction in history which alone enables us to order and interpret the events of the past- the task of the historian - and to liberate and organise human energies in the present with a view to the future - the task of the statesman, the economist, and the social reformer. But the process itself remains progressive and dynamic. Our sense of direction, and our interpretation of the past, are subject to constant modification and evolution as we proceed.

Hegel clothed his absolute in the mystical shape of a world spirit, and made the cardinal error of bringing the course of history to an end in the present, instead of projecting it into the future. He recognised a process of continuous evolution in the past, and incongruously denied it in the future. Those who, since Hegel, have reflected most deeply on the nature of history have seen in it a synthesis of past and future. Tocqueville, who did not entirely free himself from the theological idiom of his day and gave too narrow content to his absolute, nevertheless had the essence of the matter. Having spoken of the development of
equality as a universal and permanent phenomenon, he went on:

If the men of our time were brought to see the gradual and progressive development of equality as at once the past and the future of their history, this single discovery would give that development the sacred character of the will of their lord and master.'

An important chapter of history could be written on that still unfinished theme. Marx, who shared some of Hegel's inhibitions about looking into the future, and was principally concerned to root his teaching firmly in past history, was compelled by the nature of his theme to project into the future his absolute of the classless society. Bury described the idea of progress, a little awkwardly, but clearly with the same intention, as 'a theory which involves a synthesis of the past and a prophecy of the future'. Historians, says Namier in a deliberately paradoxical phrase, which he proceeds to illustrate with his usual wealth of examples, 'imagine the past and remember the future'. Only the future can provide the key to the interpretation of the past; and it is only in this sense that we can speak of an ultimate objectivity in history. It is at once the justification and the explanation of history that the past throws light on the future, and the future throws light on the past.

What, then, do we mean when we praise a historian for being objective, or say that one historian is more objective than another? Not, it is clear, simply that he gets his facts right, but rather that he chooses the right facts, or, in other words, that he applies the right standard of significance. When we call a historian objective, we mean I think two things. First of all, we mean that he has a capacity to rise above the limited vision of his own situation in society and in history - a capacity which, as I suggested in an earlier lecture, is partly dependent on his capacity to recognise the extent of his involvement in that situation, to recognise, that is to say, the impossibility of total objectivity. Secondly, we mean that he has the capacity to project his vision into the future in such a way as to give him a more profound and more lasting insight into the past than can be attained by those historians whose outlook is entirely bounded by their own immediate situation. No historian today will echo Acton's confidence in the prospect of 'ultimate history'. But some historians write history which is more durable, and has more of this ultimate and objective character, than others; and these are the historians who have what I may call a long-term vision over the past and over the future. The historian of the past can make an approach towards objectivity only as he approaches towards the understanding of the future.

When, therefore, I spoke of history in an earlier lecture as a dialogue between past and present, I should rather have called it a dialogue between the events of the past and
progressively emerging future ends. The historian's interpretation of the past, his selection of the significant and the relevant, evolves with the progressive emergence of new goals. To take the simplest of all illustrations, so long as the main goal appeared to be the organisation of constitutional liberties and political rights, the historian interpreted the past in constitutional and political terms.

When economic and social ends began to replace constitutional and political ends, historians turned to economic and social interpretations of the past. In this process, the sceptic might plausibly allege that the new interpretation is no truer than the old; each is true for its period. Nevertheless, since the preoccupation with economic and social ends represents a broader and more advanced stage in human development than the preoccupation with political and constitutional ends, so the economic and social interpretation of history may be said to represent a more advanced stage in history than the exclusively political interpretation. The old interpretation is not rejected, but is both included and superseded in the new. Historiography is a progressive science, in the sense that it seeks to provide constantly expanding and deepening insights into a course of events which is itself progressive. This is what I should mean by saying that we need 'a constructive outlook over the past'. Modern historiography has grown up during the past two centuries in this dual belief in progress, and cannot survive without it, since it is this belief which provides it with its standard of significance, its touchstone for distinguishing between the real and the accidental. Goethe, in a conversation towards the end of his life, cut the Gordian knot a little brusquely:

When eras are on the decline, all tendencies are subjective; but on the other hand when matters are ripening for a new epoch, all tendencies are objective.

Nobody is obliged to believe either in the future of history or in the future of society. It is possible that our society may be destroyed or may perish of slow decay, and that history may relapse into theology - that is to say, a study not of human achievement, but of the divine purpose - or into literature - that is to say, a telling of stories and legends without purpose or significance. But this will not be history in the sense in which we have known it in the last 200 years.

I have still to deal with the familiar and popular objection to any theory which finds the ultimate criterion of historical judgement in the future. Such a theory, it is said, implies that success is the ultimate criterion of judgement, and that, if not whatever is, whatever will be, is right. For the past 200 years most historians have not only assumed a direction
in which history is moving, but have consciously or unconsciously believed that this
direction was on the whole the right direction, that mankind was moving from the worse to
the better, from the lower to the higher. The historian not only recognised the direction,
but endorsed it. The test of significance which he applied in his approach to the past was
not only a sense of the course on which history was moving, but a sense of his own moral
involvement in that course. The alleged dichotomy between the 'is' and the 'ought',
between fact and value, was resolved. It was an optimistic view, a product of an age of
overwhelming confidence in the future; Whigs and Liberals, Hegelians and Marxists,
thelogians and rationalists, remained firmly, and more or less articulately, committed to
it. For 200 years it could have been described without much exaggeration as the accepted
and implicit answer to the question 'What is history?' The reaction against it has come with
the current mood of apprehension and pessimism, which has left the field clear for the
theologians who seek the meaning of history outside history, and for the sceptics who find
no meaning in history at all. We are assured on all hands, and with the utmost emphasis,
that the dichotomy between 'is' and 'ought' is absolute and cannot: be resolved, that
'values' cannot be derived from 'facts'. This is, I think, a false trail. Let us see how a few
historians, or writers about history, chosen more or less at random, have felt about this
question.

Gibbon justifies the amount of space devoted in his narrative to the victories of Islam on
the ground that 'the disciples of Mohammed still hold the civil and religious sceptre of the
Oriental world'. But, he adds, 'the same labour would be unworthily bestowed on the
swarms of savages who, between the seventh and twelfth centuries, descended from the
plains of Scythia', since 'the majesty of the Byzantine throne repelled and survived these
disorderly attacks'. This seems not unreasonable. History is, by and large, a record of what
people did, not of what they failed to do: to this extent it is inevitably a success story.
Professor Tawney remarks that historians give 'an appearance of inevitableness to an
existing order 'by dragging into prominence the forces which have triumphed and thrusting
into the background those which they have swallowed up'. But is not this in a sense the
essence of the historian's job? The historian must not underestimate the opposition; he
must not represent the victory as a walk-over if it was touch-and- go. Sometimes those
who were defeated have made as great a contribution to the ultimate result as the victors.
These are familiar maxims to every historian. But, by and large, the historian is concerned
with those who, whether victorious or defeated, achieved something. I am not a specialist
in the history of cricket. But its pages are presumably studded with the names of those
who made centuries rather than of those who made ducks and were left out of the side.
Hegel's famous statement that in history 'only those peoples can come under our notice
which form a state', has been justly criticised as attaching an exclusive value to one form of social organisation and paving the way for an obnoxious state-worship. But, in principle, what Hegel is trying to say is correct, and reflects the familiar distinction between prehistory and history; only those peoples which have succeeded in organising their society in some degree cease to be primitive savages and enter into history. Carlyle in his *French Revolution* called Louis XV 'a very World Solecism incarnate'. He evidently liked the phrase, for he embroidered it later in a longer passage:

What new universal vertiginous movement is this: of institutions, social arrangements, individual minds, which once worked co-operative, now rolling and grinding in distracted collision? Inevitable; it is the breaking-up of a World Solecism, worn out at last.

The criterion is once more historical: what fitted one epoch had become a solecism in another, and is condemned on that account. Even Sir Isaiah Berlin, when he descends from the heights of philosophical abstraction and considers concrete historical situations, appears to have come round to this view. In a broadcast delivered some time after the publication of his essay on *Historical Inevitability*, he praised Bismarck, in spite of moral shortcomings, as a 'genius' and 'the greatest example in the last century of a politician of the highest powers of political judgement', and contrasted him favourably in this respect with such men as Joseph II of Austria, Robespierre, Lenin, and Hitler, who failed to realise 'their positive ends'. I find this verdict odd. But what interests me at the moment is the criterion of judgement. Bismarck, says Sir Isaiah, understood the material in which he was working; the others were led away by abstract theories which failed to work. The moral is that 'failure comes from resisting that which works best ... in favour of some systematic method or principle claiming universal validity'. In other words the criterion of judgement in history is not some 'principle claiming universal validity', but 'that which works best'. It is not only - I need hardly say - when analysing the past that we invoke this criterion of 'what works best'. If someone informed you that he thought that, at the present juncture, the union of Great Britain and the United States of America in a single state under a single sovereignty was desirable, you might agree that this was quite a sensible view. If he went on to say that constitutional monarchy was preferable to presidential democracy as a form of government, you might also agree that this was quite sensible. But suppose he then told you that he proposed to devote himself to conducting a campaign for the reunion of the two countries under the British crown; you would probably reply that he would be wasting his time. If you tried to explain why, you would have to tell him that issues of this kind have to be debated on the basis not of some principle of general application, but of what would work in given historical conditions; you might even
commit the cardinal sin of speaking of history with a capital H and tell him that History was against him. The business of the politician is to consider not merely what is morally or theoretically desirable, but also the forces which exist in the world, and how they can be directed or manipulated to probably partial realisations of the ends in view. Our political decisions, taken in the light of our interpretation of history, are rooted in this compromise. But our interpretation of history is rooted in the same compromise. Nothing is more radically false than to set up some supposedly abstract standard of the desirable and condemn the past in the light of it. For the word 'success', which has come to have invidious connotations, let us by all means substitute the neutral 'that which works best'. Since I have joined issue with Sir Isaiah Berlin on several occasions during these lectures, I am glad to be able to close the account with, at any rate, this measure of agreement.

But acceptance of the criterion of 'what works best' does not make its application either easy or self-evident. It is not a criterion which encourages snap verdicts, or which bows down to the view that what is, is right. Pregnant failures are not unknown in history. History recognises what I may call 'delayed achievement': the apparent failures of today may turn out to have made a vital contribution to the achievement of tomorrow - prophets born before their time. Indeed, one of the advantages of this criterion over the criterion of a supposedly fixed and universal principle is that it may require us to postpone our judgement or to qualify it in the light of things that have not yet happened. Proudhon, who talked freely in terms of abstract moral principles, condoned the coup d'etat of Napoleon III after it had succeeded; Marx, who rejected the criterion of abstract moral principles, condemned Proudhon for condoning it. Looking back from a longer historical perspective, we shall probably agree that Proudhon was wrong and Marx right. The achievement of Bismarck provides an excellent starting-point for an examination of this problem of historical judgement; and, while I accept Sir Isaiah's criterion of 'what works best', I am still puzzled by the narrow and short-term limits within which he is apparently content to apply it. Did what Bismarck created really work well? I should have thought that it led to an immense disaster. This does not mean that I am seeking to condemn Bismarck, who created the German Reich, or the mass of Germans who wanted it and helped to create it. But, as a historian, I still have many questions to ask. Did the eventual disaster occur because some hidden flaws existed in the structure of the Reich I or because something in the internal conditions which brought it to birth destined it to become self-assertive and aggressive I or because, when the Reich was created, the European or world scene was already so crowded, and expansive tendencies among the existing Great Powers already so strong, that the emergence of another expansive Great Power was sufficient to cause a major collision and bring down the whole system in ruins I On the last hypothesis, it may
be wrong to hold Bismarck and the German people responsible, or solely responsible, for the disaster: you cannot really blame the last straw. But an objective judgement on Bismarck’s achievement and how it worked awaits an answer from the historian to these questions, and I am not sure that he is yet in a position to answer them all definitively. What I would say is that the historian of the 1920s was nearer to objective judgement than the historian of the 1880s, and that the historian of today is nearer than the historian of the 1920s; the historian of the year 2000 may be nearer still. This illustrates my thesis that objectivity in history does not and cannot rest on some fixed and immovable standard of judgement existing here and now, but only on a standard which is laid up in the future and is evolved as the course of history advances. History acquires meaning and objectivity only when it establishes a coherent relation between past and future.

Let us now take another look at this alleged dichotomy between fact and value. Values cannot be derived from facts. This statement is partly true, but partly false. You have only to examine the system of values prevailing in any period or in any country to realise how much of it is moulded by the facts of the environment. In an earlier lecture I drew attention to the changing historical content of value-words like liberty, equality, or justice. Or take the Christian church as an institution largely concerned with the propagation of moral values. Contrast the values of primitive Christianity with those of the medieval papacy, or the values of the medieval papacy with those of the Protestant churches of the nineteenth century. Or contrast the values promulgated today by, say, the Christian church in Spain, with the values promulgated by the Christian churches in the United States. These differences in values spring from differences of historical fact. Or consider the historical facts which in the last century and a half have caused slavery or racial inequality or the exploitation of child labour - all once accepted as morally neutral or reputable - to be generally regarded as immoral. The proposition that values cannot be derived from facts is, to say the least, one-sided and misleading. Or let us reverse the statement. Facts cannot be derived from values. This is partly true, but may also be misleading, and requires qualification. When we seek to know the facts, the questions which we ask, and therefore the answers which we obtain, are prompted by our system of values. Our picture of the facts of our environment is moulded by our values, i.e. by the categories through which we approach the facts; and this picture is one of the important facts which we have to take into account. Values enter into the facts and are an essential part of them. Our values are an essential part of our equipment as human beings. It is through our values that we have that capacity to adapt ourselves to our environment, and to adapt our environment to ourselves, to acquire that mastery over our environment, which has made history a record of progress. But do not, in dramatising the struggle of man with his environment, set up a
false antithesis and a false separation between facts and values. Progress in history is achieved through the interdependence and interaction of facts and values. The objective historian is the historian who penetrates most deeply into this reciprocal process.

A clue to this problem of facts and values is provided by our ordinary use of the word 'truth' - a word which straddles the world of fact and the world of value, and is made up of elements of both. Nor is this an idiosyncrasy of the English language. The words for truth in the Latin languages, the German Wahrheit, the Russian pravda, all possess this dual character. Every language appears to require this word for a truth which is not merely a statement of fact and not merely a value judgement, but - embraces both elements. It may be a fact that I went to London last week. But you would not ordinarily call it a truth: it is devoid of any value content. On the other hand, when the Founding Fathers of the United States in the Declaration of Independence referred to the self-evident truth that all men are created equal, you may feel that the value content of the statement predominates over the factual content, and may on that account challenge its right to be regarded as a truth. Somewhere between these two poles - the north pole of valueless facts and the south pole of value judgements still struggling to transform themselves into facts - lies the realm of historical truth. The historian, as I said in my first lecture, is balanced between fact and interpretation, between fact and value. He cannot separate them. It may be that, in a static world, you are obliged to pronounce a divorce between fact and value. But history is meaningless in a static world. History in its essence is change, movement, or - if you do not cavil at the old-fashioned word - progress.

I return therefore in conclusion to Acton's description of progress as 'the scientific hypothesis on which history is to be written'. You can, if you please, turn history into theology by making the meaning of the past depend on some extra-historical and super-rational power. You can, if you please, turn it into literature - a collection of stories and legends about the past without meaning or significance. History properly sec-called can be written only by those who find and accept a sense of direction in history itself. The belief that we have come from somewhere is closely linked with the belief that we are going somewhere. A society which has lost belief in its capacity to progress in the future will quickly cease to concern itself with its progress in the past. As I said at the beginning of my first lecture, our view of history reflects our view of society. I now come back to my starting-point by declaring my faith in the future of society and in the future of history.

6. The Widening Horizon
THE conception which I have put forward in these lectures of history as a constantly moving process, with the historian moving within it, seems to commit me to some concluding reflexions on the position of history and of the historian in our time. We live in an epoch when - not for the first time in history - predictions of world catastrophe are in the air, and weigh heavily on all. They can be neither proved nor disproved. But they are at any rate far less certain than the prediction that we shall all die; and, since the certainty of that prediction does not prevent us from laying plans for our own future, so I shall proceed to discuss the present and future of our society on the assumption that this country - or, if not this country, some major part of the world - will survive the hazards that threaten us, and that history will continue.

The middle years of the twentieth century find the world in a process of change probably more profound and more sweeping than any which has overtaken it since the medieval world broke up in ruins and the foundations of the modern world were laid in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The change is no doubt ultimately the product of scientific discoveries and inventions, of their ever more widespread application, and of developments arising directly or indirectly out of them. The most conspicuous aspect of the change is a social revolution comparable with that which, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, inaugurated the rise to power of a new class based on finance and commerce, and later on industry. The new structure of our industry and the new structure of our society present problems too vast for me to embark on here. But the change has two aspects more immediately relevant to my theme - what I may call a change in depth, and a change in geographical extent. I will attempt to touch briefly on both of these.

History begins when men begin to think of the passage of time in terms not of natural processes - the cycle of the seasons, the human life-span - but of a series of specific events in which men are consciously involved and which they can consciously influence. History, says Burckhardt, is 'the break with nature caused by the awakening of consciousness.' History is the long struggle of man, by the exercise of his reason, to understand his environment and to act upon it. But the modern period has broadened the struggle in a revolutionary way. Man now seeks to understand, and to act on, not only his environment but himself; and this has added, so to speak, a new dimension to reason, and a new dimension to history. The present age is the most historically-minded of all ages. Modern man is to an unprecedented degree self-conscious and therefore conscious of history. He peers eagerly back into the twilight out of which he has come, in the hope that its faint beams will illuminate the obscurity into which he is going; and, conversely, his aspirations and anxieties about the path that lies ahead quicken his insight into what lies behind. Past,
The change in the modern world which consisted in the development of man's consciousness of himself may be said to begin with Descartes, who first established man's position as a being who can not only think, but think about his own thinking, who can observe himself in the act of observing, so that man is simultaneously the subject and the object of thought and observation. But the development did not become fully explicit till the latter part of the eighteenth century, when Rousseau opened up new depths of human self-understanding and self-consciousness, and gave man a new outlook on the world of nature and on traditional civilisation. The French revolution, said de Tocqueville, was inspired by 'the belief that what was wanted was to replace the complex of traditional customs governing the social order of the day by simple elementary rules deriving from the exercise of the human reason and from natural law'. 'Never till then,' wrote Acton in one of his manuscript notes, 'had men sought liberty, knowing what they sought.' For Acton, as for Hegel, liberty and reason were never far apart. And with the French revolution was linked the American revolution.

Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth upon this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.

It was, as Lincoln's words suggest, a unique event - the first occasion in history when men deliberately and consciously formed themselves into a nation, and then consciously and deliberately set out to mould other men into it. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries man had already become fully conscious of the world around him and of its laws. They were no longer the mysterious decrees of an inscrutable providence, but laws accessible to reason. But they were laws to which man was subject, and not laws of his own making: In the next stage man was to become fully conscious of his power over his environment and over himself, and of his right to make the laws under which he would live.

The transition from the eighteenth century to the modern world was long and gradual. Its representative philosophers were Hegel and Marx, both of whom occupy an ambivalent position. Hegel is rooted in the idea of laws of providence converted into laws of reason. Hegel's world spirit grasps providence firmly with one hand and reason with the other. He echoes Adam Smith. Individuals 'gratify their own interests; but something more is thereby accomplished, which is latent in their action though not present in their consciousness'. Of the rational purpose of the world spirit he writes that men 'in the very act of realising it, make it the occasion of satisfying their desire, whose import is different
from that purpose'. This is simply the harmony of interests translated into the language of German philosophy. Hegel's equivalent for Smith's 'hidden band' was the famous 'cunning of reason' which sets men to work to future purposes of which they are not conscious. But Hegel was none the less the philosopher of the French revolution, the first philosopher to see the essence of reality in historical change and in the development of man’s consciousness of himself. Development in history meant development towards the concept of freedom. But, after 1815, the inspiration of the French revolution fizzled out in the doldrums of the Restoration. Hegel was politically too timid and, in his later years, too firmly entrenched in the Establishment of his day to introduce any concrete meaning into his metaphysical propositions. Herzen's description of Hegel's doctrines as 'the algebra of revolution' was singularly apt. Hegel provided the notation, but gave it no practical content. It was left for Marx to write the arithmetic into Hegel's algebraic equations.

A disciple both of Adam Smith and of Hegel, Marx started from the conception of a world ordered by rational laws of nature. Like Hegel, but this time in a practical and concrete form, he made the transition to the conception of a world ordered by laws evolving through a rational process in response to man's revolutionary initiative. In Marx's final synthesis history meant three things, which were inseparable one from another and formed a coherent and rational whole: the motion of events in accordance with objective, and primarily economic, laws; the corresponding development of thought through a dialectical process; and corresponding action in the form of the class struggle, which reconciles and unites the theory and practice of revolution. What Marx offers is a synthesis of objective laws and of conscious action to translate them into practice, of what are sometimes (though misleadingly) called determinism and voluntarism. Marx constantly writes of laws to which men have hitherto been subject without being conscious of them: he more than once drew attention to what he called the 'false consciousness' of those enmeshed in a capitalist: economy and capitalist society: 'the conceptions formed about the laws of production in the minds of the agents of production and circulation will differ widely from the real laws'. But one finds in Marx's writings striking examples of calls for conscious revolutionary action. 'Philosophers have only interpreted the world differently', ran the famous thesis on Feuerbach; 'but the point is to change it. "The proletariat', declared the Communist Manifesto, 'will use its political dominance to strip the bourgeoisie step by step of all capital, and concentrate all means of production in the hands of the state.' And in Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx spoke of 'intellectual self-consciousness dissolving by a century-old process all traditional ideas'. It was the proletariat which would dissolve the false consciousness of capitalist society, and introduce the true consciousness of the classless society. But the failure of the revolutions of 1848 was a
serious and dramatic setback to developments which had seemed imminent when Marx began to work. The latter part of the nineteenth century passed in an atmosphere which was still predominantly one of prosperity and security. It was not till the turn of the century that we completed the transition to the contemporary period of history, in which the primary function of reason is no longer to understand objective laws governing the behaviour of man in society, but rather to reshape society, and the individuals who compose it, by conscious action. In Marx, 'class', though not precisely defined, remains on the whole an objective conception to be established by economic analysis. In Lenin, the emphasis shifts from 'class' to 'party', which constitutes the vanguard of the class and infuses into it the necessary element of class-consciousness. In Marx, 'ideology' is a negative term - a product of the false consciousness of the capitalist order of society. In Lenin, 'ideology' becomes neutral or positive - a belief implanted by an elite of class-conscious leaders in a mass of potentially class-conscious workers. The moulding of class-consciousness is no longer an automatic process, but a job to be undertaken.

The other great thinker who has added a fresh dimension to reason in our time is Freud. Freud remains today a somewhat enigmatic figure. He was by training and background a nineteenth-century liberal individualist, and accepted without question the common, but misleading, assumption of a fundamental antithesis between the individual and society. Freud, approaching man as a biological rather than as a social entity, tended to treat the social environment as something historically given rather than as something in constant process of creation and transformation by man himself. He has always been attacked by the Marxists for approaching what are really social problems from the standpoint of the individual, and condemned as a reactionary on that account; and this charge, which was valid only in part against Freud himself, has been much more fully justified by the current neo-Freudian school in the United States, which assumes that maladjustment’s are inherent in the individual, and not in the structure of society, and treats the adaptation of the individual to society as the essential function of psychology. The other popular charge against Freud, that he has extended the role of the irrational in human affairs, is totally false, and rests on a crude confusion between recognition of the irrational element in human behaviour and a cult of the irrational. That a cult of the irrational does exist in the English- speaking world today, mainly in the form of a depreciation of the achievements and potentialities of reason, is unfortunately true; it is part of the current wave of pessimism and ultra-conservatism, of which I will speak later. But this does not stem from Freud, who was an unqualified and rather primitive rationalist. What Freud did was to extend the range of our knowledge and understanding by opening up the unconscious roots of human behaviour to consciousness and to rational enquiry. This was an extension
of the domain of reason, an increase in man's power to understand and control himself and therefore his environment; and it represents a revolutionary and progressive achievement. In this respect, Freud complements, and does not contradict, the work of Mane. Freud belongs to the contemporary world, in the sense that, though he himself did not entirely escape from the conception of a fixed and invariable human nature, he provided tools for a deeper understanding of the roots of human behaviour and thus for its conscious modification through rational processes.

For the historian Freud's special significance is two-fold. In the first place, Freud has driven the last nail into the coffin of the ancient illusion that the motives from which men allege or believe themselves to have acted are in fact adequate to explain their action: this is a negative achievement of some importance, though the positive claim of some enthusiasts to throw light on the behaviour of the great men of history by the methods of psycho-analysis should be taken with a pinch of salt. The procedure of psycho-analysis rests on the cross-examination of the patient who is being investigated: you cannot cross-examine the dead. Secondly, Freud, reinforcing the work of Marx, has encouraged the historian to examine himself and his own position in history, the motives - perhaps hidden motives - which have guided his choice of theme or period and his selection and interpretation of the facts, the national and social background which has determined his angle of vision, the conception of the future which shapes his conception of the past. Since Marx and Freud wrote, the historian has no excuse to think of himself as a detached individual standing outside society and outside history. This is the age of self-consciousness: the historian can and should know what he is doing.

This transition to what I have called the contemporary world - the extension to new spheres of the function and power of reason - is not yet complete: it is part of the revolutionary change through which the twentieth-century world is passing. I should like to examine some of the main symptoms of the transition.

Let me begin with economics. Down to 1914 belief in objective economic laws, which governed the economic behaviour of men and nations, and which they could defy only to their own detriment, was still virtually unchallenged. Trade cycles, price fluctuations, unemployment, were determined by those laws. As late as 1930, when the great depression set in, this was still the dominant view. Thereafter things moved fast. In the 1930s, people began to talk of ‘the end of economic man', meaning the man who consistently pursued his economic interests in accordance with economic laws; and since then nobody, except a few Rip Van Winkles of the nineteenth century, believes in
economic laws in this sense. Today economics has become either a series of theoretical mathematical equations, or a practical study of how some people push others around. The change is mainly a product of the transition from individual to large-scale capitalism. So long as the individual entrepreneur and merchant predominated, nobody seemed in control of the economy or capable of influencing it in any significant way; and the illusion of impersonal laws and processes was preserved. Even the Bank of England, in the days of its greatest power, was thought of not as a skilful operator and manipulator, but as an objective and quasi-automatic registrar of economic trends. But with the transition from a laissez-faire economy to a managed economy (whether a managed capitalist economy or a socialist economy, whether the management is done by large-scale capitalist and, nominally private, concerns or by the state), this illusion is dissolved. It becomes clear that certain people are taking certain decisions for certain ends, and that these decisions set our economic course for us. Everyone knows today that the price of oil or soap does not vary in response to some objective law of supply and demand. Everyone knows, or thinks he knows, that slumps and unemployment are man-made: governments admit, indeed claim, that they know how to cure them. The transition has been made from laissez-faire to planning, from the unconscious to the self-conscious, from belief in objective economic laws to belief that man by his own action can be the master of his economic destiny. Social policy has gone hand in hand with economic policy: indeed economic policy has been incorporated in social policy. Let me quote from the last volume of the first Cambridge Modern History, published in 1910, a highly perceptive comment from a writer who was anything; but a Marxist and had probably never heard of Lenin:

The belief in the possibility of social reform by conscious effort is the dominant current of the European mind; it has superseded the belief in liberty as the one panacea. ... Its currency in the present is as significant and as pregnant as the belief in the rights of man about the time of the French revolution.

Today, fifty years after this passage was written, more than forty years after the Russian revolution, and thirty years after the great depression, this belief has become a commonplace; and the transition from submission to objective economic laws which, though supposedly rational, were beyond man's control to belief in the capacity of man to control his economic destiny by conscious action seems to me to represent an advance in the application of reason to human affairs, an increased capacity in man to understand and master himself and his environment which I should be prepared, if necessary, to call by the old-fashioned name of progress.
I have no space to touch in detail on the similar processes at work in other fields. Even science, as we have seen, is now less concerned to investigate and establish objective laws of nature, than to frame working hypotheses by which man may be enabled to harness nature to his purposes and transform his environment. More significant, man has begun, through the conscious exercise of reason, not only to transform his environment but to transform himself. At the end of the eighteenth century Malthus, in an epoch-making work, attempted to establish objective laws of population, working, like Adam Smith's laws of the market, without anyone being conscious of the process. Today nobody believes in such objective laws; but the control of population has become a matter of rational and conscious social policy. We have seen in our time the lengthening by human effort of the span of human life and the altering of the balance between the generations in our population. We have heard of drugs consciously used to influence human behaviour, and surgical operations designed to alter human character. Both man and society have changed, and have been changed by conscious human effort, before our eyes. But the most significant of these changes have probably been those brought about by the development and use of modern methods of persuasion and indoctrination. Educators at all levels are nowadays more and more consciously concerned to make their contribution to the shaping of society in a particular mould, and to inculcate in the rising generation the attitudes, loyalties, and opinions appropriate to that type of society; educational policy is an integral part of any rationally planned social policy. The primary function of reason, as applied to man in society, is no longer merely to investigate, but to transform; and this heightened consciousness of the power of man to improve the management of his social, economic, and political affairs by the application of rational processes seems to me one of the major aspects of the twentieth-century revolution.

This expansion of reason is merely part of the process which I called in an earlier lecture 'individualisation' - the diversification of individual skills and occupations and opportunities which is the concomitant of an advancing civilisation. Perhaps the most far-reaching social consequence of the industrial revolution has been the progressive increase in the numbers of those who learn to think, to use their reason. In Great Britain our passion for gradualism is such that the movement is sometimes scarcely perceptible. We have rested on the laurels of universal elementary education for the best part of a century, and have still not advanced very far or very quickly towards universal higher education. This did not matter so much when we led the world. It matters more when we are being overtaken by others in a greater hurry than ourselves, and when the pace has everywhere been speeded up by technological change. For the social revolution and the technological revolution and the scientific revolution are part and parcel of the same process. If you
want an academic example of the process of individualisation, consider the immense diversification over the past fifty or sixty years of history, or of science, or of any particular science, and the enormously increased variety of individual specialisation’s which it offers. But I have a far more striking example of the process at a different level. More than thirty years ago a high German military officer visiting the Soviet Union listened to some illuminating remarks from a Soviet officer concerned with the building up of the Red air force:

We Russians have to do with still primitive human material. We are compelled to adapt the dying machine to the type of dyer who is at our disposal. To the extent to which we are successful in developing a new type of men, the technical development of the material will also be perfected. The two factors condition each other. Primitive men cannot be put into complicated machines.'

Today, a bare generation later, we know that Russian machines are no longer primitive, and that millions of Russian men and women who plan, build, and operate these machines are no longer primitive either. As a historian, I am more interested in this latter phenomenon. The rationalisation of production means something far more important - the rationalisation of man. All over the world today primitive men are learning to use complicated machines, and in doing so are learning to think, to use their reason. The revolution, which you may justly call a social revolution, but which I will call in the present context the expansion of reason, is only just beginning. But it is advancing at a staggering pace to keep abreast of the staggering technological advances of the last generation. It seems to me one of the major aspects of our twentieth-century revolution.

Some of our pessimists and sceptics will certainly call me to order if I fail at this point to notice the dangers and the ambiguous aspects of the role assigned to reason in the contemporary world. In an earlier lecture I pointed out that increasing individualisation in the sense described did not imply any weakening of social pressures for conformity and uniformity. This is indeed one of the paradoxes of our complex modern society. Education, which is a necessary and powerful instrument in promoting the expansion of individual capacities and opportunities, and therefore of increasing individualisation, is also a powerful instrument in the hands of interested groups for promoting social uniformity. Pleas frequently heard for more responsible broadcasting and television, or for a more responsible press, are directed in the first instance against certain negative phenomena which it is easy to condemn. But they quickly become pleas to use these powerful instruments of mass persuasion in order to inculcate desirable tastes and
desirable opinions - the standard of desirability being found in the accepted tastes and opinions of the society. Such campaigns, in the hands of those who promote them, are conscious and rational processes designed to shape society, by shaping its individual members, in a desired direction. Other glaring examples of these dangers are provided by the commercial advertiser and the political propagandist. The two roles are, indeed, frequently doubled; openly in the United States, and rather more sheepishly in Great Britain, parties and candidates employ professional advertisers to put themselves across. The two procedures, even when formally distinct, are remarkably similar. Professional advertisers and the heads of the propaganda departments of great political parties are highly intelligent men who bring all the resources of reason to bear on their cask. Reason, however, as in the other instances we have examined, is employed not for mere exploration, but constructively, not statically, but dynamically. Professional advertisers and campaign managers are not primarily concerned with existing facts. They are interested in what the consumer or elector now believes or in events only in so far: as this enters into the end-product, i.e. what the consumer or elector can by skilful handling be induced to believe or want. Moreover, their study of mass psychology has shown them that the most rapid way to secure acceptance of their views is through an appeal to the irrational element in the make-up of the customer and elector, so that the picture which confronts us is one in which an elite of professional industrialists or party leaders, through rational processes more highly developed than ever before, attains its ends by understanding and trading on the irrationalism of the masses. The appeal is not primarily to reason: it proceeds in the main by the method which Oscar Wilde called 'hitting below the intellect'. I have somewhat overdrawn the picture lest I should be accused of underestimating the danger. But it is broadly correct, and could easily be applied to other spheres. In every society, more or less coercive measures are applied by ruling groups to organise and control mass opinion. This method seems worse than some, because it constitutes an abuse of reason.

In reply to this serious and well-founded indictment I have only two arguments. The first is the familiar one that every invention, every innovation, every new technique discovered in the course of history has had its negative as well as its positive sides. The cost has always to be borne by somebody. I do not know how long it was after the invention of printing before critics began to point out that it facilitated the spread of erroneous opinions. Today it is a commonplace to lament the death-roll on the roads caused by the advent of the motor-car; and even some scientists deplore their own discovery of ways and means to release atomic energy because of the catastrophic uses to which it can be, and has been, put. Such objections have not availed in the past, and seem unlikely to avail in
the future, to stay the advance of new discoveries and inventions. What we have learned of
the techniques and potentialities of mass propaganda cannot be simply obliterated. It is no
more possible to return to the small-scale individualist democracy of Lockeian or liberal
theory, partially realised in Great Britain in the middle years of the nineteenth century,
than it is possible to return to the horse and buggy or to early laissez-faire capitalism. But
the true answer is that these evils also carry with them their own corrective. The remedy
lies not in a cult of irrationalism or a renunciation of the extended role of reason in modern
society, but in a growing consciousness from below as well as from above of the role
which reason can play. This is not a utopian dream, at a time when the increasing use of
reason at all levels of society is being forced on us by our technological and scientific
revolution. Like every other great advance in history, this advance has its costs and its
losses, which have to be paid, and its dangers, which have to be faced. Yet, in spite of
sceptics, and cynics, and prophets of disaster, especially among the intellectuals of
countries whose former privileged position has been undermined, I shall not be ashamed
to treat it as a signal example of progress in history. It is perhaps the most striking and
revolutionary phenomenon of our time.

The second aspect of the progressive revolution through which we are passing is the
changed shape of the world. The great period of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, in
which the medieval world finally broke up in ruins and the foundations of the modern
world were laid, was marked by the discovery of new continents and by the passing of the
world centre of gravity hem the shores of the Mediterranean to those of the Atlantic. Even
the lesser upheaval of the French revolution had its geographical sequel in the calling in of
the new world to redress the balance of the old. But the changes wrought by the twentieth-
century revolution are far more sweeping than anything that has happened since the
sixteenth century. After some 400 years the world centre of gravity has definitely shifted
away from western Europe. Western Europe, together with the out-
,lying parts of the
English-speaking world, has become an appenage of the North American continent, or, if
you like, an agglomeration in which the United States serves both as power- house and as
control-tower. Nor is this the only, or perhaps the most significant, change. It is by no
means clear that the world centre of gravity now resides, or will continue for long to
reside, in the English-speaking world with its western European annex. It appears to be the
great land-mass of eastern Europe and Asia, with its extensions into Africa, which today
calls the tune in world affairs. The 'unchanging east' is nowadays a singularly - worn-out cliché.

Let us take a quick look at what has happened to Asia in the present century. The story
begins with the Angle-Japanese alliance of 1902 - the first admission of an Asiatic country to the charmed circle of European Great Powers. It may perhaps be regarded as a coincidence that Japan signalised her promotion by challenging and defeating Russia, and, in so doing, kindled the first spark which ignited the great twentieth-century revolution.

The French revolutions of 1789 and 1848 had found their imitators in Europe. The first Russian revolution of 1905 awakened no echo in Europe, but found its imitators in Asia: in the next few years revolutions occurred in Persia, in Turkey, and in China. The First World War was not precisely a world war, but a European civil war - assuming that such an entity as Europe existed - with world-wide consequences; these included the stimulation of industrial development in many Asian countries, of anti-foreign feeling in China, and of Indian nationalism, and the birth of Arab nationalism. The Russian revolution of 1917 provided a further and decisive impulse. What was significant here was that its leaders looked persistently, but in vain, for imitators in Europe, and finally found them in Asia. It was Europe that had become 'unchanging', Asia that was on the move. I need not continue this familiar story down to the present time. The historian is hardly yet in a position to assess the scope and significance of the Asian and African revolution. But the spread of modern technological and industrial processes, and of the beginnings of education and political consciousness, to millions of the population of Asia and Africa, is changing the face of those continents; and, while I cannot peer into the future, I do not know of any standard of judgement which would allow me to regard this as anything but a progressive development in the perspective of world history. The changed shape of the world resulting from these events has brought with it a relative decline in the weight, certainly of this country, perhaps of the English-speaking countries as a whole, in world affairs. But relative decline is not absolute decline; and what disturbs and alarms me is not the march of progress in Asia and Africa, but the tendency of dominant groups in this country - and perhaps elsewhere - to turn a blind or uncomprehending eye on these developments, to adapt towards them an attitude oscillating between mistrustful disdain and affable condescension, and to sink back into a paralysing nostalgia for the past.

What I have called the expansion of reason in our twentieth-century revolution has particular consequences for the historian; far the expansion of reason means, in essence, the emergence into history of groups and classes, of peoples and continents, that hitherto lay outside it. In my first lecture I suggested that the tendency of medieval historians to view medieval society through the spectacles of religion was due to the exclusive character of their sources. I should like to pursue this explanation a little further. It has, I think, correctly, though no doubt with some exaggeration, been said that the Christian church was 'the one rational institution of the Middle Ages'. Being the one rational
institution, it was the one historical institution; it alone was subject to a rational course of
development which could be comprehended by the historian. Secular society was moulded
and organised by the church, and had no rational life of its own. The mass of people
belonged, like prehistoric peoples, to nature rather than to history. Modern history begins-
when more and more people emerge into social and political consciousness, become aware
of their respective groups as historical entities having a past and a future, and enter fully
into history. It is only within the last two or three centuries, even in a few advanced countries,
that social, political, and historical consciousness has begun to spread to anything like a
majority of the population. It is only today that it has become possible for the first time
even to imagine a whole world consisting of peoples who have in the fullest sense entered
into history and become the concern, no longer of the colonial administrator or of the
anthropologist, but of the historian.

This is a revolution in our conception of history. In the eighteenth century history was still
a history of elite’s. In the nineteenth century British historians began, haltingly and
spasmodically, to advance towards a view of history as the history of the whole national
community. J. R. Green, a rather pedestrian historian, won fame by writing the first
*History of the English People*. In the twentieth century every historian pays lip service to
this view; and, though performance lags behind profession, I shall not dwell on these
shortcomings, since I am much more concerned with our failure as historians to take -
account of the widening horizon of history outside this country and outside western
Europe. Acton in his report of 1896 spoke of universal history as 'that which is distinct
from the combined history of all countries'. He continued:

> It moves in a succession to which the nations are subsidiary. Their story will be told, not
> for their own sake, but in reference and subordination to a higher series, according to the
time and degree in which they contribute to the common fortunes of mankind.'

> It went without saying for Acton that universal history, as he conceived it, was the concern
of any serious historian. What are we at present doing to facilitate the approach to
universal history in this sense ?

I did not intend in these lectures to touch on the study of history in this university: but it
provides me with such striking examples of what I am trying to say that it would be
cowardly of me to avoid grasping the nettle. In the past forty years we have made a
substantial place in our curriculum for the history of the United States. This is an
important advance. But it has carried with it a certain risk of reinforcing the parochialism
of English history, which already weighs like a dead hand on our curriculum, with a more insidious and equally dangerous parochialism of the English-speaking world. The history of the English-speaking world in the last 400 years has beyond question been a great period of history. But to treat it as the centre-piece of universal history, and everything else as peripheral to it, is an unhappy distortion of perspective. It is the duty of a university to correct such popular distortions. The school of modern history in this university seems to me to fall short in the discharge of this duty. It is surely wrong that a candidate should be allowed to sit for an honours degree in history in a major university without an adequate knowledge of any modern language other than English; let us take warning by what happened in Oxford to the ancient and respected discipline of philosophy when its practitioners came to the conclusion that they could get on very nicely with plain everyday English. It is surely wrong that no facilities should be offered to the candidate to study the modern history of any continental European country above the text-book level. A candidate possessing some knowledge of the affairs of Asia, Africa, or Latin America has at present a very limited opportunity of displaying it in a paper called with magnificent nineteenth-century panache 'The Expansion of Europe'. The title unfortunately fits the contents: the candidate is not invited to know anything even of countries with an important and well-documented history like China or Persia, except what happened when the Europeans attempted to take them over. Lectures are, I am told, delivered in this university on the history of Russia and Persia and China - but not by members of the faculty of history. The conviction expressed by the professor of Chinese in his inaugural lecture five years ago that China cannot be regarded as outside the mainstream of human history' has fallen on deaf ears among Cambridge historians. What may well be regarded in the future as the greatest historical work produced in Cambridge during the past decade has been written entirely outside the history department and without any assistance from it: I refer to Dr Needham's *Science and Civilisation* in China. This is a sobering thought. I should not have exposed these domestic sores to the public gaze, but for the fact that I believe them to be typical of most other British universities and of British intellectuals in general in the middle years of the twentieth century. That stale old quip about Victorian insularity 'Storms in the Channel - the Continent Isolated', has an - uncomfortably topical ring today. Once more storms are raging in the world beyond; and, while we in the English-speaking countries huddle together and tell ourselves in plain everyday English that other countries and other continents are isolated - by their extraordinary behaviour from the boons and blessings of our civilisation, it sometimes looks as if we, by our inability a unwillingness to understand, were isolating ourselves from what is really going on in the world.

In the opening sentences of my first lecture I drew attention to the sharp difference of
outlook which separates the middle years of the twentieth century from the last years of
the nineteenth. I should like in conclusion to develop this contrast; and, if in this context I
use the words 'liberal' and 'conservative', it will be readily understood that I am not using
them in their sense as labels for British political parties. When Acton spoke of progress, he
did not think in terms of the popular British concept of 'gradualism'. 'The Revolution, or as
we say Liberalism' is a striking phrase from a letter of 1887. 'The method of modern
progress', he said in a lecture on modern history ten years later, 'was revolution'; and in
another lecture he spoke of 'the advent of general ideas which we call revolution'. This is
explained in one of his unpublished manuscript notes: 'The Whig governed by
compromise: the Liberal begins the reign of ideas.' Acton believed that 'the reign of ideas'
meant liberalism, and that liberalism meant revolution. In Acton's lifetime, liberalism had
not yet spent its force as a dynamic of social change. In an day, what survives of
liberalism has everywhere become a conservative factor in society. It would be
meaningless today to preach a return to Acton. But the historian is concerned first to
establish where Acton stood, secondly to contrast his position with that of contemporary
thinkers, and thirdly to inquire what elements, in his position may be still valid today. The
generation Acton suffered, no doubt, from overweening self-confidence and optimism and
did not sufficiently realise the precarious nature of the structure on which its faith rested.
But it possessed two things both of which we are badly in need of today: a sense of change
as a progressive factor in history, and belief in reason as our guide for the understanding
of its complexities.

Let us now listen to some voices of the 1950s. I quoted in an earlier lecture Sir Lewis
Namier's expression of satisfaction that, while 'practical solutions' were sought for
'concrete problems', 'programmes and ideals are forgotten by both cuties', and his
description of this as a symptom of 'national maturity'. I am not fond of these analogies
between the life-span of individuals and that of nations; and, if such an analogy is
invoked, attempts one to ask what follows when we have passed the stage of 'maturity'.
But what interests me is the sharp contrast drawn between the practical and the concrete,
which are praised, and 'programmes and ideals', which are condemned. This exaltation of
practical action over idealistic theorising is, of course, the hall-mark of conservatism. In
Namier's thought it represents the voice of the eighteenth century, of England at the
accession of George III, protesting against the impending onset of Acton's revolution and
reign of ideas. But the same familiar expression of out-and-out conservatism in the form
of out-and-out empiricism is highly popular in our day. It may be found in the most
popular form in Professor Trevor-Roper's remark that 'when radials scream that victory is
indubitably theirs, sensible conservatives knock them on the nose'. "Professor Oakeshott
offers us a more sophisticated version of this fashionable empiricism: in our political concerns, he tells us, we 'sail a boundless and bottomless sea' where there is 'neither starting-point nor appointed destination', and where our sole aim can be 'to keep afloat on an even keel'. I need not pursue the catalogue of recent writers who have denounced political 'utopianism' and 'messianism'; these have become the current terms of opprobrium for far-reaching radical ideas on the future of society. Nor shall I attempt to discuss recent trends in the United States, where historians and political theorists have had less inhibitions than their colleagues in this country in openly proclaiming their allegiance to conservatism. I will quote only a remark by one of the most distinguished and most moderate of American conservative historians, Professor Samuel Morison of Harvard, who in his presidential address to the American Historical Association in December 1950 thought that the time had come for a reaction against what he called 'the Jefferson-Jackson-F. D. Roosevelt line' and pleaded for a history of the United States 'written from a sanely conservative point of view'.

But it is Professor Popper who, at any rate in Great Britain, has once more expressed this cautious conservative outlook in its dearest and most uncompromising form. Echoing Namier's rejection of 'programmes and ideals', he attacks policies which allegedly aim at 're-modelling the "whole of society" in accordance with a definite plan', commends what he calls 'piecemeal social engineering', and does not apparently shrink from the imputation of 'piecemeal tinkering' and 'muddling through'." On one point, indeed, I should pay tribute to Professor Popper. He remains a stout defender of reason, and will have no art with past or present excursions into irrationalism. But, if we look into his prescription of 'piecemeal social engineering', we shall see how limited is the role which he assigns to reason. Though his definition of 'piecemeal engineering' is not very precise, we are specifically told that criticism of 'ends' is excluded; and the cautious examples which he gives of its legitimate activities - 'constitutional reform' and 'a tendency towards greater equalization of incomes' - show plainly that it is intended to operate within the assumptions of our existing society. The status of reason in Professor Popper's scheme of things is, in fact, rather like that of a British civil servant, qualified to administer the policies of the government in power and even to suggest practical improvements to make them work better, but not to question their fundamental presuppositions or ultimate purposes. This is useful work: I, too, have been a civil servant in my day. But this subordination of reason to the assumptions of the existing order seems to me in the long run wholly unacceptable. This is not how Acton thought of reason when he propounded his equation revolution = liberalism = reign of ideas. Progress in human affairs, whether in science or in history or in society, has come mainly through the bold readiness of human
beings not to confine themselves to seeking piecemeal improvements in the way things are done, but to present fundamental challenges in the name of reason to the current way of doing things and to the avowed or hidden assumptions on which it rests. I look forward to a time when the historians and sociologists and political thinkers of the English-speaking world will regain their courage for that task.

It is, however, not the waning of faith in reason among the intellectuals and the political thinkers of the English-speaking world which perturbs me most, but the loss of the pervading sense of a world in perpetual motion. This seems at first sight paradoxical for rarely has so much superficial talk been heard changes going on around us. But the significant thing is that change is no longer thought of as achievement, as opportunity, as progress, but as an object of fear. When our political and economic pundits prescribe, they have nothing to offer us but the warning to mistrust radical and far-reaching ideas, to shun anything that savours of revolution, and to advance - if advance we must - as slowly and cautiously as we can. At a moment when the world is changing its shape more rapidly and more radically than at any time in the last 400 years, this seems to me a singular blindness, which gives ground for apprehension not that the world-wide movement will be stayed, but that this country - and perhaps other English-speaking countries - may lag behind the general advance, and relapse helplessly and uncomplainingly into some nostalgic backwater. For myself, I remain an optimist; and when Sir Lewis Namier warns me to eschew programmes and ideals, and Professor Oakeshott tells me that we are going nowhere in particular and that all that matters is to see that nobody rocks the boat, and Professor Popper wants to keep that dear old T-model on the road by dint of a little piecemeal engineering, and Professor Trevor-Roper knocks screaming radicals on the nose, and Professor Morison pleads for history written in a sane conservative spirit, I shall look out on a world in tumult and a world in travail, and shall answer in the well worn words of a great scientist: 'And yet - it moves.'